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1. The Problem Stated 
The problem of this dissertation is to examine t h e 
basis or ground of the emotive theory of ethics. Th e emotive 
theory of et hics has in recent times and the present been 
presented and emphasized by the log ical positivistic school 
of thought. The emot ive theory of ethics is that school of 
ethical philosophy which seeks to maintain that an evaluative 
decision is a resolution of a conflict in attitude and that 
ethical proposi tions are neither true nor false. 
The problem of this dissertation is to inquire into 
the validi ty of the arguments used by the emotivists in which 
they seek to show the impossibility of value judgments and 
the unreality of the "ought experience." 
2 . Definition of the Emotive Ethic 
The emotive eth ic is that school of philosophic thought 
which holds that moral value is one of attitude. There are 
many .forms of the emotive ethic found in the history of phi-
losophy. lviost forms of the intuitional ethi c are emotive to-
g ether with the personalism of Bowne and the ethics of Jesus. 
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1 However, recently the emotive theory of ethics has been 
seized by the philosophers of the log ical positivistic 
school of thought and they have reinterpreted the ethics 
of attitude in a new light. These men, inmaking ethics a 
matter of attitude, have eb~~taated, so they believe, both 
intrinsic moral value and value judgments from et rilcs. 
3. The Emotivists and Their Claims 
.The thesis or consensus concerning ethics in the 
thought of the emotivists is that morality is not a matter 
of log ical judgment but rather a matter of emotional dispo-
sition or attitude. It is t h e belief of the s e men that t h e 
tradit i onal mode of treating ethical problems is out-moded 
or inadequate. Traditional moralists have t reated eth ics as 
a matter of judgment. These traditionalists are criti-
cized by the emotivists as delving into the realm of the 
abstract and a priori and drawing conclusions without taking 
into careful consideration the finding s of modern science, 
especially the science of psych ology. Some of the emotivists 
claim that the traditionalists h ave lagg ed behind with the 
medieval Scholastics and are still using the same tactics to 
arrive at moral values. They expect to arrive at value judg -
ments axiomatically. 2 These men feel that ethics must move 
1. That is, in the span of a g eneration. 
2. Cf. Moore, PE, 7. 
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along with science and that if t h ere be any advance in sci-
ence that might shed light upon the problems of ethics, they 
should inquire into it. fhey claim that advan ce in the 
field of ethics has suffered in t h at it he.s l e,gg ed behind 
and failed to avail itself of modern scientific data. 
A second ma j or criti cism which these emotivists have 
had ·to make a g ainst t h ose who approach the problems of 
eth ics from the traditional point of view is t hat t h ey fell 
to analyze c arefully the subject a t hand. The solution of 
the problem lies in analysis, especially from the linguis t ic 
point of view and not as the traditionalists have been doing , 
viz., tak ing refug e in complicating the issue. Th ese emo-
tivi sts therefore seem to be ag reed in that the solution 
lies in (1) careful linguistic analysis or semantics and 
(2) an emotive rather than an objective and evaluative con-
cept of ethics. 
The emotivists claim that ethics is a matter of emo-
tional expression and as such is outside t h e realm of judg -
ment. Et h ics is an emotional e j aculation and noth ing more. 
No value jud6ment may be made about it as you cannot praise 
or blame one for his psycholog ical constitution. 
The emotivists in g eneral say that the ext ent of 
· ethics is simply that when a person says, 11 I react to t h is 
siGuat ion with pleasure," that is the end of the matter and 
nothing further can be said since it is not a matter of 
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j udgment but psycho logical reaction. C.L. ~tevenson goes a 
step further an d says that it is not only a matter of psycho-
log ical reaction or attitude but t hat when one sa ys, "I ap-
prove of ·t his, 11 he means, 11 I approve of this, and want you 
to do so as well.nl 
The treatment of the emotive ethic in this disserta-
tion will undertake tc :~ . amr.e step further than Stevenson and 
maintain the thasis that even g ranting eth ical expression to 
be on t h e level of the emotive , there is not only discrepancy 
in the realm of emot ive a t titudes but also that attitudes are 
obligatory or in the realm of value judgments. 
This dissertation will carry t he matter still furt her 
and cla im t hat when one says, 11 I approve of this," he not 
only means, 11 I approve oi' this, and want you to do so as well, 11 
he really means, 11 I approve of thi s because I ou3ht · to and 
want you to do so as well because you ought tc, 11 or, 11 I tak e 
this a t titude and feel this way about t he matter because I 
ought to and want you to do so as well because you ought to. 11 
Thus t h e conclusion of the matter lies in an attitudinal 
obligatory ethics or an emotive obligatory eth ics. As is, 
or will become evident, t h is view is a repudiation of the 
others. 
1. Stevenson, EL, 25. 
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4. Classification of the Emotivists 
The emotivists i n the present treatment of them have 
been classified under the following heads according to their 
various points of view: 
1. Radical emotivism. 
2. Psycholog ical emotivism. 
3. Moderate emotivism. 
4. Liberal emotivism. 
5. Personalistic emotivism. 
1. Radical emotivism is ethical skepticism, it is the 
point of view that ethics he.s no cognitive meanin,:; Yv'hat so-
ever. There are no value judgments. The most that one can 
say about what persons have been calling ethics is t h at it 
is an evincing or an ejaculation. It is not even a statement 
about one's emotions. I t; is simply the having of an emotion. 
Among this school of thought may be classified Carnap, Ayer, 
Russell and the like. 
2. The second sch ool of emotive ethi cs may be called 
the ps ycholog ical school or ps ychological emotivism. Moritz 
Schlick and Herbert Feig l are to be classified as proponents 
of this school of t hought. Essentially, it is t h e school 
which maintE.ins t hs. t e ·t;hics is psychological description. 
Por tbis school of thought et h ics has a restri cted meaning . 
Et h ics is useful in the influencing of human motivation and 
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conduct. However, the only ethical propositions are sci-
entific ones. 
0. iifloderat e emotivism is the scbool of thou; ht of men 
s u ch as Stevenson. The moderat e emotivists mai ntain that 
ethi cs do es h ave meaning , but that objective values are ab-
sent. They do maintain that ethics has meaning and a very 
important function. In t hi s resp ect they differ from the 
radical emot i vists. The y dii'fer from the psycholog ical 
emoti vists in that they do not restr i ct eth ical propositions 
t o mere description or science. For the moderat e emotivist, 
e thi cs is a subject ive attitude wh ich an individual seek s to 
instill in others. 
4 . Libera l emot ivism is the school of thought which 
not only permits ethical judgments , but allows for ob j ec t ive 
valu es. However , t hese values are emotive in nature. Brit-
ton is classif i ed as a member of this school of ·thought . 
5. Personal is t i c emotivism is the position whi ch main-
t a i ns t hat (a) ethics has co gnitive meaning , (b ) there are 
value judgments, (c) there are objective va lue s, (d) ethical 
values as emotive are of a mat ter of attitude, e. g ., kindness, 
love, g ood will, ( e) there is an obl i gation to deve lop t h ese 
values (attitudes), (f ) moral values do not exist out side of 
persons, (g ) sacredness of human personality. 
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5. Limitations of the Study 
The purpose of this dissertation is not to g ive an 
exhaustive trea tment of a ll t he individual emot i vis s, but 
to trea t the various main types and , in particular, t h e more 
i nf luential men that typify them. I t is not t h e intention 
in this diss e rtat ion to lis t or classify all the log ical emo-
tivists wh o h ave had anything to say a bout ethi cs or even 
the etnics of emotivism for that would carry us far afield. 
In place of that , howeve r, var i ous sch ools of emo t ivistic 
though t within log ical positivism have been treated, and re-
presentatives wh ose e thi cal t hinking most typifies t hat 
sch ool or wh o h ave b een most i nf luent ial in propag a t ing -c his 
t yp e of ethical phi l osoph y ha ve been selected and di scussed 
in full. 
I t was t h e ori _s inal intention to di.scuss all forms of 
sub j ecti vi sm in ethical thought but t h is very quick ly appeared 
t o b e um•1i se for the si.mp le reason that if the emoti ve as pect 
o f positivism wouln consume t he area of a sing le dis sertat ion 
then each form of subjectivism woul d probably consti t ute a 
p roper dissertation in itself. 
~hi s dissertat ion is not primarily concerned with an 
examination of p arti cula r acts which may be deba t ed as moral 
or immoral, but i t i s con cerned with t he proof' and met hods of 
eth ics, viz., moral value theory. It is conce r ned with what 
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ethics is, what constiljutes ethi cs, a nd what the c r iterion 
of ethics is. It deals with such questions as Does ethics 
exist? Are there va l ue jud3ments? Is oblig ation a reality? 
What does oblig ation mean? What is meant b y morality and 
immorality? Although in such a discussion other questions 
pertinent to the ethical discuss i on here are often involved, 
the y do not, however, constitute the basic problem of the 
dissertation. 
6. Importance of the Problem 
The emotive e t hic is at present widely and heatedly 
discussed in philosophical circles. It is a modern school of 
thought that; really beg ins with t h e men treated in the pre-
sent work . A consid erable portion of the 1949 meeting 1 of 
the Eastern Division of the Ame rican Philosophical Association 
was devoted to it. Cont emporary articles in journals and 
currently published text book s on ethics are finding it im-
portant enough to include it in their discussion. Richard 
B. Brandt s a ys: 
I should like to beg in by expressing my belief 
that the considerable advances in ethical theory in 
the past twenty years have been in g reat part a re-
sult, directly or indirectly, of the ideas of the 
p roponents of the emotive theory.2 
1. Held at; Clark University, Worcester, ~'Jass., on December 
28, 1949. 
2. Brandt, Art., {1950), 305. 
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·rne problem is one of importance for the present day 
and will soon be enjoying a popularity in more and more 
textbooks on ethics. Perhaps the reason for this is that it 
seems to be fitting in so well with the times in which we 
live. A Freudian psycholog y, 1 interpreted recklessly, so as 
to encourag e one to relax one's inhibitions, seems to har-
monize well with an ethical theory that teaches that t h ere 
is neither a moral right nor wrong , but all is merely a mat-
ter of emotion. It is high time t h at this theory was care-
fully examined. 
7. A ~tatement of Literature on the Problem 
Most of the literature on this problem comes .from the 
ethical writing s of the logical positivists or those non-lo-
g ical positivists who have something to say about the log ical 
positivistic treatment of value theory, and their chief works. 
The more prominent emotivlstic ethical writers of the posi-
2 
tivistic school are: Carnap, Philosophy and Log ical ... yntax 
( 1935); Ayer, Language, r.rruth and Log ic ( 1946); Ogden and 
Richards, The Meaning of :Meaning ( 1946); Hussell, Religion 
and Science (1935), "Reply to Critics" (1944); Feig l and 
1. The psychology of Freud is not here under criticism, but 
certain "popular" interpretations of it. 
2. For an account and listing of pos i tivistic journals, see 
Bochenski, EPG, 60 ff. A brief history of log ical posi-
tivism may be .found in Laird, RC, 175 .ff. 
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Sellars, Readings in Phi losophi cal Analysis (1949); Steven-
son, Ethics and Lan,:;uage (1944 ); Britton, Communication 
(1939); Schlick, Problems of Ethi cs (1939). Other positi vis-
tic treatments on the emotive ethic are to be found in the 
journal Analysis; Black , Lan,suag e and Philosophy (1949 ); Pap, 
El ements of Analytic Philosophy (1949); Russell, A Hist ory 
of Western Phi losophy (1945); Ledden, 11 0n the Logical Status 
of Value" (1950); Stevenson, "The Emotive Conception of 
Et hics and its Cognitive Implications" (1950). 
The more prominent treatment of critical and evalua-
tive works are: Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valua-
tion (1946) ; Ross, Foundations of Ethics (1939); Ewing , The 
Definition of Good ( 1947); Dewey, "Theory of Valuation it 
( 1939 ) ; Broad, 11 Some of the Main Problems of Et r11 cs" ( 1949) ; 
Joad, A Critique of Logical Positivism (1950); Buchler, 
"Russell and the Principles of Ethics li (1944 ); Hart, Trea t ise 
on Values (1949); Lepley, Verifiability of Value (1944 ). 
Other treatment of the matter is found in Miller, 11 Moral 
Truth" (1950); Brandt, 11The h"notive Theory of Ethics" (1950). 
Other philosophical works considerably depended upon 
are: The Philosophical Review for July, 1950; the ethi cal 
works of Kant; Bowne, 'rhe Principles of Ethics ( 1892) ; Mar-
tineau, Types of Ethical Theory (1891); Ra~hda ll, Theory of 




The emotive theory of ethics has been called by va-
rious names by different philosophers. For purposes of 
clarif ication many of the terms used to identify this ethical 
t heory are here listed: 
The 1~on-Cogni ti ve 11 Theory of Et hics. That is, those 
ethical theories whi ch attempt to take ethics outside the 
realm of judgments or genuine propositions and make of them 
a matt er of ejaculation, command, or poetry have been g iven 
various names by different adherents. This term is used by 
many of t h e log ical positi vi sts to express the emotive con-
cept of ethics. Feig l uses the term to some extent. 1 
Interjec-cional Analysis. This is the term by which 
C. D. Broad identifies this ethical theory. 2 He calls it the 
nmost radically skeptical view11 that makes morality a matter 
of emotions and not a matter of knowledge or even of op inion. 
For the adherents of this view there are no moral judgments; 
there are only "ostensible moral judgments." 
Emot ive Theory of Values, or Emotive Theory of Ethics. 3 
A.J. Ayer prefers to identify this theory by this name. For 
hlm et hical expression is a value judgment, it is not even a 
statement of one's feeling s or emotions. It is merely evinc-
ing one's feelings. 
1. See Feig1, Art. (1947). 
2. Broad, Art. (1949), 548. 
3. See Ayer, IJr L, 20. 
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Rg~dical Subjectivism. 1 This is the term which A.J. 
Ayer first used for the identif i cation of his theory. He 
later abandoned it for "emotive theory of value or e thics. 11 
Pseudo-ques t ions. R. Carnap relegat es ethics to the 
realm of pseudo-questions and regards i t as a myth, i.e., 
poetry, non-theoretical, non-factual. 
Logical Positivism Ethics. Since most of the propo-
nents of this ethical theory are Logical Positivists, it is 
often referred to a s the eth ical theory of the Logical Po-
sitivists. The term, log ical positivism, itself wa s probably 
g iven by fiudolf Carnap. 
Ethi cs of the 11 Vienna Circle. 11 The Log ical Positiv-
ists are often referred to by this name since their ideas 
and members got their start from a seminar led by Professor 
Moritz 3ch~ick in 1923 at Vienna. 2 
Psycholog ical Emo t ivism. Since ethics for these 
thinkers are emotions and emotion is a psycholo gica l matter, 
t hi s is another ·term used to identify this school of thought. 
Th is has been used in referen ce to the eth ical theory of 
l~! ori tz Schlick. 
Value Expres sion as Ejaculatory. This i s the title 
bes t owed upon this school of thought b y John Dewey, in his 
1. Ayer, LTL , 109. 
2. See the nHistorical Notes" that follows the article 11 Lo-
g ical Empiri cism" by Feigl in Runes, (ed.), TCP. 
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article 11'I'heory of -~aluation 11 in the International 1:£ncyclo-
pedi a of Unified Science. 
Persuasive Definition. This term is used particularly 
in reference to the treatment of the matter by C.L. Stevenson. 
A Form of Subjectivism. B. Russell and A.C. Ewing 
identify it as a form of sub jectivism, no t as sub jectivism. 
Ewing treats this eth ical theory as a.n outgrowth of subject-
ivism.l Russ. ~&ll, he.Sipant as to what to call it says it is 
probably a form of subject ivism. 2 
Analytic Value Theory. This is the term by which 
Arthur Pap prefers to call this school of ethical thought.3 
However, the emotive ethic is only one of the many kinds of 
e thics which may fall under the head 11 analytical value the-
cry. tt 
Extreme Ethical Relativism. This term also has been 
used to designate t he emotive e thics, especially the systems 
4 
of Ayer and Carnap. It is not to be confused with Wester-
marck's relativism. 
Ethical Naturalism. Positivistic ethi cs is a forrrl of 
naturalism and is therefore called by some writers ethical 
naturalism. 5 W.D. Ross includes his discuss i on of it in 
1. See Ewing , DG , Chapter I. 
2. Russell, RS. 
3. Pap , EAF, Chapter II. 
4. Pap, EAF , .41. 
5. See Stevenson, EL , 108. 
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the chapter on Naturalism. 
Value-nomin a lism. This is the term that Samuel L. 
Hart uses to i d entify the emotive eth ic of the log i cal posi-
t i vists. He has in mind particularly the value t heory of 
1 Ru dolph Carnap. 
Eth ical Skepticism. Th is term is used b y T . E . Hill 
to describe t h e et hical theory of the log ical positivi sts. 2 
Disag reement in Attitude Thesis. A term used by 
Rich ard B. Brandt at an American Philosophical Association 
symposium on the emotive t h eory of ethics. Brandt divides 
the emotive theory of eth ics into five classifications and 
uses oth er terms as 11 the expression thesis, 11 11 the emotional 
influence t h esis," and 11 the blind emotive meaning theory11 to 
desig nat e t h is type of "Chinking in et h ics. 3 
1. Hart, TOV, 60ff. 
2. Hill, GET, 9ff. 
3. Brandt, Art. (1950), 305. 
PAR'r TWO 
'rYPES OF THE EMOT I VE E.T rliC I N LOGICAL POSIT IVISM 
CHAP:P .ER I I 
RADICAL EMOTIVISM 
1. Rudolf Carnap 
Statement of Carnap'a Ethical Position. With the 
possible exception of Wit~genstein, Rudolf Carn~p is pro-
bably the man most responsible for the g ermination of the 
non-cognitive school of t h ought in the field of ethics. 1 
Carnap calls his philosophical method "Log ical Positivism." 
Wittg enstein supplied the principles of log ical syntax which 
Carnap used to reduce ethics as a branch of metaphysics to 
the realm of non-knowledg e, since it is not a matter that 
can be directly or indi rectly verified b y sense and is there-
fore "non-sense" (unsinnig). 2 
Carnap, as founder of t h e school of l~g ical p ositivis~ 
rejects the subject matter of metaphysics as meaning less and 
desi gnates it to the province of pseudo-questions. Ethics, 
i.e., normative e thics is a branch of metaphysics. 3ince 
metaphysical realities do not exist for Carnap t h en ethics 
also is non-existent. 
Carnap rejects metaphysical realit ies because as he 
1. Se e Patrick, I TP , 360. , 
2. The log ical positivists following Wittg enstein use 
term "senseless" in referring to the metaphysical. 




says t h e y are unverifiable. Scient i sts state facts; philo-
sophers state t h eor i es about f acts. Since eth ics and me t a -
physics are non-f actual t h e y are neith er in t h e province of 
l 
scien ce nor phi losophy , t h a t i s , for Carnap. All proposi-
tions scientif i c or othe rwi se whi ch c&nno t be verified ul-
tima bely by sense are t h erefore me a n i ng le s s (pseudo-ques ti ons ) . 
Zven t h e phys i cist's conc ept of a "levitat ional f ield ", i.e., 
t h e raising of heavy bod ies i n to the air wit hout support, 
e. ;._s ., as i n dreams, is re j ected as 11 non-sense 11 s ince t h ere 
is no sense percep tion of it eith er d irectly or indirectly . 
Carnap writes ; 
Suppose, e. g ., he asserts t ha t t h ere is not 
only a g ravit a t i onal field ha v ing an e f fect on bo-
d ies accord i ng t o t h e known laws of gravitat i on , 
bu t also a levitat ion al field, and on being ask ed 
wh a t so rt of effect t his levi tation al f ield has, 
a ccord ing to h is t h eory, he answers that t h ere is 
no observable ef f ect; i n oth er words, he co n f e sses 
h is inab ili ty t o g ive r ules accordin g t o which we 
c ould deduce perceptive p ropositions from his asser-
tion. In t h a t case our reply is: Yo u r ass ert i on 
i s no assert ion a t all; it d oes no t speak about any-
t h ing ; it is nothing but a series of empt y words; 
i t is simply without sense.2 
On t h e othe r h and the phys i cist's concept of the 
e l ectro -magnetic f i eld is cognitive and is a genuine asser-
tion and does mak e good sense because "perceptive proposi-
t ions are deducibl e fro m them." 3 'rhe ob j ection to the 
1. That is, n o r-ma t ive e -ch ics, not scientific ethics, e. g ., 
t h e p sych olog y of e t hical beh avior. 
2. Carnap , PLS , 14. 
0. Carnap , PLS, 15. 
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levitat i onal field is that there is no way of verifying it. 
Carnap is a t a loss here to explain past electro-magnetic 
fields o r eclipses. 
What has been said of the levitational field may also 
be said of metaphysics ( and normative et.bics, since Carnap 
cls.ssifies normative et h ics under me taphysi cs). .i.vietaphysics 
has unverifiable sub j ect matter since it deals with t hat 
whi ch trans cends all exp erience; it deals with essences, 
absolutes, numbers, qualities, relations, the g iven, other 
minds , universals, ru1.d thing s-in - themselves . Metaphysical 
doc t rines of necessity must be unverifiable be caus e if they 
were veri f iable they would depend upon experience and there-
fore be in the province of the empiri cal sciences. Even 
if they depended u pon experience it would not necessarily 
preclud e their reality. Metaph ysics is coherently r e levant 
to experience even though it may not be nominalistics.lly 
verifia ble . Since metaphysicians attempt to di scuss knowl-
edg e which is i ndependent of exp erience ·che y automati cally 
cut off all conne ction between proposit ions and expe rience, 
i.e., theory and fact, and as a result the propositions lack 
sense a nd are therefore non-sense or unverifiable. 
For Carnpp all non -sensory or "metaphysical" reality 
is unverifiab le; t h e i deal reali ty of the I dealis t s tog ether 
with 11 real 11 reality of the Realists. Since met aphysi cal c on-
cepts and normati ve or absolute concepts of ethics are con-
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cepts of .reality they too are unverifia.ble. Questions about 
reality are pseudo-questions; they cannot be said to be either 
true or false; they simply have no sense. 
At this point Ca rnap treats of the philosophy of 
values in more detail. He differentiates it from t h e sci-
ences. Ethics as an empirical study is a matter of descrip-
tion ~~d as such a scientific study design at ed to the sci-
ence of psycholog y or sociolog y. Assertions or propositions 
of this kind are true or false. They are true if the descrip-
tions are accurate and false if t h ey are not. If one makes 
an accurate statement about another's feeling s, behavior or 
emotions, it may be said to be true if it is a correct one. 
But Carnap does not tell h ow one may verify its accuracy. 
On t h e other hand ~here is the study of values as 
normat ive , absolute or objective. r.rhis, Carnap would say, 
is not an investig ation of facts; it is merely "a p retended 
investigation of what is good and wh at is evil, what it is 
right to do and what it is wron g t o do. 11 1 'l'hese philosophical 
or norma t ive judgments of moral values are met a physica.l enti-
ties and as s u ch are ne i ther true nor false but unverifiable 
and pseudo-questions. Commands are imperatives and as such 
are not propositions about reality, hence they cannot be 
said to be cognitive, i.e., true or false. One can translate 
the imperative uno not killt 11 into the value judgment 11 Killing 
1. Carnap, PLS, 23. 
20 
is evi l ." However, t he r e is no d ifference in the two state-
ment s. A value judgment a }.)pears as a statement but it is 
only a command in g ramrna ti cal disguise. 
Th e value statement, uKilling is evil," although, 
lik e t he rule, it is merely an expression of a cer-
tain wish , has the gram:u1atical f'orm of an assertive 
proposi t ion ••• actually a value statement is nothing 
else than a command in a misleading g ramrr!B.tical f'orm. 
It may have effects upon the actions of men, and 
t h ese ef fects may eit her be in accordance with our 
wishes or not; but it is neither tr·ue nor false. It 
does not asseri anyth ing and can neither b e p roved 
nor di sproved . 
Carnap says that the reason for this is that no pro-
positions s.bcut future experiences can be deduced from t h e 
statement 1Killing is evil." Pre positions such as ~his and 
all value judgments are devoid of theoretical meanin g and 
as a result are unverifiable. 
It ma y , however, be ars ued tha~ HKilling is evilt1 on 
t h e g rounds t h at i f anyone k ills another it will result in 
feel l ng s of remorse. However, Carnap counteracts this with 
trJ.e argument that as such it still is not a value judgment 
but a psychological description of facts. Carnap overlooks 
t h e fact that for many ethic i sts this is not always true 
anyway. I t is t herefore a matter for the psychologist and 
not t h e philosopher. The emotional react i ons of a person 
to his behavior is a matter of psychological investigation. 
Carnap 'Nould not object to a science of psychological ethi cs. 
1. Carnap, PLS, 24. 
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On the oth er hand the philosopher who is concerned with 
norms and value judgments is in difficulty. 1 The proposi-
tions of normative eth ics, whet h er they have the form of 
rules or the form of value statements, have no t h eoretical 
sense, are not scientific proposit i ons (tak ing t h e word 
scientif i c to mean any propositions). 
As a final word of encourage~ent Carnap says that 
we should not g ive up the study of ethics for it is of much 
importance. However, its importance consists of a scienti-
fie inves t i g ation of value statements tog ether wit h acts of 
valuation.2 Ethics is open to empirical investig ation. 
Hi storians, psycholog ists, and sociolog ists may a."lalyze and 
offer causal explanations of the facts of ethical experience; 
as such value statements are scientifically meanin~ful pro-
positions in the realm of sense. Carnap would accept an 
et h ics of utility; where in t h e practical affairs of l i fe 
one may apply the me thod of induction and probabi lity as is 
found done in economic matters. 3 
The error which resulted in all this confusion of 
ethics and metaphysics, Carnap would probably say is due to 
lang uag e. Languag e has two functions and it is confusion 
of languag e that mak es for so much difficulty. 1'he dual 
l. Carnap, ~LS, 25. 
8. Carnap, PLS, 25. 
~. Garnap, LFP, 266-267. 
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function of language is (1) expressive (2) repre sentat i ve 
or cognitive. The expressive func tion of lane;ua~.:; e i s t o 
express one 's fe elin;:; s, moods, disposition s and the lik e. 
1'he repre sentaiJive func tion o f l angua.; e is to make state-
ment s of f ac t , that are assertion s, predications , o r judg -
ments. they are scientific statements. 1 
writ es: 
Con cerning the expressive funct i on of words Carnap 
If , for instance, somebody is laughing , we may 
take this as a sympt om of his merry mood: if on the 
other he.nd he tells us without laughing : ''Now I am 
merry, 11 we can learn from hi s words the same thing 
whi ch we inferred in the first case from laughing ••• 
Howe ver, there is a diff erence between making the 
statement conc ern ing one's merry state and simply expressing 
laughter. The forme r is an ass er tion, a statement of fact 
whicn may be either true or false whereas the latter is 
simp ly an expression and as such i s neither true nor false 
for it asserts nothing , i t merely eVinces in s pit e of the 
fact that it may be genuine or de c eptive. ·arnap is r i .:;ht 
in saying t hat t here is a difference in makin~ a s t a tement 
concerning one's merry s tate and the expression of' lau:.::,ht e r . 
Howe ver, thi s is no t a comp le te ana l ysi s of the matt er for 
t here are those persons who express laughter and assume a 
merry stat e out of a sense of oblig at ion. Sometimes a person 
1. Carnap , Art. {1937), 109 . 
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feels obligated to assume a merry attitude even on sad occa-
sions. A comedian sometimes has to appear happ y wh en cir-
cumstances are not favorable. The expression t Laugh , clown, 
laugh, even though your heart is breaking , 11 suggests that he 
is d oing so out of a sense of oblig ation. Often a father at 
the bedside of a critically ill child tries to be cheerful 
and expresses laughter in an attempt to bring cheer to his 
child . Re does so out of a sense of oblig ation even thoug h 
he feels like expressing remorse. Poetical u tterances and 
sigh~ Lor Carnap, are of the expressive type~ The expressive 
function of l an gua g e neither asserts nor theorizes ; it is 
devoid of knowledg e. Carnap attempts to claim t h at all met a-
physical entities includin3 normative ethics are in this 
cate6 ory and as such ethical statements are 
neither true nor false, because they assert nothing , 
they con t ain neither knowledg e nor error, they lie 
coinp le tely outside the field of kno wledg e, of the-
ory, outside the discussion of truth or falsehood. 
But they are, like laughing , lyrics and music, ef-
pressive ••• emotional or volitional disposit i ons. 
2. Critique of Carnap's Posi t ion 
(a) The Meaning of Value Predicates 
It is a startling and yet a significant point that 
Carnap,lik e several of the oth er emotivists,has not g iven a 
1. Carnap, PLS, 29. 
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proper analysis of other e thicists. That is, should one 
ex a nine t he book s of these emotivists, and this is pe.rticu-
larly true of Carnap, he will find scarcely: any foo t notes 
ref erring to t h e class i cal philosophers. In Carnap 's ma i n 
treati sel on eth ics there is no t a sing le footno t e. Does 
t h is mean t hat Carnap and several of the other emo t i vista 
are unfami liar with the classic works of t h e g reat ethicists 
of h istory; or does it mean t hat Car-nap and the other emo-
ti.vist s do not consider these classic works as having any 
value? If these men are no t acquainted with the ethical 
work s of these outstanding philsophers, as the lack of re-
terence to them seems to indicate, then t hey are not in a 
posi t ion to pass judgment upon the philosophical conclusions 
of t h e classical e ~hicists. I f one does not know t he g rounds 
of another's reasoning , then how can one refute it? 
The sincere searcher after truth can never bear to 
refuse considerat i on to any datum. The new observa-
tion ma y be hard on complacency, but it may also 
bring truth undreamed of before.2 
However, if Carnap and t h e other emotivists are familiar 
wi th the ethical philosophy of the classics, then t he y are 
obligated to take them into consideration and include t h em 
in t heir discussion . 
Carnap, curiously enough, does not put himself in 
1. Carnap, PLS. 
2. DeWolf, RRAR , 197. 
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quite the same position as do the other emotivists. I''or 
examp le, he does not overtly deny the reality of moral ex-
perience. In p l a ce of denying t h e reality of moral experi-
ence, he says that norms and obligat ions are unverifiable 
by sense. This is open to a dual interpretation: (l) Does 
he mean that since they are unverifiable therefore they do 
not exist or, ( 2 ) does he mean that since they are unveri-
fiable, judgment must be suspend e d ? Ernst Mach1 is another 
positivi st who left hims elf open to dual interpreation. 
~viach cla.imed that metaphysical reali t ies were no t o p en to 
sense verif i cation and therefore were not to be included 
within the province of science. Frank2 says that since •••ach 
lef t himself open to this double i n t erpretation an odd result 
occurred . Hi s teaching s were accepted by two extreme g roup s, 
(a) Roman Catholics and (b) Russian Commun i sts. The Russians 
accepted f.iach and interpreted him to mean t h at all metaphy-
sics is false. The Roman Catholics accept ed h im and inter-
preted him to mean that the metaphysical is real and it is 
no t t h e bus i ness of science to medd le into such matG ers for 
it lies within the provinc e of t h e Church only. 
Carnap says that he does not deny the me taphysical 
aspects of phi losophy such as is found in the philosophy of 
realists an d idealists. He says that he disreg ards or 
1. Mach, SM. 
2. Philip Prank in a course at Harve.rd University. Physics 
s 1 3 , 1948. 
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ignores the who le matt.er. 
Sometimes the views of the Vienna Circle have 
been mistak en f or a denial of the Aeality of the 
physical world, b ut we make no such denial. It is 
tru e that we reject t he t h esis of the Realit y o f 
t h e physi cal world; but we do not reject i t as false, 
but as having no sense, and its Idealistic anti-
thesis is subject to exactly the same rejection. Ve 
neither ass e r t nor deny t h ese theses, we reject the 
wh ole question.l 
Exactly what is meant b y the foregoing statement is unclear. 
Do e s Carnap mean that the nRealist 11 and 11 Idealist 1' the ses 
could possibly be true but it stands in need of verification 
or does h e mean that the the ses are unverifiable and t h ere 
is not a possible chan ce in the future of their being veri-
fied? 
At any rate, we may sa y t h at moral experience is not 
precluded from discussion. It merely stands in nee d of 
verification. Carnap attempts to claim that t h e f a cts of 
moral experience, i.e., the experience of ought , etc., are 
unverifiable. 'rhis may be object ed ·to on two counts: ( 1) 
By v erification , Carnap means ve rif i cation by sense, t h i s is 
untenable for this very principle, viz., "verifi c ation by 
sense 11 cannot be v e rified b y sense ; 2 ( 2 ) Moral experience is 
3 
op e n to verification . 
1. Carnap, PLS , 20-21. 
2. This poin ·~ is ela borated in t h e chapt er ttThe Case Ag ainst 
Emotivism . 11 
3. S e e the section on nThe Problem of Obli3at ion • 11 
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Carnap is well aware of the first objection for he 
writes, nrf every proposition which does not belen; either 
to mathema~ics or to the empi rical investig a t ion of facts , 
is meaning less, how does it fare then with your own proposi-
tions ? You posi t ivists and anti-met aphysicians yourselves 
cut off the branch on which you sit. 111 Carnap although aware 
of the objection is unsuccessfu l in contending with it. 
Carnap makes the s t B.t ement, 11The reality of anyth ing 
is nothing else than the possibility of its being placed in 
a certain system." 2 Carnap probably has in mind some con-
cep t of coherence. I f he seriously me ans what t h e foreg oing 
statement says then moral experience is as verifiable as any 
other experienc e . This is s h own to be true in a s ubsequent 
'Z 
chapt er. 0 
However, it would be interesting to see just how Car-
nap seeks to di spose of the facts of moral experience. For 
Carnap , the "ought" experience is not a genuine one. Whs.t 
others call an experience of oblig ation, Carnap interprets 
as a command . 11 Ki lling is evil'1 is not a moral statement; it 
is an expression of a wish, says Ca:c-nap . 11 Do not kill ," is 
a command. 4 Carnap does not recognize t he se statements as a 
1. Carnap, Art. (1934 ), 7. 
2. Carn ap, PLS, 20. 
0 . See the section on "·. ;The Problem of Obligation. n 
4 . Carnap, LTL, 24. 
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universalizing of the experience of obligation. He thinks 
t h at we have been the dupes of language. However, it seems 
that Carnap has been the victim of languag e for as is later 
s h own i n this dissertation statements e.s 11 Do not kill 11 can-
net be reduced to mere commends •1 Ca rnap 1 s line of reasoning 
is somewh at plausible when he confines himself ·to the second 
person and to the present. However, when addressed ~o the 
third p erson or used in the past tense the uniqueness of 
obli ; ation becomes apparent. For example, how is it pos-
sible for Carnap to reduce the f ollowing statements of obli-
g ations to mere conil lands. nHe oughtrot!JDkill. 11 This cannot 
be a co rmne.nd as the third person need not be present and is 
not commanded. Or, a g ain, " He ow~;ht not to have killed that 
man." How may the preceding s t atement be interpreted in 
terms of a command? How can one command that which has al-
ready ts.ken place?2 It does not appear, therefore, that 
Carnap is successful in reducing oblig ations to commands. 
Anot;her interesting point about Carnap and other posi-
tivists is that the positivists seek to ally themselves with 
the pragmatic or instrumental school ·of philosophy. 3 The two 
do not have very much in common, moreover, the instrmnental-
ists make strong attack s a g ainst posi t ivism. These attacks 
1. Section on 11 The Problem of Obli gation." 
2. Ross, FE, 33. 
3. See Frank, Art. (194 5 ), 3. 
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are also carried into the realm of va lue theory, and it may 
be add ed, t h at such attacks are jus tifi e d . For example, 
emo t ivis ts a.s Car·nap sa y t h&t v&lue jud'Sments are unverifi-
able s i nce f rom such propositions as 11 Lying is evil," "we 
can not, 11 says Carnap, 11deduce any proposition about future 
experiences. Thus this statement is not verifiable and h as 
no theoretical sense, and the same t hin g is true of all other 
value statements." 1 I nstrument alists, t;og ether with oth er 
philosophical schools object to the foreg oing statement and 
condemn it as false. 2 Geig er, s p eak ing for Dewey and the 
instrumental school of philosophy says t hat t h e exper ience of 
obl i gation is a g enuine one and that normat ive statements 
are value j u dgments that can be verified and from which 11 pre-
dictab1lities g row. 11 3 Dewey, ob j ecting to the posit:i.vist's 
t h eory of value, says, "Valuations exist in fact and are 
capable of empirical observation so that proposi t ions about 
them are empirica.lly verifiable. 11 4 Ge i g er proves by the 
ack nowled,; ed s t andards of verif l ca t ion of the inst r·ument -
a li s t s a nd. posit:i.vists that normative sta t ements and scien-
t ifi c s tatement s are veri :t' ied b y the same process o f verifi-
c a ti on. Even though k eeping in mind, one is an " ought" 
l. Carnap, LrL, 25. 
2. Gei ger's views are p resBnted h ere. Lepley and Dewey's 
v i ews are p resented in the ch apter entitled, '~he Case 
Against Emo t ivism. 11 
3 . Geig er, ? SO, 178 f'f. 
4. Dewe y , Ar~. (1939), 58. 
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(normative) and the other an 11 is 11 (scientific). Both are 
treated as hypotheses c apable of pr oof . 11 1 1Vfen ou3ht to be 
healthy' do es have both meaning and verif i ab ility becaus e 
certain consequences are i mp lied by it , and they are subjec t 
to testing . 11 1 The value j u dgment , 11 Men ought to be heal thy" 
has two aspects to it: ( l) the fa ctual aspect concerning 
h e alth whi ch medics are able t o define, (2) the normative 
or 11 ought i l aspect . Geig er insists tnat the ought experience 
i s not reducible Go mere exclamation , wish , feeling , et c., as 
the ernot l vists of Carnap ' s type a ·ttempt to cls.im . Carnap 
is wrong in s aying , "Values are interje ctional an d hort ato ry; 
they have no objective referent. 112 For t he instrumen t alists 
the il ou ght ' indi ca t e s a cond i tion tha t leads to determinable 
c onsequences . 
11vlen ought to be heal -chy' means t herefore: i f men 
a chi eve the condit i on of health , then they will be 
able to perfo r m certain a c t ivities with ef{icien cy, 
assurance , zest, energ y , and che erfulness.~ 
Howev er, t he ought must not be in t erpreted in descriptive 
terms for ii oughtH or value is 11 man 's long -time preferen ces, 
preferences in the general a rea encompassing his b as ic atti-
tudes of life , his deep-rooted tastes and int erests, his o b -
4 jects of' respe c t a nd reverence. " Geig er 's exp l anation of 
1 . Gei ger, PSO , 178 . 
2 . Geig er , PSO , 179 . 
3 . Geig er, PSO , 179 . 
4. Gei2;er , PSO, 180 . 
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t h e experience of obligation is far more acceptable and 
adequate than Carnap's, but what Geig er h as failed to do is 
to show why '1 oughts 11 are deep-rooted and lon,g - time prefer-
ences and it ma y be added the . reason ~ i s t hat the y c onstitu~e 
an order of experience other than the world of f act. They 
belong to the world of the preferred (value) , whereas facts 
belon g to the d escriptive world of existence. 
(b) The Problem of the Ri ght and the Good 
in the Light of Carnap 1 s 
Positivistic Principles 
The positivists have made strong attacks a gainst the 
traditional ethlcists only to find that the instrument which 
they were using to attack and des tro y these other philosophies 
only served to destroy their own position. Implicitly, wr~t 
the emotivists are saying is tantamount to the following : 
No philosophy may be said to be ri ght or wrong . :::>ince po-
sitivism or emotivism is a philosophy therefore one dannot 
say positivism is correct or ri ght . The basic prepositions 
or principles of positivism are not suo ject to sense experi -
ence and t herefore cannot be said to be propositions at all. 
This, therefor e , leaves positivism in a self-contradictory 
position . Even Witt g enstein, admits that positivism is in 
this peculiar predicament . He writes: 
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My propositions are elucidatory in t h is way: h e 
who un derstand s me finally recognizes them as sens e -
less, when h e has climbed out through them , on them , 
ove r t h em. . He must, so t o speak , throw away the l~; dder after he has clinil3ed upon it • 1 · 
Carnap , however, refuses to admi t the val j.d ity of Wittg en-
s t ein1s reasoning 2 for the reason t ha t t h e positivist's 
method yields results whi ch are open to sense observetion . 
Ne verthe less, e ven if the point were gr a n t ed, that the posi-
tivists 1 method produces result s wh ich are ver i fia b le by 
sen se, t hat would still not chan ge t he fact t h at the basic 
princip les or postulates of positivism are metaphysical in 
nature . 
Knu d son says: 
As a matter of fact, current p osit i v i sm is by 
no means metaphysically neutral. It is a p olemic 
a gainst a reasoned met aphysics and a tacit apology 
for the crude naturalistic metaphysics that s p ring s 
up spont aneously on t h e sense plane. ~he t ru th is 
tha t t h e h uman mind i s so constructed tha t it can-
not dispense with a metaphysics of some k i n d . 3 
Moreover, the posit ivists are in another unhapp y pre -
dicament . They d eny that pr incip l e s or other metaphysical 
realities are ri ght or wrong and ye t they a ssume their own 
funda~nental principles r; o be rig h t. If , ho weve r, Carnap 
objects to the fo r e go i n g reason i n g on the g rounds that he 
( Carne.p ) does n ot say t hat t he principles of lo g ice.l posi-
1. Witt gens t ein, T LP, 189 . 
2 . lf<'erkme ister, HPIA, 569. 
0 . Kwudson, POP , 177. 
tivism are right (since he seeks to avoid the value term 
ri ght) at least he a ssumes that positivism is a better or 
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t h e best system offe red as yet. Th is, too, is an eva luation; 
t h e termsbetter and best connote value. 
i'lloreover, if Carnap thou3ht that his book had tt-no 11 val-
ue, why did he wrlte it in tlle first place? Wittg enstein 
def i nitely believes t hat his book has value, for he say s, 
tt I f this worl{ h as a value it consists in two thing s. First 
that i n i t t h oughts are expressed , and t h is value wil l be the 
g reater the be ·t;ter the thoughts are expressed. 111 Wittg en-
stein makes tbe po s itivist · c posit i on more untenable by say-
ing that his "senseless il 2 propositions are true. Whereas 
for pos i tivism senseless proposit i ons cann ot be said t o be 
true. 1tYit tgenstein writes, 'On -c;he other hand the truth of 
the thoughts communicated here seems to me unassaila.ble and 
definitive. 113 The positivists have been victimized by their 
own philosophy. They so restric~ ed t h e meanin g of signi-
ficance that i n t h e end t h ey .had to a dmit that their philo so-
phy had . 4 no meanlng . 
r hus we see that Carn ap is in the unenviable p osition 
of' condemning his own ph ilosophy by his philosoph ical prin-
1. Wittg enstein, TLP, 29. 
2. See Black, LP, 151, footnote number 54. 
3 . Wittg enstein, T LP, 29. 
4. See Hawton, PP , 182. 
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cip les wh i ch cannot stand up under t;lle verifics.tion of sense 
experience. He is sub j ect -wo the cond emnation t h a t ~ J ~L ttg en-
stein passed on h is ovm system of philosophy. "'Whereof one 
cannot s p eak, thereof one must be silent ."l Laird , also 
claims t; t'.cat t h e positivi sts are victims of their own ph ilo-
s c phi cal first prin ciples wh ich "refused to be pitchf'orked 
out of existence. 11 Ls.ird says t hat log ical posi"Givists are 
not only aware of these difficulties but t h ey acknowled~ e 
t11.eir val i dity. "Lo g ic, even i f it is P- logic, (i.e., phy-
sical lang uag e) has to infer stat ements from statements; : and 
sense experience is not a statement at all. 11 2 
Many log ical positivists of the present day refuse to 
accept V'littg enstein 1 s indictment. Although, ~ ' itt g enstein 
think s that the pri nciples or p ropositions of log ical posi-
t i vism are senseless, he thinks it is n evertheless, important. 
App aren tly , he does not realize t hat this is whs.t many of the 
g reat traditional philosophers conceive as value, i mportant 
non sense or value independent of sense. In fact, "importance'' 
is the term tha t Whitehead3 ~ ives to value. Flewelling g ives 
a similar term to value, viz., "'thing s t h at matter most • 11 4 
Black thinks that the log ical positivist s are no t i n 
a self-contradictory position and adds the startling remark, 
1. Wittg enstein, TLP, 189. 
2. Laird, RP, 186. Brackets mine. 
3. Whiteh ead, PR. 
4. Flewa llin~~ , TIVIM . 
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11 The statement on which the charg es of self-contradition is 
based itself contains a contradiction.« 1 Black says that 
since a senseless proposition is not one at all, 
and it is log ica lly i mpossj.ble that ·whatever we "un-
derstand t should, whet.her 11 finally 11 or at ax1y other 
time, be revealed as senseless. Either there was 
nothing to understand and we were uttering nonsensi-
cal collocations of sounds, 2or we did understand and something was communicated. 
In writing the fore going Black is of the opinion that 
h e has rescued log ical positivism from its basic log ical dif-
f i culty. This is not the case, however, and t h e dilemma 
wh ich he directs towards the critics of log ical posit ivism is 
not valid and we may refute it in the following manner: If 
there was nothing understandable in the principles of log ical 
pos i tivism then positivists are uttering nonsens i cal collo-
cations of sounds, and if someth ing is understandable in the 
propositions of logical positivism then somet h ing was cori1mu-
nlcated. If, therefore, the princi p les of logical positivism 
are understandable and communicable t h en the principles of: .. : 
3 
other philosophies are also. 
The positivists are in another contradictory situation. 
They d eny that t h e value term 11 g oodH can be predicat ed of 
any object. Accord ing to t h e log ical positivists the ter·m 
g ood is 11 sens e lessn and therefore without meanin.g . However, 
~. Black, LP, 150. 
2. Black, LP, 150. 
3. See Collingwood, PM, 147. 
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it does not seem likely for a positivist to sa y that the 
positivistic philosophy and the treat ises by positivists are 
not good. In fact, they assume t heir position to be better 
t h an a!ly other. 
In the ligh t of what has been said one can see that 
t he re is no place in the logical positivistic sys t em, at 
least in Carnap's philosophy, for the concept of "right" as 
used in the ethical sense of the term. For Carnap the state-
ment, "It is not ri ght to take a person's life' is equivalent 
to saying , "Do not kill," and "Do not killn is, for Carnap, 
not an eth ical statement, but a command. There is, for Carnap, 
no et h ical difference between the following propositions: 
"Don't kill," tt:oo kill," " Love your neighbor," "Hate your 
nei ghbor. 11 For Carnap the preceding are commands in mislead-
ing form and we mistook them to be mora l dictates. The error 
involved in Carnap's reasoning need not be again elaborated 
upon here for this error committed by Carnap has been fully 
trea t ed in t he section on the ramifications of Carnap 1 s views. 
The absurdit y of sayinz t ha-c moral judgments are mere-
l y a command becomes apparent when one is com.r.--nanded to do 
somet hing i ®noral and feels an obligation not to do it. You 
can command ano t:;her to do some act, but you can't make him 
feel obligated to do it. The will is, as Kant says, autono-
mous. You can force a person to do some act; but you cannot 
make him will it. 
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(c) Languag e and its Log ical Syntax 
The value theory of Carnap is an outg rowth or impli-
cation of the meth od of philosophy peculiar to him, viz., 
11 log ical syntax. 11 Lo gical syntax, however, is to be dis-
tinguished from the syntax of lang uag e in t h at; it . is the ap-
plication of meaning to scientific propositions. This being 
t h e case for Carnap, it is then not possible to h ave a moral 
value theory or metaphysical system, since these studies are 
not included in the sciences. 'rhe study of mora l values s.n d 
the rest of t1pbillbsophy is to be replaced by the logic of sci-
~--that is to say, by the log ical analysis of the con-
cepts and sentences of the sciences, for the log ic of science 
is nothing other ths.n the log ical syntax of the lang uag e of 
science. 111 In place of raising such questions as to the 
meaning of reality, Carnap attempts to determine the meaning 
of statements. As was discussed in a previous section it 
was pointed out that value propositions were disguised com-
mands. 'l'he log ical complications that arise in reducing val-
ue statements as obligations to commands was also pointed out. 
However, the purpose of this sect ion is to examine the log ical 
difficulties involved in the meth od of log ical syntax wh ich 
g ives rise to Carnap's unacceptable theory of moral value. 
As Hawton2 points out, the ordinary view of lan guag e 
1. Carnap, LS L, xiii. 
2. Hawton, PP, 18 4. 
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interpreted as a set of sig ns includes (1) that which is 
being signified, viz., the object, (2) the sign, i.e., the 
linguis ti c symbol itself, viz., terms, and (3 ) the on e inter-
preting t h e sign, viz., the subje ct. Log ical positivists, 
with out adequate g rounds, as it will be s h wwn presently, re-
ject as real number t h ree, i.e., the subject and many even 
go so far as to reject number one e.lso, . i.e., the object sig -
nified . The log ical difficult y involved here is man~fold. 
It is true that it is possible that there are many terms that 
one could create tha·t signify noth ing as "oooml. 11 However, 
if that is the case, it cannot be said that "oooml" has sig -
nificance; for a term to be a sign it must stand for some ob-
ject. If the term does not have an object then it is not a 
sign. In other words, for a term to have meaning it must 
stand for an object in one's experience. 
'J:hi s bring s us to another difficulty in Carnap's 
lang uag e theory. Hawton think s that Ca.rnap's philosophy of 
11 log ical syntax" is trivial •. , However, he adds, 1 I f it is 
sound, it ha s the most revolutionary consequences. For it 
not merely disposes of the soul, 1 it wipes out the mind and 
what we ordinarily call the self.n2 Hawton is correct in 
what he says but he is also ri ght in thinking that Carnap's 
1. F'or a statis·tical, although erroneous, interpre t ation of 
log ical positivism that permits j u dgments of value and 
realities such as the soul see Brinton, IAM, 516-517. 
2. Hawton, PP, 184. 
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theory is not sound. ;l'o say that signs signify not hing is 
an abuse of language. A s lgn not only implies an object 
tha t it is s ignifying but a subject interpreting t he sign. 
Moreover, i t is not possible to have an ob j ect without a 
subject. If there were objects with no subject thinking it 
then i t could never be an object of knowledge. If an object 
is to be known it must be known by a subject. 'l'o speak of 
signs and nothing more h as no significance. 
Carnap 1 s lan guag e t heory has unreasonable i mp lications. 
To say t hat t he subject does not exist; and only beh avior is 
significant leads to the following as Hawton puts it: 
Suppose I say I am thirsty. To re:du'ce .. that 
to an empirical, non-metaphysical statement I mere-
ly assert "No, thirst." The "I" is dropped out. 
It is regarded as a mere grammatical convenience. 
But how, on this basis, is it possible for me to 
tell someone else, or for him to gall me, that I 
am, or he is, thirsty. All that can be done, ac-
cording to Carnap, is to describe behaviour--be-
cause if we restrict ourselves to the physical 1 languag e we cannot talk about private feelings. 
Since the feeling of thirst is incommuni cable Carnap 
would be forced to say that it does not exist. 'I' he fundfu'1lent-
al inadequacy with Carnap 1 s logi cs.l syntax is that it is in-
cap able of' explaining many o:f the facts of' human experience, 
therefore, Carnap rejects them as such :facts. 
I h"l h 1 d 1" ~ 2 Carnap s p 1 osop y ea s to so lps sm. r he require-
1. Hawton, P? , 183 . 
2. See Northrop, MEW , 116. 
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menta of empirical verif iability interpreted in the li ght 
of Carnap 's philosophy would make him the only person exist-
. 1 J.ng . 
If I assert t .hat someone beside myself exists, it has 
significance only when reducible to statements capa-
ble in principle of being verified in my own experi-
ence. This is to say that oth er selves will have to 
be cons tructions defined in terms of elements in ~ 
experience; otherwi se they are metaphysical beings, 
ru l ed out by the posit i vist's criterion.2 
A cri ti cism of the log ical positivists as t h e self-
a ppo inted guardians of science is reserved for a later chap-
ter. 
Log ical positivists seem to assume that t h e sign or 
term does not stand as a symbol of reality, but is t h e reality 
itself. 3 Ri tchie attacks the log ical posi"t;ivists on this 
point and says , "Positivists seem to imagine t h at all that 
happens is t o read the nruae Benzene on the label of a bottle 
and see the me rcury thread coincid e with 80.4 on the scale," 4 
of a thermometer. Positivists do not s eem to res.lize that 
the label is only a lingu istic sign. 
Positivists h ave confused l anguag e with reality and 
entertain the false supposition that what does not fall under 
their ling uistic rules is ruled out as nonsense, not realizing 
l. See Swabey, Art . (1924). Es pecially 57 ff. 
2. Rams perg er, POS, 112. 
;:s. See Ding le, r_r SP , 336 . 
4 . Ri tchi e, ~P , 75. 
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t h at it may be different "from the standpoint of t h e compre-
h ensive human wisdom to which a sound philosophy appeals. 111 
Moreover, log ical positivists have failed to show the applies-
bility of their linguistic rules to nature. 
The validity of a proposition in such a system is 
assured by its conformit y with the adopted rules or 
postulates of the sys t em, but t his is no guarantee 
of its applicability to nature.2 
Log ical positivists have replaced tru th with lan.':;uag e. 
This has revealing conse quences. They canno t speak of the 
truth of their system as over a g ainst the falsit y of those 
systems which are contrary to log ical positivism.. ·lloreover, 
t h ey confuse log ic with languag e and equate the two. This 
is esp ecially true of Carnap. Since languag e is a result of 
convention the validity of logic would be no more than that 
of languag e. 3 It would, therefore, be .irrelevant to speak 
of the 'i truth 11 of logical principles. "They b ave an h istori-
cal explanation, but are not propositions about existence.n4 
Knudson calls this "verbal intimic1ation."5 
( d) Mi s cellaneous Remark s 
Carnap and all of the positivists are in serious 
dang er im that t h ey build t heir philosophy upon an assumed 
l. Murphy, Art. (1945), 57. 
2. Ramsperg er, POS, 109. 
3. See Miller, HIMP, 521-522. 
4. Edel, TPP, 90. 
5. Knudson, PER, 177. 
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foundation. Positivists refuse to face certain con sequences 
wh ich follow from their phi losophy. 1 Carnap says that all 
p ropositions must ultimately be verified b y sense exp erience 
by which the emotivists mean that propositions must be open 
to public verifi cat i on as is done in the xciences. By such 
an assertion they b elieve that the y have elimina ted all meta-
physical idealism from the picture. Th is is not the case, 
ho wever, since every physical fact is a postulation and as 
such is a menta l matter. If something is accep ted as a fact 
it must be accepted as an ideal t ·act. VVhen e. scientist work-
i ng with a given subs t ance calls it by the formula S , he is 
postulating that it is S. He is t h eorizing about it. It is 
not a fact that is non-i d ea l . It is a fact of mind. The 
sc ientist is i n what Pe rry calls 1 an e go-centric predica-
ment. 112 
Some persons may wis h to object to the fore going 
point and sa y that a postulation is a mental act, but what 
is postulat;ed need not be mental. Hoyce's arg ument is per-
haps the best answer to this type of objection. Royce writes, 
11 If the world exists yonder, its essence is then already ca-
pable of being known by some mind. I"f capable of being 
1. I n another section it is shown that log ical positivism 
is self-contradictory since it is based upon principles 
which are not experienced by sense. 
2. cr. Perry, CPT, t he section on idealism. 
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known by a mind, this essence is tnen already essentially 
i d eal and mental. 111 If the world were not mental and ideal 
then it would be unknowable since ·the facts of htu'llan exp eri-
ence are never other than mental and ideal. If t h e world were 
non-i d eal then it would not be known to man. It is as Royce 
says, either the world is ideal or unknowable. 
Eith er ••• your real world yonder is through and through 
a world of ideas, an outer mind that you are more or 
less compreh ending through your experience, or else, 
in so far as it is real and outer it is un· nowable, 
an inscr·utable x, an absolute , mystery. 'rhe d ilemma 
is perfect. There is no third alt ernative. Either 
a mind yonder, or else the unknowable; that is your 
choice. 11 2 
Ayer is quite aware oi' the p r oblem of the privacy of per·sonal 
experience and discusses the problem at some len~th. 3 Ee ob-
j ects to Stace 1 s posit i on in the matter and believes tha~ 
personal experience can be and is invaded. Stace sa ;ys, 11 I 
4 
cannot experience anyth ing except my own experience." Ayer 
believes that one can experience another's headache and at-
tempts to prove it by showing that "there is a sen se in which 
it can be said that different people do have common experi-
ences.•5 However, Ayer has overlooked the fact that although 
two persons are having the same kind of experience they cannot 
l. Royce, SMP, 367. 
2. Royce, SMf , 364. 
3. Ayer, FEK, 1;)6 ff. The chap ter entitled, "The Eg o- Centric 
Predicament." 
4. St ace, TKE, 67. 
5. Ayer, FEK, 139. 
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enter into the privecy of each other's expe riences. Two 
persons mey have headaches, but t h e experience of t h e ache 
of each is private. Ayer recognizes t he truth of this dis-
tinction bsr saying that t h e experiences are quali t a ... i vely 
the same, but numerically different . 
When a person look s at an ob j ect and calls it a 
ch air, he is postulating that the object before him is a c hair. 
llioreover, t h e only proof or evidence he has for substanti-
a ting such a cla im are the facts that h e has in mind, i.e., 
other mental postulates. It is only the coherent ordering 
of these postulates that mak es one fact valid and another 
fact, false. 
Carnap says that assertions and propositions are true 
if the descriptions are accurate , and false if they are not. 
I f one makes an accura t e statement about another's fee ling s, 
behavior or emotions it may be said to be true if it is a 
correct one. The problem here is, 'How can one verify its 
accuracy?" Certainly it can n ot be done according to Cernap's 
positivistic principles. Feeling s are private as is any 
fact of cons c i ousness. I t is what Werkmeister calls the 
"f i rst person experi ence." 1 The privac y of consciousness 
cannot be invaded. 
It is as Russell points out. There are two kinds of 
1. Werkmeister, BSK, 4,5,81. 
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k nowledg e , ( 1 ) knowledg e by ac quaintance and ~ 2 ) knowledg e 
by description. Kno·wledg e by acqua.intance is the experience 
of an object in the privacy of one's own consciousness. 
Knowledg e by descript i on 11 enablesus to pass beyond the limits 
of our private experience. " 1 However, "Knowledg e conc e rning 
wh at is k nown by d escription is ultimately reducible to knowl-
ed:;:, e concern i n g what is k nown by acquaintance. 112 Concernin g 
t h e positivistic viewpoint on this matter, Brightman writes: 
l'hese men h ave argued that wba t was given in 
sense was certain; what could not be perceived by 
the senses was unverifiable s pecula tion, worthy 
only of being consigned to the f lames. It is, how-
ever, significant that noae of these thinkers has 
held wi th rig id consistency to the sensation alistic 
principle; into the thought of all of them has 
crept a t some point a recognition of objects that 
it is impossible to perceive by the senses, such, 
for example, as consciousness.3 
Carnap rejects t he study of all normative values as 
a "pretended investig ation of what is good and what is evil, 
4 
wh at is ri 3ht to do and wh at i t is wrong to do." By 11 pre-
tense 11 he means that a s t udy of norms cannot be g enuine in 
t hat it is not open to sense inspection. For Carnap, t ruth 
is an accurate statemen t of wh at is experienced in sense. 
This is his criterion of truth. Ot h er positivists, however, 
have modified this criterion some what. They say that it is 
l. Russell, POP, 59. 
2. Russell, POP , 58. 
3. Brightman, ITF, 43-44. 
4. Carnap, PLS, 23 . 
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not necessary to ma k e the actual sense verification of t h e 
object i n question as long as one is able to set u p t h e con-
d i tions under which verifiability b y sense is possible. For 
examp l e , no one h as seen the other sid e of the moon. Does 
t h is mean that accord ing to t he positivistic principles that 
there is no oth e r side to the moon? Not necessarily , sin ce 
one is a b le to lay down t h e conditions necessary f or the 
l 
o b s e rva tion of its ot her si de. However, t h e criterion of 
t h e logical positivi sts d epend s upon another, viz., coher ence. 
How c a n one know wha t he is g enuinely experienc i n g e x c e pt 
tha t he order hi s experiences in a ra t ional and coherent or-
de r in mi nd? 
For example, how can one tell whether t h e sense e x -
peri ence h e h as of a body of water b efore him is a fact, 
mirag e, or hal l ucin a t ion? I f h e relied purel y upon sense 
experience it would be a matte r of a wild guess. 'l' h e t ruth 
of s u ch propos it ions u lt i ma t ely rests u pon t h eir o r derly re-
la t ion to the res t of the facts of experience~-Ln oth er 
words, a coh erent explanation of t h e f ac t s of experience. 
An obj ect becomes a fac t no t by .virtue o .f its being 
sensed, or even publicly sensed for mirag es are open t o pub-
lie verifi cation. An object becomes a fact by virt ue of its 
bein g found or placed in a coheren t orderly relation to the 
whole o f experience. '.L'he only validity of sense verifica-
1. See Blumberg and Feig l, Art. (1931), 293. 
tion is to be found i n the criterion of coh erence. 
Carnap relax es his radical positivism as does Witt-
; ens t ein when faced with insurmount able difficulties. l''or 
examp le, strictly speak ing , from t h e positivistic point of 
vi ew t h e concept of the electro-magne t ic field in the sci-
ence o f physics cann o t be v e rified by sense and yet Ca rnap 
do e s not reject i t as it is too valuable an idea to reject. 
Th e essential reason for his accepting it as a genuine fact 
is that 11 perceptive propos i tion s are deducible 111 from pro-
positions about electro-magnetic fields. To accept facts 
as g enuine because other propositions are deducible from 
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them is g ood reasoning , but in a ri gorous positivism this must 
be consi dered illeg itimate since proof depends purely upon 
sen se. Since Carnap has at this point modified h is posibiv-
ism he has opened the way f or moral values for percep t ive 
propositions are deducible from them. Maliciousness, hate, 
and g reed, have moral si._:!; nificance wh ich have perceptible 
consequences everywhere. 'rhe battles a n d wars that man has 
s t rugg led. through are undeniable consequences. !1 oreover, 
love, k indness, sympathy, are moral qualities wh ich have per-
c epti b le consequences both in the indi vi dual and society 
that cares to express them. 
Carnap argues that moral norms are fanciful things. 
1. Carnap, PLS, 15. 
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They have no reality. They are mistaken notions. A moral 
norm is a command in disg uise. One who believes in norms 
has been fooled . He is a victim of lang uage. He is using 
languag e that h as no meaning . However, Carnap does not see 
that in a command no ch oice isiDt ·endad whereas in a moral 
norm a ch oice is pres ent. A norm implies oblig ation where-
as a command does not. In a command one must do this or 
that whereas in a moral dictate one is obli gated to do so 
and so and has the ch oice to refuse. For Carnap, the reason 
that moral norms are not facts is that they themselves are 
neith er perceptible by sense nor are percept ive propositions 
deducible from them. Carnap would say that Kant's entire 
world of prac~ical reason must be releg ated to the world of 
unreality. Kant claims that consequences or anything else 
in t h e rea~n of sense is devoid of moral value. 
However, dang erous problems arise for Carnap when he 
attempts to do the same with other ethical theories as the 
system of the ideal utilitarians. For the ideal utilitarian, 
tha t act is right which produces the g reatest amount o f good 
consequences. Certainly some of these consequences are open 
to both sense and public ins pection. Many moral principles 
are arrived at directly because of their undesirable per-
ceptible consequences. When it is said that cold-blooded 
murder is bad or evil and ought not to be practised it is 
because of definite perceptible consequences which result 
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from such actions. It is not simply that one is commanded 
not to beh ave so for one ough! not to comrnit such actions 
even if no command were g iven. 
Carnap believes that e thi cs h as a place in our so-
c i ety. Ho wever, he does not have in mind normative ethics 
for this is not compatible with his philosophy; at least he 
believes so. What he has in mind is a p sycholo gica l system 
of descriptive ethics. It seems that morality is so i m-
bedd ed in the human mind that it is not a simple matter to 
discard it or i gnore it. 
Carnap would tolerate a descriptive ethical system. 
A psychological d escriptive ethics which is based upon sci-
entific investig ation is the only valid system of ethics. 
Ethics cannot be metaphysical in nature; ethics must be 
psycholog ical. Therefore if one were to have a system of 
ethics, such a system would have t o be someth ing akin to 
psycholog ical hedonism or some form of the psychoanalytic 
ethic. ~hat is, ethics would be a matter of doing by nature 
t h at which is pleasurable and avoj_ding that which is painful 
or a matter of sublimation and repression. 1 Take for pur-
poses of illustration the act of murder. I f one does not 
murder a person he intensely dislikes it is because he has 
repressed these feeling s of hate or one may do some other 
1. See FlUgel, MMS. 
50 
socially acceptable thing as sublimating these feeling s of 
murder by going hunt i n ;:S and killing animals in order to g ive 
vent to these feeling s of murder. In the last analysis he 
will do that which gives him pleasure and avoid that which 
gives him pain unless other thing s prohibit him from so 
doing . 
Carnap has either overlooked the fact or has i gnored 
the fact that there are those (e. g ., instrumentalists) who 
claim that a purely scientific or descriptive ethic is not 
t h e only ethic which has perceptive propositions 1 involved, 
for there are many systems of ethics which may claim such.2 
Aristotle's self-realization ethic certainly has to be un-
derstood in t h e light of definite observable facts. If in 
a self-realization ethic one's potentialities must be made 
actualities then some of these actualities at least are de-
finitely open to investig ation even of a public nature. 
Moreover, perceptive propos i tions are very readily deducible 
from them. 
Obli gation must therefore be accepted as a fact; for 
althou6h oblig ation is not open to public observation ( al-
though it is open to a form of' investigation) perceptive pro-
positions follow from such a postulate. When a person says, 
l. Here, and elsewhere, where this term is used, Carnap means 
sensory: perceptive propositions. See Carnap, PLS, 15. 
2. E .~. Geig er, PSO, 178ff, Dewey, Art. (1947), 58. 
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"I ought to improve my physical h ealth, 11 h e is doing so out 
of a sense of oblig a tion. If Carnap protests that obli g a-
tion must be ruled out on the g rounds that it is not a per-
ceptive proposition, yet he must accept obliga t ion on the 
gr ounds that perceptive propositions are deducible from the 
postulation of oblig ation. The p erson out of a sense of 
obl igation may g o on to improve his physical health. The 
fact that his health is i mpro ved is open to public observa-
tion and is a consequence of an experience of obligation. 
Physical h ealth follows from obligation; oblig ation is not a 
perceptive proposition but physical health is an observable 
fact. A proposition is accept ed as valid if it is open to 
public inspe ction or if perceptive propositions follow from 
such a concept. ~ince this is the case in the matter of 
obligation then it must be ruled a valid fact even according 
to the positivi stic principles of Carnap. It i~ as Hill 
writes: 
·.i.'he g rounds offered by the .Lo gical Positivists 
for their paradoxical rejection of moral experience 
are unconvinc i ng in tha t , even if their criteri a of 
intelligible d iscourse ••• are fully accepted, they do 
not, as the Lo gical Positivists suppose, necessarily 
re quire the exclusion of moral j udgments f rom in-
tellig i ble discourse for the reason that such judg-
ments c an readily be translated in a nmnber of ways 
any one of which is at the same time closer to their 
real intention than the translation of the Log ical 
Positivists and sufficiently meets the positivist 
tests.l 
1. Hill, GET , 28. 
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3. A.J. Ayer 
Statement of A.yer's Ethice.l Position. Alfred Jules 
Ayer is perhaps the most persuasive writer of the emotivists 
and also the most radical. Moreover, he is popular; his 
treatment of the emotive ethic, which is found in Langua;2; e, 
Truth and Lo;::; ic, has undergone nine printings and two edi-
tions since it was first published in 1936. A.J. Ayer wrote 
the book when he was relatively young . His book is exactly 
as he says, nin every sense a young man's book, it was written 
with more passion that most philosophers would allow them-
selves to show. 111 He attributes its popule.rity to that 
fact. 
A.J. Ayer takes a very unusual stand in the field of 
ethics. He calls his system by several names. vVhen his 
book Lan ?; ua r,~e, 'r ruth and Log ic was first written he said 
that his "theory of ettJics mi ght fairly be said to be radi-
cally sub jectivist," 2 but when the book was revised, he 
called it "the emotive theory of' values.'' 3 Emotive is pro-
bably the better word for he does not want to identify it 
with subjectivism for he feels that it has very little in 
comrnon with traditional subjectivistic t heories. 
1. Ayer, LTL, 109. 
2. Ayer, LTL, 109. 
3. Ayer, LTL, 20. 
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As far as Ayer is concerne d t he re is no e thi cs; it 
is not a matter of judgment, ethi cal matters are outside of 
the realm of those preposit i ons which can be c a lle d true 
cr fal.s e. There is nothing t .c.at c an be predicated con cern -
ing t hem . In fact he g oes so far as to sa y tha -c t l1 e y· are 
mere emotionel experiences and whatever is said. concerning 
them is mere e jacula t ion. If someone s hou l d attempt to mak e 
a statement concernin::; his emotions it would carry no more 
sensible we i :::;ht than if he had said. 11 ouchn or 11 mrnm 11 or 1 u rsh . " 
YIJ e cannot me.k e j uds ment s of va l u e since values do n ot exist, 
they a re outside of the realm of science, a nd as such have 
no signlficance. The moa t that one can say about values and 
the only conc lusion tha t we can validly reach is that they 
11 are simply expressions of arnot ion which can be n either tr·ue 
nor false." 1 " Ethical concepts are ps eudo-concept s and 
consequently indef inable. 112 
Ayer says that the treatment o f ethics may be di-
vided into four parts ; 
1. repositions whi ch express definition s o f ethical 
terms; 
2. Propositions describin.:; the causes and phenomena 
of moral e xperience; 
3 . Exhortations to moral virtue; 
1. Ayer , LTL, 103. 
2. Ayer, LI'L , 113 . 
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4. Actual ethical judgments. 
Althoug h the study of eth ics should follow the above classi-
ficatio n , hardly anyone has g iven it this classification. 
~n fact, many writers in the field of ethics have written 
in more than one of the above classes, not realizing that 
tit is often very diff icult to tell from their works what it 
is that t hey are seeking to discover or prove. 11 1 The pro-
vince of ethics may be divided as follows: 
1. Propositions which express definitions of e thical 
terms. Ayer believes that propositions in this class only 
can leg itimately be said to cons~itute ethical philosophy. 
2. Propositions describing the causes and phenomena 
of moral experience. 1'he se propositions are relega-t;ed to 
t he task of the psychologist or the sociolo~ist. 
3. Exhorta t ions to more.l virtue. These are not, 
strictly speak ing , propositions but rather corrL.llands or 
ejaculation s. 'rheir purpose is to arouse a desired type 
of act ion. Ayer says that this g roup belong s neit her to the 
province of philosophy nor science. 'rhey are f ound prin-
cipally in the pulpit. 
4. Actual e~hical judgments. Actual et hica l judg -
ments are non-cognitive judgments; they are emotive. Other 
than saying that these do not belong in the field of ethical 
1. Ayer, LTL, 103. 
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philosophy Ayer thinks of this group as unclassified. 1 
The task of the philosopher is not that of makin g 
ethica l jud3;ments but t h at of analyzing ethi cal t erms in 
order t o classify t h em. Ayer believes t hat this is pre-
cisely what h e has done. He poses t he problem as to whet h er 
or not statements of ethic a l value can be converted into 
statements of empirical fa ct. 'rhe outcome of his probing 
is t hat ·'only normative eth ical symbols, and not d escrip-
tive e thi cal symbols, ••• are ••• indefinable in factual terms. 112 
~ince normative e thics cannot be reduced to descriptive 
eth ics the way is open for the aabsolutist 11 or 0 objectivist 11 
view of e thi cs. The 1 absolutist" he c l aims ultimately bases 
his position on a priori propositions which are arrived at 
by "intellectual int uition." Slnce this is the c a se they 
stand no valid test, at leas t they cannot be empirically 
tested and ther·efore are unv erifiable. For Ayer, 11 intellect-
ual intuition" is not an adequate test, 11 f or it is notori-
ous that wha t seems intuitively certain to one person may 
seem doubtful, or even false to another." 3 He goes on to 
say that this t y-_pe of c ert a i nty is only ps ycholog ica 1 and, 
t h erefore, mere ly subjective, and is unverifiable since it 
stands no empirical or public test. Empiricbanfor Ayer 
means sense experience. Emp iri cal verifiability is the only 
1. Cf . h ob i nson, POC, 339. 
2 . Ayer, LTL, 108. 
3. Ayer, LT L, 106. 
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adequate test . Ayer is no t a sub j ectivist, at least this 
is what he a t t empts to claim. A sub j ectivist makes a s t ate-
ment or p roposition about ·what h e believes he is experienc-
in:; • An e motivisiJ makes no statement , supposedly·, he merely 
. 1 
emo"Ges. 
What then can be said of value judgments ? l:t 'i rst of 
all they are unanalyzable since t h ere is no criterion by 
which ·they can be tested. This Ayer feels he h as in common 
with the absolutist or intuitionist, although he seeks to 
repudiate both of their positions . He probably has in mind 
Kant • ..i:!;mpirica l facts are irre levant tc mor&l value. It 
is not tha~ Ayer a grees with Kant tn that there is mora l 
' j 
value but rat h er that t h ere is no ' relevant empirical test 11 
f or morality . He differs rad ically from the intui t ionist in 
that he explains ethi cal concepts as pseudo -concepts . The 
lang uag e we use to express our ethi cal concepts i s not in 
reality of any normative consequence. Y~ ords expr·essing val-
ue judgments are mere statements of fact. In fact you can 
delete a ny value t e nn and find that~ t h e content has not b een 
altered, e thi cally, or otherwise. There is no difference 
be t ween saying , 1 John is an habitual liar, therefore he is 
sinful, 11 and saying , 11 Jor.!.ll he.bitually lies. ' 'l 'he ohly dif-
ference is that one mi ght say it wit h an emotional .feeling 
l. See Joad's exposition of Ayer on this point in CLP , 113 -114. 
57 
of disdain. The only thin g that makes a thi ng moral or 
immoral is the accompanying emotion, i.e., the expression 
or ejaculat ion of horror or delight. It is simpl~ a matter 
of psychological reaction. Thus , Ayer writes, 
The presence of an ethical symbol in a pvoposit ion 
adds nothing to its factual content. Thus if' I 
say to someone, uYou acted wrong ly in stealing that 
money , " I am not s-wating anything more than if I 
had simply said, hYou stole that money.'' In add-
i ng that this action is wrong I am not makin~ any 
further statement about it. I am simply evincing 
my moral disapproval of it. It is as if I had said, 
11 You stole that money, tt in a peculiar tone of hor -
ror, or written i t with the addition of some special 
exclamation marks. 1he tone , or the exclamation 
marks , adds nothing to the literal meaning of the 
sentence. I t merely serves to show that the expre-
sion of it is attended by certain feeling s in the 
speaker •1 
From this point we can proceed to explain ethical 
codes or mor a l laws as for example the ten corr..m.andments. 
Ethi cal codes are merely statements, like the fore going , 
g eneralized. However , they cannot be said to be true or 
false since they are not judgments but only emotive e jacu-
lations. YtJe say the.t !!.Adultery is wrong , 11 is the same 
thin.-s as sayinc~ ' 11 Adulteryt t t n in an exclamatory tone, or 
as Ayer says by some other suitable convention. 'l1 r uth or 
falsehoo d c snnot be predice.ted to tl: ese st a tements . ·l ' o 
disa gree with someone about the immorality of an act is 
simply to s ay thEt h e does not have the same emotive feel-
l. Ayer , DJl L, 107 • 
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ins s about the matter as you do. I t is a matter of psy-
cholog ical sentiments or construction and not a me.tter of 
log ical debate. T o say that a certain kind of act i s moral 
or immoral is simply to say tha t your psychological make-up 
is so that you habitually react to that type of action with 
this kind of emotion. 'rhus in the matter of values, factual 
statements are not made; only moral sen timents are expressed. 
And the man who is ostensibly contradicting me is 
merely expressing his moral sentiments. So that 
t here is ple.inly no sense in ask ing which of us is 
in the right. For neith er of us is assertin0 a 
g enuine proposition.l 
The lanc;uage or terms we use to expre ss our ethical 
sentiment have a dual function. They serve (1) t o arcuse 
feelin g and ( 2 ) to s t i mulate action. In fact some oi' t h em 
have the effect of co~~ands. 
Thus the sentence, 11 It is your duty to tell the 
truth," may be reg arded both as the expression of 
a certain sort of eth i cal feeling about truthful-
ness and as the expression of the command , Tell 
the truth. 11 'rhe sentence, "You ought to tell the 
truth, 11 also involves the command, "'rell Ghe truth, 1 
but here the tone of bhe command is less emphatic. 
In the sentence, 11 I t is good to tell the trut h , 11 
the command has become a lit t le more than a sugg es-
tion. And thus the 0 meaning li of the word 'l z oodu, 
in its ethical usag e, is differentiated from that 
of the word ilduty u or the word "ought ." In f'act 
we may d efine the meanin g of the various ethi cal 
words in t erms both of the different feeling s they 
are ordinarily taken to express, and also the dif-
feren~ responses wh ich they are calculated to pro-
voke. 
1. Ayer, DTL, 108. Also see Art.(l934) 
2. Ayer, Dl' L, 108. 
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Ayer conclud es f rom t h ese for egoing c onclu sions of 
hi.s the t t r: e r e can be no criteri on by which we ma y tes t val-
ue j udgments i n t h e fi eld of ethics. It isn' t as t h e int ui-
t i on i s t s believe t h at t h e y tran scend empi r ica l da t a a nd a r e 
li i n d e pen d en t of ordinar y sen s e -experie nce, · b ut rather they 
s i mply don ' t e x ist i n a ny fo rm and t b.e r efore p osses s no ob-
j ective validi t y but on ly an inne r e mot i ve i mpulse. 
Bu t i n the c a se of any g i ven proposition we can say 
wh at mEkes i t t rue simp ly by describing wh a t would 
coun t as evi :J ence f or it; ••• This is a mat t e r of 
relat ing on e s ymbol t o ano ther. I t is a mat ter of 
es t abl ishing a se t o f semantic rules.l 
F'or thi s reason we cannot ascr ibe truth or f alsity ·to 
ethica l codes since they are ext ra-judgmental and 11 sen t ences 
which s imp ly exp r e ss moral j udgmen ts d o not say a n yth ing . tt 2 
I' h e rea s on tha t t hey don 1 t s a y a n yt hin g is t hat t 11e y are 
feeli n g s, emo t i ons, sentiment s, and no t stat em ent s a b out 
f eeling s, emot i ons, or sen t i ment s. nrrhey are un verif i able 
f er t h e same r e ason as a cry of pa·in or a wo r d of' command 
:Ls unverif i able--becau se t h e y d o no t express g enuine propo-
s i t i ons. 11 3 However, Aye r h as at t his point neg lected to tak e 
in t o cons iderat ion the fact that p sych olo3 i st s c an d etect 
f e i g ned cries f rom r eal ones. 
1. Ayer, TM , 28 . 
2 . Ayer, LTL, 108. 
v• Ayer, Dr L, 109. 
4. Ayer's Attempt to Differentiate the Emotive 
Ethic .from the Subjectivist Ethic 
60 
For Ayer, it is imperative that we draw distinctions 
between expressions of feeling and assertions of feeling for 
the former constitutes a psycholog ical experience and the 
smn total of ethical concern, whereas the latter is a state-
ment and is of no ethical consequence. In this respect the 
emotive ethics of Ayer differs markedly from the ethics of 
the subjectivists. The subjectivists are maldng statements 
of fact. r hey are mak ing statements about t h eir emotive 
feeling s. The ques t i on may arise, 11Well, wh y not make state-
ments about your emotive experiences? Aren't they ethical 
judgments ? 11 'l'he answer would be, 11 No. 1 ::itatements about 
matters of fact are purely d escriptive statements and not 
va l ue judgments and as such are consigned to the province 
of science as the science of psycholog y which attempts to 
describe and make statements about emotional phenomena. We 
would conclude theref ore that the subjectivist in ethics is 
not a philosopher in the sense that he is making value judg -
ments in respect to ethics but he is usurping the place of 
the psycholog ist and is simply describ ing psycholog ical phe-
nomena and its causes as interests, feeling s, sentiments, 
and emotions. Nevertheless, Ayer has overlooked the fact 
that true--false statements can be made about ejaculations, 
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i.e., the experience to which he localizes moral experience. 
Moreover, Ayer here has also overlooked the fact that a he-
donist in ethical theory does say that feeling s of pleasure 
are g ood; it is ri3ht to increase them . Thus the main dif-
ference between the emotive theory of ethics and the sub j ect-
ivist theory of ethics is that the emoti vists deny that the 
ethicist is statin~~ any g enuine propositions whereas the sub-
jectivist claims that the moralist is stating g enuine propo -
sitions. However, the subjectivist does deny that ethical 
codes have any absolute or non-empirical nature. The sub-
jectivists claim that value jud~ments are merely s tatements 
about your own personal feelings an d interests. If t;his is 
true t hen propositions expressing ethical matters may be la-
beled either true or false. They would be true i f t h e speak -
ers did in fact have those experiences and false if the speak-
er did not possess t h e feeling s which he b e lieved that he 
had. Moreover, this is also subject to empiri cal verifica-
tion, log ical discussion, and d ispute. If a person should 
say, "Deceit is dishonest , 1 and a second person s hould say, 
11 But you app rove of it, n the n log ical debate and d iscussion 
would ensue. 'rhe subj ectivist makes statements about his 
feeling s whereas the emotivist simply ejaculates them or e-
vinces them. 
The feature that distinguish es Ayer from the sub-
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jec~ivists is his claim t hat one can express feeling s with-
out making statements about them. In fact, this is exactly 
what we do in ethi cs, he thinks. 
Thus I may simultaneously express boredom and 
say that I am bored, and in t hat case my utterance 
of the words, 11 I am bored, 11 is one of the circum-
stances which make it true to say that I am expres-
sing or evinc i ng boredom. But I can express bore-
dom without actually saying that I am bored. I can 
express it by my tone and gestures, while making a 
statement about something wholly unconnected with 
it, or b y an ejaculation, or without uttering any 
words at all. So that even if the assertion that 
one has a certai n feeling always involves the ex-
pression of that feeling , the expression of a feel-
ing assuredly does no t always involve the assertion 
that one has it. 1 And this is the important point 
to grasp in considering the distinction between our 
theory and the ordinary subjectivist theoryi For 
whereas the subjectivis t holds that ethical state-
ments actually assert the existence of certain 
feelings, we hold that ethical statements are ex-
pressions and excitants of feeling ~hich do not 
necessarily involve any assertions. 
The subjectivist in making eth ical statements or 
judgments finds that it is often possible to make contra-
di ctory s 'Gat ements; however, the emo t i vist s as Ayer escape 
this predicament for they do not make ethical statements at 
all, in fact ethical judgments or value judgments have no 
validity. 
In the last analysis all we can say is, nwe find 
t hat ethical philosophy consists simp ly in saying that 
1. 'Ihi s sounds a g ood deal like Kant , in that Kant vmuld say 
that one can act according to duty without acting from it. 
2. Ayer, D1: L, 109-llO. 
ethical concepts are pseudo-concepts and therefore unana-
lyzable."1 Moreover , by a pseudo-concept or pseudo-propo-
sition is meant, uA series of' words that may seem to have 
the structure of a sentence but is in fact meaningless. "2 
5. Critique of the Ethics of Aye_~ 
(a) General Remark s 
Ayer is perhaps the most radical of all t he emotiv-
ists. For him ethics is an ille gitimate study. Its place 
is among the pseu!b-sc~~hee~ Ayer goes beyond Carnap in 
t hat he does not even allow a subjectivistic ethic or even 
ethics as a descriptive psychological science. 
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'l'he atrocities that occur in war or anywhere else hs.ve 
for Ayer no moral significance. For example, a person may 
ms.liciously lie about another person and as a result bring 
serious harm to him. Or a person motivated by hate may 
torture and k ill a g roup of persons as the Nazis did to the 
inmates of concentration camps. 'l1heoretically, for Ayer 
this is not a moral issue, 11and we have, t herefore, noth ing 
to say to the guard in the concentrat ion camp who prefers 
cruelty; we can only mak e noises expressive of our feelings 
of repulsion." 3 If someon e cares to moralize about it then 
l. Ayer, LTL, 112. 
2. Ayer, Art. (1934), 335. 
3. Joad, CLP, 119. 
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he is simply acting e motionally. It is merely a matter of 
psycholog ical constitution and adjustment since ethi cs is 
on ly impulsive ejaculations. 
~uch an interpretation o f ethics as Ayer offers mak es 
a fool of s.nyone who cares or attempts to be moral for the 
reason that such a person is merely exchang ing one set of' 
ejaculations for another; the one no better than the other. 
It destroys the very foundations upon which society is built 
and destroys the basis of interpersonal relations, for one 
has no obligation s or responsibilities which he has to live 
up ·to. It reduces man to a level even below that of the ani-
mal for it perverts man's nature. Such an ethic deg enerates 
a man morally, for it cuts the nerve of moral endeavor; 
psych olog ically, it p erverts him; and i t insult s him int el-
lectually, for man's reason forces him to face the facts of 
moral exp erience, whereas Ayer's t h eory would make man in-
tel l ectually dish onest, insistins that man refuse to incor-
porat;e such dicta in his philosophy. C .I. Lewis, completely 
dis gusted with such a base and extreme position for any 
rig ht-minded man to hold, writes; 
But this is one of the strang est aberrations ever 
to visit the mind of man. l'he denial to value-
apprehensions in g eneral of the character of' truth 
or falsity and of knowledg e, would imply both mo-
ral and practical cynicism. It would invalidate 
all action; because action becomes pointless unless 
there can be some measure of assurance of a valuable 
result which it may realize. And this neg ation, if 
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it be carried out consistently, likewise invalidates 
all knowle dge; both because believing is itself' an 
active attitude which should have no point if it 
were not better to be right t h an wrong in what one 
believes, and becauie knowle dg e in g eneral is for 
the sake of action. 
A thoroughg oing skeptical position as Ayer 1 s is its 
own condemna t ion. It places him in a self-contradictory 
position. ~he skeptic cannot maintain that no knowledg e is 
possible because in so do i n ; h e is admitting that his skep-
tic i s m is at least knowable. The skeptic in ethics and 
value t h eory is in a similar predicament. If there is noth -
ing of value, eth ica lly or otherwise, what mak es Ayer 1 s 
eth ical theory any better or more right than any other? 
Ayer can 1 t p ossibly claim that his ethical ideas are right 
or even be tter than t h e next fellow's because he has de-
stroyed the rule and criterion by wh ich they are measured. 
I f there is no sucn t h ing as someone or something 
being in value, right or better than another sub je cti vely, 
objectively, or any other way, how can Ayer possibly cla im 
pr~eminence or any other place of value for l'l..is posit ion, 
since he has denied that whi ch he is seekin~ to claim for him-
self and hi s phi l oso phy, viz., value? Man is in wha t one 
migh t c &ll a "value-predicament .i Ee eva l uates whet h er h e 
cares to or not. It is in his very nature so to do. As 
Schiller says, Hour valuations .•• thus perve.de our whole ex-
1. Lewis, AK V, 366. 
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perience, and affect whatever 'fact,' whatever knowledge we 
consent to recognize." 1 
'i' o sa y that value is emotive is to state nothing but 
contradictions. In making the statement 11 value is e motive" 
one is in effect se.ying , 11 1 value t h is point of view con-
earning the philosophy of value as the best knowledge on the 
metter whicl:'.1. amounts to this; there is no value except thB.t 
which is emotive in nature.' 1 .c;ven to make such a statement 
one is oblig ed to admit that there is more to value than 
mere ly emotion. 
Ayer's ethical system is a superficial one. It is a 
philosophy of declaration and n ot one that is lo s ically pre-
sented. Joad sa ys that ttit is i mpossible to re &d lo .~ ical 
positivist literature without being struck by -~;he recurrence 
of dogmatic statements. Doctrines such as ••• the 'emotive 
t h eory'of ethics ••• s.re simply announced. 11 2 .fiyer's s ystem is 
superficial in that it takes int o account only a small part 
of ethical data. To say that emotion is involved in ethi cal 
matters is to make a correct statement for ethical concerns 
are of such great importance to pe rsons that t h e y quick ly 
becollie emotional When such matters are discussed. But to say 
that since emotion often is aroused when moral issues are at 
stake that therefore ethical value is merely emotive is to 
1. Schiller, HUM , 10. 
2. Joad, CLP, 12. 
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neg lect too many data and t o commit the f a llacy of the ne-
g lected aspect. 
Ayer differs from all t he d ive rse s ystems of c l assical 
e thics in the matter of a cr i t e r ion of ethical g oodness or 
rig htness. l t is not t .t1at ethi cs i s subjecti ve a n d the re-
f ore t h ere are as man y criteria as t h ere are p ersons, nor 
t h a t e thics is ob j ect i ve and d :i. fficul t t:;o analyze in that i t 
i s indef inable or i d eal. Ayer would sa y tha t t h e reason why 
one canno t determine the validity of ethical judgments is 
t h a t t h ere is no criterion a t all. He s a ys, " I t is i mpossible 
to f ind a cr i t eri on for d et er mining t h e val i d ity o f eth ical 
judgments. I t is not because t h e y h ave an absolu te valid i t y 
wh ich is mysterious ly ind e pendent o f ord inary sense-ex peri-
e n ce, but becau se t h ey have no objective valid ity whatso-
1 
eve r." It i s not surprisin3; t hat Ayer should come t o such 
a conclus i on i n t h e matter of a c r iter i on of truth in ethics 
but a gain he h as submitted to the ori 8 inal bia s of pos it ivism 
in ord er t o a rr i ve at such a conclusion. It is not t h at 
t h e r e is no cri t e r ion f or et hi ca l truth, i t is t h at Ayer h as 
t J... dt 1 h . . i 2 not even a t empue o a p p y a ny ot er c r 1cer on. He, him-
se lf , a dm i t s tha t he writes .i' rom a bias and wa n t:;s to p res e nt 
an eth ic not as received from a t h orough investig ation of 
eth ical da t a, but r a ther from a foreg one conc l us i on, that 
1. Ayer, LT L, 108. 
2. See Ayer, Art . (1935), 28. 
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is, somet hing which will su3gest itself from the principles 
of positivism. 1 In so doing he is not empirical in his 
approach but rather scholastic, i.e., finding reasons for 
t he support of fore g one conclus i ons. Ayer says, 1Now .i do 
not deny that in putting forth this theory I was concerned 
with maintaining the g enera.l coh,sistency of my position. u2 
Collin:;wood takes issue with Ayer on the matter of 
ethi cal propositions. Ayer c a lls ethical propositions pseudo-
ones but Collingwood says: 
To call somet hin; a pseudo-~ implies that it 
is no t an x, but that; somebody has mistaken i "t for 
one. I f t h ese "metaph ysical propositions'1 are, as 
Mr. Ayer says they are, and as I ag ree t hey are, 
p seudo-propositions, it fol lo ws that t h ey are not 
p ropo s itions. l 'hen what; are they? 'ivhat is it that 
i n these cases somebody has mistaken for proposi-
tions? I answer, nsupposi t ions. 11 3 
Colling wood then adds tha t it is Ayer who has made 
the mistak e in that Ayer has mistaken s uppositions for propo-
s i"ti ons. Metaphysics, and that includes ethics i s , for 
Collingwood, "the attempt to ascerta i n the absolute presuppo-
sitions of' th~ught. 11 4 
In an ethical philosophy as Aristotle's, happiness or 
the life of' contemplation is considered the summum bonum; 
in a he d onistic philosophy as Bentham's, i t is pure quanti-
1. Ayer, LTI, , 20.(rev. ed.) 
2 . Ayer, D-:r L, 20. 
3. Collingwood, EOM , 165. 
4. Collinc wood, ECM, 168. 
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tat ive ple asure; for Kant, it is the g ood will; for Mill, 
it is qualitati ve pleasure. Most ethica l philosoph ies have 
a place for the g ood , that is, t h ey have an explanation and 
criterion for it. However, Ayer's philosophy, not only ha s 
not a criterion for it but he denies that t h ere is any e n ti-
ty as the g ood. Many ethical philosophies dep end upon the 
g oo d to determine the right act, that is, the righ t act is 
t h e one whi ch is most conducive t o the g ood . :even natural-
istic philosophers account for t h e g ood. For examp le, 
eth icists of the evo lutionary nat uralistic sch ool cons i der 
physical well being as the good and t h e act wh ich makes for 
its surviva l is the right act a nd t hs.t wh i ch h arms the well 
being of life is wrong . Yet A;ler dive r g es and opposes just 
about every classical ethi c with the bold st atement that 
t h ere is no such ent ity as g ood. voes he not see that in 
making such a statement he is in effect saying t h at his own 
philosophy is not of any value, i.e., is of no g ood. He is 
in e1'fe ct admitting that any effort he may put forth in any 
endeavor even before he beg ins su ch En enterprise is o f no 
value. His efforts, reg ardless of how indus trious, how 
heart -breakin i::; , how es.rnes li , are of no va l ue. His end eavor, 
reg ardless of h ow noble, how beneficial to man, or how g reat 
an improvement o f his own welfare are no g ood even before 
embarking on such an enterprise. 
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Some persons think that the emotive system of ethics 
as presented by Ayer is the ordinary form of subjectivi sm. 
Th is is not the case, however. Ayer, himself, insists that 
it is no t t h e case. He says t hat although the t h eory he 
has presented may 11 f'airly be said to be radically sub jec-
tivist, it differs in a very i mportant respect .from the or-
t hodox sub j ec t ivist theory. 11 l 'l'he subjectivist has a cri-
terion of ethics as int erest, personal feeling , subjecti ve 
judgment and the like. The subject ivis ·c; also ha s an account 
of how the :sood or eth i cal right is known, that is, he places 
ethical truth on a cognitive level. He also has a criterion 
for det erminin.:::; the rightness or wrons nes s of acts. For 
subject ivi sts of' Burne's cype an act is ri:?,ht or wrone; if 
p eop le generally approve or disapprove o f it. The cri t erion 
of right i s for Burne approbs.-c ion or general approbation. 
For sub j ectivists as Westermarck, 2 .!. is right means, 11 I ap-
prove of it." The criterion of ri G"ht is personal approval. 3 
For Ayer, there is no criterion of right nor is t h ere 
any moral value. 1vloral juds rnen t is neither true nor false; 
it i s not even a ,judgment . There are no moral propositions. 
Ayer says tha t he differs from the sub j ectivists in t h at for 
the subjectivist ther e are moral jud.gments which are cogni-
1. Ayer, Ill' L, 109. 
2. Westermarck, ER, 141-142. 
~. See Blanshard, Art. (1951), 127, 1 32-133 . 
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tive, i.e., statements about right and wrong which may be 
considered correct or incorrect. In so doing the subjectiv-
ist has brcught ethics into the realm of k nowledO' e. Ayer 
objects to this because moral judgments then become ve.lid 
and truth or falsity may be app lied to them. In the matt er 
of diverting from the sub .j ectivlsts and insisting that ethical 
judgments have no vali dit y, Ayer believe s that h e he.s im-
proved upon subjectivism and presented a better t h eory; and 
yet, he believes that neither values nor value judgments 
exist. It is as was pointed out previously, that before one 
can reject value, he must first accept it. Urban h ad a 
similar i dea in mind when he criticizes the emotivists by 
saying , 11 The proposa.l to transvaluate all our values is re-
volutionary enouz h but it still presupposes values to be 
trans valuated. 111 
An embarrassing si t uation which Ayer a t tempts to re-
concile to his position is the matter of dispute in the realm 
of eth ics. i he problem is: If there are no ethical judg -
ments, subjective or objective, why is it t hat men arg ue over 
ethi cal propositions? G. E . Moore uses this as an arg ument 
a 3ainst ethical subjectivists. 2 I n other words, if ethical 
judgments are sub jective why dispute about them at all? 
1. Uroan, Art. (1947), 56. 
2. Cf. Moore, PS , "'rhe Nature of Moral Philosophy. 11 
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Ayer thinks that he escape s this difficulty by sa yin.:?; 11 t h at 
one really neve r does dispute about questions of value."l 
If this is the cas e then what is he doins and what does he 
think is bein.; done here? Barnes thinks tha.t ilpositivists 
have s omet i mes spoken as thouz h whaG is not a verifiable as-
sertion is not meanin.5ful. 112 
Ayer says l:ibat although it appears that we are a r g u:-
ing about matters of e t hical concern that this is no t the 
case. 'l'he argument is about a question of fact. He says, 
vvhat we attempt to show is tha-c h e is mistaken 
about the facts o f the case. We arg ue t h s.t he bas 
misccnceived the ag ent's motive: or that h e h as 
misjudg ed the effects of the action, or its proba-
ble effects in view of the ag ent's knowledg e; or 
that he has fa i led to take into a cccunt the special 
c i rcums tances in which the a g ent was placed ••• We 
do this with t h e h ope that we hav e only to get our 
opponent t o ag ree with us about t h e nature of the 
emp irical facts for him t o adopt t h e same mora l 
attitude towards them as we do.0 
Ayer does not see that this is precisely the whole ethi cal 
issue. r hese are the et hi cal judgments that are argued 
about. One person believes that he has the r i ght da t a and 
judgment a bout ethical matters and attempts t o convince and 
convert his neig hbor. 
Ayer has the whole e shi cal problem in a nut shell and 
does not even see it. What ca.n be more at the heart of 
l. Ayer, LT L, 110. 
2 . Barnes, Art. (1948), 5. 
3. Ayer, LTL, 111. 
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ethical matters than the ag ent 's motive? Ayer a grees that 
motive is a reality and present in e thical disputes and is 
a fact and yet he fails to recognize it as a moral judgment. 
He accepts it as a cognitive judgment but does not see that 
it involves moral judgments. Moreo ver, judgments which take 
into consideration the circumstances in which the ag ent is 
placed and judg e his moral actions in that light are mora l 
judgments. Yet all this escape~ -- Ayer' s n ot i ce even t houg h 
he g rants all these as facts. Fur thermore, Ayer thinks t hat 
wh en one attempts to convince another of his own moral po -
si"i:;ion and attitude that it is not an ethical dispute. Row-
ever, it is pre cis ely an ethical dispute; often p e rson s be-
lieve t h a t it is their oblig ation to convert or enligh ten 
others. 
Probably nowhere in the hist ory of ethical thought 
is there a more bold and radi cally extreme exp lanation of 
e thica l actions as in the ethical philosophy of Ayer . To 
the quest ion , tiHow do I kno w that the act I am about to com-
mit is moral or immora l ?" there is by most ethlcal philoso-
phers some explanation . Ayer, however, denies tha t it is a 
proper problem . A subjectivist would answer it b y saying 
that it is a matter of opinion. The evolutionist would an-
s wer by saying that i t is that act which makes f or the sur-
vival of the g roup. 'l'he intuitionist of Kant's type 1 would 
1. Blanshard ' s class ifi cation has been followed in treating 
Kant as an intuitionist. See Blanshard's unpublished 
syllabus for t h e course entitled ''c_ll ypes of Ethical 1:heory . ' 
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say that it is acting out of reverence for moral law. That 
is, 11 Act as if the maxim from which you act were to become 
l 
through your will a un i versal law of nature." '.i'he Aris-
totelian self-realizationlst would say that the right act 
is t h e mean between two vices which are extremes. 'l 'o do 
the rig ht act involves doing it 11 to the rig ht person, to the 
rig ht extent, at the rig ht time, with the right motive, and 
in the right way." 2 'l'he hedonist would say that it is that 
act which g ives the g rea t est amount of pleasure. 'J:he utili-
tarian, as Mill, would say 1 that actions are rig ht in pro-
portion as they tend to promote h appiness, wrong as they tend 
to produce the reverse of happiness. 11 3 However, in seeking 
an e xp lanation of the matter in the phi l osophy of Ayer, one 
finds that acts are neither to be considered as right nor 
as wrong . They are simply acts of a neutral kind . 1his is 
a highly unreasonable position for Ayer to hold, for it re-
sults in absurd. conclusions when it is carried out or when 
its i mp lications are pointed out. Ayer says that there is 
no d ifference between the statement, "You acted wrong ly in 
stealin,g that money," and llYou stole that money. 11 l'he only 
difference in the two statements is that one has emotional 
overtones about it, that is, it was prompted by emo t ion. 
1. Kant, :M.Ivl , 221. 
2. Aristotle, Ni c. Eth., 1109a. 
3. Mi ll, urr. 
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Ayer is in effect sa ying that there is absolutely no moral 
difference between wh it t ling on a pencil with a jack-knife 
and torturing one's best friend with the same knife. They 
are simp ly two different acts. If one expresses disturbance 
about one of the acts it is only because he is expressing a 
bit of emotion and mistakes it as a moral issue. Joad is 
rig ht in saying "If I consistently believe that the statement, 
1 s t ealins is wrong ', does no more than express an emotion of 
horror a t stealing , it will presently cease to exp ress the 
emot ion of h orror. No t to put too fine a point on it, I 
1 
s hal l cease to believe that s t ealing is wrong ." S .L. Hart 
cond emn s such indifference to value as "mental derang ement 
2 
and moral callousness. 11 'J:he only possible reason for Ayer 1 s 
ma i ntaining such a theory of moral value is that he valued 
his philosophy of positivism so g reatly that he was read y to 
accept any ethi cal theory which was in harmony with his 
philosophy reg ardless of the absurd heights to which it mi ght 
tak e him. 
i''or Ayer, what was happening a few g enerations a go in 
the world o f labor was no t a moral issue. Child labor was 
being emp loyed and persons worked from dawn to night and 
during the h oliday season would work night and day until some 
of them fell d ead from exhaustion, over-work, and insanitary 
1. Joad, CLP, 146. 
2. Hart, TOV, 63. 
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work ing conditions which would cause all k inds of diseases. 
Obviously, i t was a moral matter , when afte r some of t h ese 
persons d i ed from working conditi ons that a company-influenced 
physi ci an was cilled in and claimed that the person died 
from causes which would not incriminat e the factory owners. 
It was clearly a mora l issue that persons were workin7 in 
the mi ll under extreme hazardous conditions such as to cause 
the loss of arm or leg and t hen were unable to work and 
forced to do wit hout any consideration from the plant . .t>or 
Ayer , btJ.ere was no morality to be found anywhere, not even 
in such literature as expressed i n some of the great social 
r eform .poets as Ina Coolidge, who wrote: 
,.l'he g olf links lie so near the mill 
'l'ha t almost every day 
'l'he little children can look out 
And see the men at play. 
For Ayer to analyze the above situations and then conclude 
that ethics is merely a mat t er of the misuse of language and 
is a non-exis t ent entity is simply to refuse to face the 
realities of experience and to deny the f acts of moral ex-
perience. 
(b) Ritchie's Criticisms of Ayer 
1. Ayer's method of verif i cation. Ri tchie ha s i ven 
extensive cri ticisms of Ayer under the t i tle nErrors of 
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Log ical Positivism. 11 1 However, Rit chie 's criti cism of Ayer 's 
method o f verification is s imilar if not i denti calwtth those 
g iven a g ainst Carnap in the preceding section. Rit chie i-
dentifies lo ?;ical positivism with phenomenalism f or the rea-
son that Aye r assumes that the only valid propositions are 
those which assert matters of fact and so are logically 
e quivalent t o or are reducible to propo s i t ions that assert 
sense dat a. 2 Be r gmann, h owever , attempts to rescue ~ost 
positivists fr om phenomenalism by making a distinction be-
tween " lo gical struct uralism if and 11 log ical constructuralism. 112 
He traces phenomena lism in log ical positivism to the influ-
ence of Russell. Log ical structuralism is phenomenalistic 
and i mp l ies t h e existence of an obje c t whereas lo 3ical con-
structur·ali sm d enie s the existence of an objec t . Bergmann 
has not off ered proof f or his point; he merely attempts to 
define two possible points of view. Many log ical posit ivi s t s 
do not accept Bergmann's concept of logical constru cturalism. 
Ayer 1 s princi p le of verificat i on is based on an assumption. 
Aye r and other positivists abuse it by centering t heir atten-
tion on s howin g that the "propositions they dislike cannot 
be so reduced a n d are therefore invalid. 13 
Ayer, moreover, cannot reject metaphysics as untenable 
l. Ritchie, EP , 70 ff. 
2. Bergmann, Art. ( 1950), 478. 
3 . Ri t chie, EP , 7 4 . 
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and attempt to maintain a philosophical system which includes 
a method of verif i cation. l''or to insist upon verif'ication is 
to assume a metaphysics of verif i cation. To reject metaphy-
sics and to requi re verification is poor metaphysics for that 
would be to contradict oneself. 1 Ritchie should h ave sug -
~ e sted that ~yer fi rst apply h imself to the philosophy of t h e 
grea t metaphysicians in history before rejecting it so com-
placent l y . ~he fact is that ~yer has n ot trea t ed a sing le 
system of metaphysics in eit h er his Lan;suag e, r ruth and Log ic 
or hi s 'l'hinking am Meaning , whi ch are two of his most out-
standing works on "metaphysics 11 even though Ayer is not a ware 
of the fact t hat he is a metaphysician. 
2. Ayer's erroneous concep t concerning value judg -
me nt s. Ayer maintains, a nd righ tly so, that certai nty is 
unattainable concerning facts and that only a de g ree of pro-
bability is attain able concerning f actual assertions. Ayer 
interprets probability in pragmatic terms, that is, 
Roughly speaking , all that we mean by saying that an 
observation increases the probability of a p roposi-
t ion ·is that it increas es our confidence in the pro-
position, as measured by our willingness to rely on 
in i n practice as a forecast of our sensat i ons and 
to retain it in preference to oth er hypoth eses in 
fa ce of an unfavourable experience.2 
In maintaining such a statement, Ayer he.s damag ed his posi-
tion in t wo ways: 
1. Ri tchie, EP, 77. 
2. Ayer, LTL, 100. 
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(1) Ayer was forced to r e ly upon value terms wh ich 
according to his value theory he must reject as nonsense. 
He speak s of ui ncr·easing one's confidencen and a 11 willing -
ness to rely on it in practice. H .l.'o t h e extent t hat Ayer 
uses value tenns to t hat extent he is contradicting h i mself. 
( 2) Th e concept 11 probable 11 is not ve rifiable by sense experi-
ence and i f value terms are nonsen se so is the term probable. 
" If to say that somet h ing is good , bad, right, wrong , beauti-
ful, or ug ly, i s to say nothing , so also to sa y t hat some-
t:" • 
,_ n J.ng is probable is to say nothing . 11 1 Not only are the 
terms 1 trut h 11 and 11 falsi ty" value terms, but so is "proba-
bility. tt 
~ ince Ayer says t hat a p ropos it ion can have meaning 
if it is possible for experience to make it proba b le then 
metaphysics is reintroduced in ii all its g loryii says Di ng le. 
Ding l e sa ys, 1For wh a t is meant by probability? Clearly it 
implies a meaning for certainty; you cannot say t h at a pro-
posit ion is probably true unless t h ere is a trut h which it 
probably stat es. But that t he truth is unatta i n able 112 by 
the pr i ncip les of logical positivism. 
3. Ayer' s example s of value judp;ments. Ritchie also 
claims that t he examples of value judgments tha. -c Ayer has 
selected to cri t icize in his Lanp;uage, Truth and Lo p;ic are 
l. Ritch ie, ~P , 79. 
2. Ding le, TSP , 341. 
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not fair "because an ethical judgment is already i mplied in 
the word 1 stole.'"l 
4. Sensations and emotions. An i mportant criticism 
that Ritchie raises a gainst Ayer and one which is app licable 
to the entire school of log ical positivism is the ung rounded 
dogma t h at sensations are accep ted as essential constituents 
of facts or factual propositions, but emotions are purely 
psycholog ical and s .xtra factual. Ritchie says that it is 11 the 
t h eory that the 'subject' or 'observer' is a purely pas s ive 
. 2 
recipient and not an ag ent or operator." Ri tchie does not 
develop this idea but its i mplications are evident. (l) If 
emot i ons are subjective and private so also is sense experi-
ence. (2) If sense experience can be considered o b jective 
since some object is re quired to stimulate one's sensations 
t h en emotions may also be accorded the same objectivity since 
they, too, re quire some object to stimulate them. 
There is more to a factual observation than the mere 
fact and passive observer, there is active participation on 
the part of the observer or subject. In conclusion, Ri tchie 
critic i zin;3 lo; ical positivism, sa ys, 11 This theory I am sure 
is false and the mothe r of" a g reat family of falla_cies. I t 
is p~ausible because it appeals to what we imag i n e to be im-
mediat e, certain, and actual, and because we do not realize 
l. Ritchie, EP, 79. 
2. Ri tchie, Bp, 80. 
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that the possible sense data it has to drag in are purely 
mythical.nl 
Ayer 's ethics also fails the pras matic test. One 
could not carry i t out. It is not only i mpracticable, but 
it results in inconsistencies. •ro carry out such an ethical 
scheme would r•esult in the loss of' one's friends and ostra-
cism from one 1 s society. .::;>ocie ·ty would perish under such 
an ethic. Moreover, it cannot be thought that even a pro-
ponent of such an ethic would commit himself to it as his 
regular program of practice. 
6. Bertrand hussell 
Stat ement of' the ethical position of Bertrand h ussell. 
Bertrand nussell in his book ent itled, Relig ion and Science, 
offers a view of ethi cs amazing ly similar to that of A.J. 
Ayer. However, t hi s is not too surprising since Russel l has 
announce d that he is a member of the positivistic school of 
t h ow:s ht . 2 For hussell also, ethics is outside of the domain 
of j u d,-;;ment and as such has no cognitive meaning and is there-
fore neither true nor false. The outcome of his examinations 
are, as he puts it: 
I conclude that, while it is true that science 
cannot decide questions of value, that is because 
1. Ritchie, ~P, 85. 
2. Russell, HWP , 836. 
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they cannot be intellectually decided at all, and 
lie outside the realm of' truth and falsehood. What-
ever -knowledg e is attainable, must be attained by 
scientific methods; and !hat science cannot disco-
ver mankind cannot know. 
Russell admit s that the domain of ethics is ou t side 
the realm of science, b ut h e insists that s i n ce this is so 
e~hi cal j udgments are impossible. Ethics cannot contain 
tru ths which cannot be proved or d is proved by science. It 
does not transcend science by claiming absolute truths of 
wh ich science is unaware. But r athe r since i t lies out side 
of the scientific realm it is t h erefore in t h e realm o f non-
knowledg e. Since science has nothing t o say about values, 
then not b.ing can be said about t h em. He admit s, 11 t h e f s ct 
that science has nothing to say about 'values' ••• but when 
it is inferred that ethi cs contains trut hs wh ich cannot be 
proved or di s proved by science," 2 this he denies. 
In matters pertaining to e~hics we are destitute when 
it comes to offering proof of our position, so Bussell thinks. 
There is a deci ded disas reement wh i ch has practical i mpor-
tance but has no log ical or sc i entific importance. On the 
p rac ti cal side we are concerned with our own opin ions and 
believe them t o be right, in fact we go so far as to per-
suade others to our position but it is not a co gnitive or 
rational matter, but merely an emotional one. "We have ab-
1. Russell, RS , 243. 
2. Russell, RS, 823 . 
solutely no means, of a scientific or intellectual k ind , by 
wn ich to persuade ei~her p& r ty that the o ther i s in t he 
ri ght ••• they are all emotional, not intellectual. 111 
The experience of obli g ation is, for hussell , one 
of emobion. Wh en a person says, 11 I ou3ht to d o so and so," 
wh a he means is, " t h is is t h e act towards whi ch I feel t h e 
emotion of approval. 112 
Russell a s rees with t nose men of relig ion who insist 
that values lie outside the realm of science, but on that 
account he claims that they therefore lie out side the bounds 
of k no viledge. 11 1 Value s 1 ••• lie out sid e the domain of sci-
ence, as the defenders of relig ion emphati cally assert ••• 
but 1 draw t h e f urthe r conclusion , whi ch t hey do not drav1, 
t h e:. t questions as to 1 va.lues 1 lie wholly outsi d e t h e d omain 
of knowledg e. u::> He g oes on to sa y t hat whenever we mak e a 
statement concerning ethical judgments wha t we are really 
do in:3 i s g iving express i on to our own emo t ions and not to 
an ob j ective fa ct wh ich is tru e ind ependent o f our personal 
4 
opinions. -
To co n vince your opponen t that you nave t h e t rue 
ethi cal views is not to prove to him on objective intellectu-
al g round s the.t you h e.ve knowledg e of the absolube truth con-
l. Russell, RS, 230. 
2. Rus sell, PHI , 2 26 . 
j. :Fi.ussell, RS , 230. 
4. Fussell, Art. (1944 ), 723. 
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cernin~ values and that you intend to prove it to your op-
ponent's satisfaction, buc rather when you are successful 
in winning your opponent tc your way of thinkine; and to your 
v i ews wha t you h ave done is t o solicit kindred emotions; 
you have aroused in him the emotional sentiments that you 
h ad about t h e mat t er. H.r£very attempt to persuade peo .t?le 
t h at something is g ood (or bad) in itself, and not merely 
in its effects, depends upon the art of rousing feeling s, 
not upon an appeal to eviden ce." 1 A p reacher's success in 
persuadin3 his congre Gation to adhere to the prin ciples he 
is presentins lies in his ability to excite in h is cong reg a-
tion the emotions that he has about the matter. 2 Geig e r in-
terprets this as a taste-plus-power" ethics. 3 
1 fnat one mista.kim;J,.y calls moral value is i n reality 
merely an emotional response. Wnen anythin g excites an emo-
tionsl reac~ ion in a person, that person desires that all 
p e rsons react to t hat stimulus in the same way. 
When a man sa ys, i this is g ood in itself, 11 he se ems 
to be maldng a statement , j ust as much a s if he 
said, 'thi s is square" or 11 this is sweet. 1 I be-
lieve t hi s tc be a mis~ake. I think tha t what the 
man really means is: 1 I wish everybody to desire 
t:t. i s," .or rather "Would that eve rybo d y desired 
this. n LJ: 
Rus sell interpret s this st atement as merely the a.ffir.nati on 
1. Russell, 
2 . Russell, 
3 . Geig er, 
4. Eus s e ll, 
RS, 235. 
Art. (1944), 724 . 
·rt. (1949), 94. 
RS , 235. 
8 5 
of a pe r sona l wi s h and t o genera l ize it would sta te nothing 
but a desir e . hussell says that the wish is personal w~ere-
as the desire is ,3eneral or universal. He claims t h at so 
much o f t he conf us ion in ethi cs results f rom t h e o dd i n ter -
lock i n g of t h e p articula r, viz., wi shes , with the universal, 
viz., desire . Particulars, i.e., wishes, are not asser-
tions s i nce t h ey affirm n othing , ;r i t is log ically i mpossible 
t h a t t h ere s h ould be evidence for or a gainst it, or for it 
to possess ei the r truth or falsehood. 111 Universals, i.e. 
des i res, on the other hand , ar~ statements of t h e optative 
mood and as such are of cognitive significance. Th e y are 
stat ements of a person's state of mind and as such can be 
ei ther true or false. I f a p erson makes a statement and 
h is state of mind is in accord with it, then his statement 
is true. If h e makes a false statement about his state of 
mind , then h e is in error. But as Russell points out this 
is not in the province of ethics but i s releg ated to t h e 
fi e ld of ps ych olog y o r biography . A wish , on t h e other 
hand, i s an exp ression, not an assertion. The co n clusion 
of t he matter is therefore that 
Ethics ••• con tains no statements, whether true or 
fa l se, but c onsists of desires of a certain g eneral 
kind ••• Scien ce can d iscuss the causes of d esires, 
and the means of realizing them, but it cannot con-
tain any g enuinely e thical sentences, be~ause it 
is concerned with wha t is true or false. 
1. Russell, RS, 237. 
2 . Russell, RS , 237. 
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hussell seems to be in a ;?; reement with Ayer, Ob den 
and Rich ard s concern ing t he matter of lan~ua ~ e. These p er-
sons, tog e ther with o thers, seem to ag ree tha t languag e has 
tw o basi c purpo s es, the one being d escriptive a nd the second 
b eing emotive. The emotive aspect of lan gua~ e Rus sell calls 
Tlexpression " and the descri ptive or cognitive use o f lan-
gua :; e Russell calls "communication." 
Lan6 uag e h as two primary purposes, expression and 
communication. In its most primi t ive form i t dif -
fers li t tle from some other forms of b eh avior. A 
man ma y express sorrow by sighin3 , or by saying , 
''Alas t II or 11 \ loe is . me 111 .,. He mar communicat e by 
pointing or by saylng , 'Look! 1 
·rna pr irr;,ary purpose o f commu..."lication is to g ive in-
formation but it also serves to raise questions and g ive 
c om.m.ands. On the o the r hand i~ he exp ressive use of lang uag e 
serves to express e mo t ions, i mperat ives, and interjections. 
However , the two may overlap at times. lv'Loreover, t he emo-
tiva or express i v e use of languag e also serves to influen ce 
t he behavior of others. 2 
? · Critique of Russell's ~thical Ideas 
(a) General Criticisms 
Russell has in recent times l ef t the et h ics of sub-
jectivism and ha s accep ted the ethics of emoti vism . Eno-
1. Russell, HK , 5 9 . 
2. Se e part 2 , chapt er 1 of Russell, HK . 
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tivism is sub j ectivis t ic but t he p r opos e d difference between 
t h e two i s that the sub j ectivis t believes t hat e thi c a l pro-
positions exist whereas the emotivis c does not h old t o s u ch , 
but r &.t her attempts t o ma intain that judgments of moral val-
ue do not exist. The sub j ectivist claims that when one says, 
11 x i s right , 11 then he is expressing an o p inion or is ma k ing 
a proposition concerning his belief or feelin~ . The proposi-
tion may or may not be rig h t insofar as it is a correct 
statement of t h e person's feelin~ s. The emotivis t claime 
that the a bove view of the subjectivist belong s t o t h e pro-
vin c e of psych olog y and t hat what is left for ethics is a 
purely emotive matter, t h at is, an emotional e vinc ing and 
n o t a s t atement or proposition. 
'The reason why hussell h as accept ed the po s ition of 
t h e emotivist is t hat he beli e ve s that valid knowled~ e 
comes only from science and wh at cannot be s ubje cted t o sci-
entifi c met hod cannot be cons ide red as g enuine knowledg e. 
Si n ce e thical know ledg e falls out si de t h e realm of sc i ence 
t h en t h e re cannot be ethical k nowledg e. 1 ~hat is, proposi-
t i ons cannot be made in the field of e thics. Et h ics is, 
t herefore , non-cognitive. The error that Russell is mak ing 
here i s in h is restricted view of science and the cr iterion 
of truth emp loyed by scientists. 
1. Russell, RS, 24 3 . 
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It is not right to expect t h e met hod of t h e natural 
sciences to be applied to all fields of knowledg e. 1 The 
method of laboratory experimentation may be applicable to 
a certain g roup of facts wh ereas it may not prove feasible 
or pro f itable in application to another. There may be more 
than one method for arriving at certain conclusions. In 
t h is re~ ard Hill writes: 
I ndeed, to insist upon such universal appli-
cability of these tests is an infring ement of 
strict science upon ot her le3 itimate k inds of in-
qu iry wh ich is qui t e as objectionable as the i n-
fri ng emen t of these other inquiries upon exact sci-
ence and carries with it an implied re j ection of 
t h e larg er social respon sibilities of science it-
self.2 
Scientific meth od s hould not be restricted to laboratory 
method • . Ne vertheless, the scientific method of settipg up 
postulates and testing them by seeing whether or not the 
facts converg e upon that hypothesis is also emp loyed in the 
field of e t hics. When the i d eal utilitarian states t h at 
murder is wrong because it bring s about bad result s one may 
ch eck the hypothesis, nMurder is wrong " by the results t hat 
g enerally follow from murder. If on check ing the results 
one finds that discord, dama f~ e, harm, unhappiness, and the 
lik e result from murder t h en he has validated the hypothesis. 
1. See the discussion where Gei ger and oth er instrumentalists 
show t h e close relation between scientific fac t s and moral 
values. 
2. Hill, CET , 27-28. 
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Accordins to the ethics of t h e naturalists of the 
evolutionary type one may also e mp loy sc i entific technique 
to ch eck his ethical propos it ions. The propos it ion, 11ma-
lic i ous lying is wron;~ may be set u p as an hypothesis and 
ch eck ed for valid ity accordin g to the criterion of the evo-
lutionary e thicists. One may conclud e that lying har ms a 
socie t y an d mak es for its disinteg ration. 'ocia l survival 
is hampered through the practice of lyin.Y and therefore ly-
ing must be condemned as wrong . However, a normative defini-
tion of 11 h arm 11 must be assumed. 
The above are value judgments validated by scientific 
method. If Russell is to keep other scienti f ic propositions 
in t h e field of medicine, physics, chemi stry, and the like 
as valid t h en n e is oblig ated t o accept value judgmen s as 
valid also. As Drightman has so well put it: 
No positivistic ve t o is adequate t o forbid 
investigation of t h e larg er meanin; s of life. fhe 
positivist is interested in the facts of sense; so 
is every thinker. but the facts of sense are not 
all the fac t s; science, universals, values, persons, 
all point to ot her fac t s o r hypotheses.l 
liussell overlook s the fact that science i~self rests 
upon the fact of value judgments. There are very definite 
values tha~ a scientist prizes. The scientist places a 
g reat p remium on bein5 objective. The scientist places 
g reat value in truth an d other values. To reject value is 
1. Eri0 h t man, I TP, 215. 
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to destroy the very foundations of science, for science de-
pends upon the ob j ectivity of truth. 
In this respect Kent g ives a primacy to pure prac-
tical reason over pure speculative reason. He writes; 
When pure speculative and pure practical reason 
are combined in one cognition, the latter has the 
primaCI•••For without this subordination there would 
arise a conflict of reason with itself; since if they 
were mere ly co-ordinate, the former would close its 
boundaries strictly and admit nothing from the lat-
ter into its domain, while the latter would extend 
its bounds over everyGhing , and when its needs re-
quired would seek to embrace the f ormer within them. 
Nor could we reverse t;he order, and require pure 
practical reason to be subordinate t;o the s pecula-
tive, since all interest is ultimately practical, 
and even that of speculative reason is conditional, 
and it is only in t be pr!ctical employment of rea-
son that it is complete. 
Russell also overlooks t h e fs.ct that scientific me-
thod is not the criterion of truth, it is merely the proce-
dure of arrivin5:· at facts or the testing thereof. 'l'he cri-
terion of truth is coheren ce. A proposition is not judged 
in the li ght of its being a fact of sense. A proposition 
is judg ed in the light of its cohering with all the facts 
of experience, i.e., all whi ch enters consciousness. It is 
the lo : ical, consistent, ordering of all possible facts 
which lends validity to any proposition and not whether or 
not it is in the realm of sense experience. "Just as the co-
herent systematization of existential judgments reveals the 
1. Kant, CPR, 261-262. 
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truth about existence, so the coherent systematization oi' 
moral judgments g ives us the truth about moral values. 111 
To explain ~he facts of experience without including 
moral values results in incoherence. Almos~ everything one 
does or says is colored by value. Even to say, 11 1 like ~un­
shine, 11 involves aesthetic value. Seeming ly factual state-
ments when cohe r ent ly ordered take. on value significance • 
• ii. ccording to man y persons the raison d' ~tre 11 of science is 
its value, moral or otherwise. At least, practical reason 
has primac y over science. Kant says t hat pure speculative 
reas cn must be subordinate to pure practical reason "s ince 
all int erest is ultimately practical, and even thac of spa-
culative reason is conditional, and it is only in the prac-
tical employment of reason that it is comple te. 12 Without 
moral values, science has no meanina . li'or the utilitarian, 
the value and purpose of science 1 s in t h e bring ing about 
of h appiness for man. ~or the h edonis t , it is t h e enhance-
ment of pleasure . For the adherent of evolu·tionary ethics 
it is the enhancement of life. Without e thical value it is 
impossible to explain science coherently and i t is coherence 
tha t determines t he truth or falsity of propositions includ-
ing ~he propositions of science. 3 The worst of t~e matter 
1. Bertocci, Art. (1936), 270-271. 
2. Kant, CrR , 2 6 2. 
3. See Blanshard, NT, II, 259 ff., also Cobb, ~nv, 308-309. 
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is that Russell is fami liar wit h the criterion of coherence 
for h e discusses it at length in a book1 of his but rejects 
this crit erion in favor of the 11 criterion 11 of correspondence. 
He does not realize that alth ough correspond ence is a defini-
tion of truth, it csnnot be a criterion of truth for the rea-
2 
son t hat a proposition and its referent cannot be compared . 
Russell says that ethics is not a realit y but an emo-
t ional con di t ion b ecause one has no means of proving eth ical 
propositions.° Concerning t h e matter of moral propositions 
as bein3 mere ly emotional ejaculations, bhe same objections 
t h a t were launched a g ainst Ayer may also be used here . 
Russell, however, attempt s to claim that moral laws are 
wishes universally expressed, tha t i s , they are d esires ex-
4 pressed in the optative mood. 1'I do not think that an 
eth ical judgment merely expresses a desire; I a g ree with 
Kant that it must have an element of universe.lity. 115 Often, 
this is the case but the ethical reason for a moral attitud e 
beins; aroused is not be cause it h app ens to be aroused but 
because it ou_::sht to be aro used. Russell is of t h e mista.k en 
notion that simp ly because emotion often comes into p lay in 
ethica l ma t ters tha~ t h erefore et h ics is simp l y a matter of 
emotion. The s p eaker is habitua lly aroused and assumes a 
1. Russell, POP , 122 ff. 
2. See Randall and Buchler , PAI, 133. Also Brightman, ITP , 49. 
3 . Russell, RS, 230. 
4. Russell, RS , 235 ff. 
5. Russell, Art. (1944), 722. 
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certain moral attitude as a ras u lt of actions of a certain 
class because those actions s ugg est tba~ t h e person responsi-
ble r'or them is behavinJ immorally and that the speaker 
feels morally obli gated to ass~~e such an attitude. For 
exam~le, a person ma y feel oblig a t ed to feel a repugnance 
for malicious lies and t h erefore wh enever faced wit h a class 
of actions wh ich are 7 enerally prompted from malicious ly-
ing may because of habit feel an emotional repugnance. 
Because a person habitually behaves the same in a 
moral situation it does not lessen i ~ s moral nature. h ather, 
it increases that person's J:Horal qualities. 
In conclusion, it may be said that Russell's chief 
failure in g iving an adequate explanation of t h e facts of 
moral value lies first in his lack of employing a suitable 
criterion, as coherence, to explain the facts of experience 
and secondly, his confusion of emotion with morali t y. 
(b) Russell's Criti que of his Cwn 
Theory of ~Vlo ral Value 
Russell, himself, does not seem to b e satisfied with 
his emotive t h eory of moral values. Not only does he have 
valid objections to his own t heory but has accepted as valid 
some of t h e objections of oth ers of his emotive ethic. 
First of all, Russell has been accused of being in-
consistent in his eth ical theory for the reason that he claims 
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to be an emot i vist or a subj e ctivist and yet ne , in both 
practice and theory , maintains a typ e or obj e ctivity in 
ethics • 1 'i'he thesis of his emotive theory of values is chat 
t here a r e no morRl values, and yet he is not co ntent to let 
mora.l va lue s O' O 
.:J • His book Marri a s e and hlorals is con cerned 
with moral value in a non-emotive lig h t. In his book i-..:hat I 
Believe he is provoked at those p ersons who are morally in-
different or refuse to recognize as immoral certain acts. 
Ee is es pec i a ~Lly disturbed wi th clerg ymen who "condone cru-
elt y and cond emn innocent pleasure, t h ey can only d o harm 
as _guard. ians of the morals of the youn 3 • 112 For one who do e s 
not believe in moral value t:;he for ego i ng is indeed a strang e 
and contradic ti ory st at ement to make . In his History of 1Vest-
ern Philosophy he say s that one 11 cannot prove that it is ba d 
to en j oy ••• t he infliction of cruelty . 11 3 Yet elsewhe re h e 
writes , 11 P lea.sure in t he spectacle of cruelty horr ifies me , 
and I am no t ashamed of the fac t that it does. 114 In the 
section on e t hics i n his Philosophy his conc l usion is that 
'~he g ood life is one ins p ired by love and ~uid ed by k nowl-
edge . 115 The foregoin g quotations r·epres e nt contradictory po -
sitions and yet Russell a t tempts to ma.intain all of them. 
1. See Joad , CLP, 122 . 
2 . Russell, WIB , 47. 
;.) . Russell, HWP, 834. 
4 . Ru ssell, Art. (19 44), 720. 
5 . hussell, PHI , 235. 
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However, h e is consc i ous of his inconsistency. He sa ys, 
lam accused of inconsistency,l p erhaps .iustly, 
beca.use al thour':h I hold ultimate ethical valuations 
t6 be subjecti~e, I neverth eless allow myself em-
phatic opinions on ethi cal questions. If there is 
an inconsistency, it is on e t h at I cannot g e t rid 
of without insincerity.2 
~he forego ~n3 is a st atement which i mp lies that Rus-
sell h olds to moral value an d ob j ec t ive value s at that . His 
refusal to be i n sincere is a mark of moral concern b esides 
h i s insistence on rnaintaininf3 value judsments on ethi cal 
questions. 
nussell does no t; seem to be at all serious about h i s 
emotive theory of' ethics for he says t h at h e has no inten-
tions of giving u p his right to exp ress h i mself on moral 
issues. A moral r ight is incon sistent with a posi t ivisti c 
value theory and yet hussell s ays, 11 I am not prepar·ed to 
for e g o my rie ht to feel and express ethical passions; no 
amount of log ic, even thou_:; h i t be my own , will p ersuade me 
t h at I ouGht to do so • 113 'l'his statement is not only a re-
pudiation of emotivism but it cas t s aside the prin cip les of 
lo~ical positivism as inv&lid . Russell does no t use the 
terms 1 ri :?;ht" and 11 ought 11 as the emoti vist would insist u p on, 
i.e., in terms o f' a command but rath er i n a metaphysi cal 
li -:sht. '.r o comp licate his position st i ll f urther he add s, 
l. Russell writes i n reference to rlu chler 1 s accusa t ion of 
him. ~ee Buchler, Art. (19 44 ), 510 ff. 
2. hussell, Art. (1 ~44 ), 720 . 
3 . Russell , Art . (1944), 720. 
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ni am no more prepared to g ive up all this than I am to g ive 
u p the multipli cation table. " 1 hussell believes that the 
confusion and inconsistency found in rJ.is et l1i cal philosophy 
is due to the sub ject ivity of ethical evaluations. Bussell 
is rig h t in so thinking for a subjectivistic value theory i s 
inh erent ly self-contradictory. The reason for this is that 
the person wh o offers a sub ject ivist theory of value is in 
effect maintainin ~ t h e ob j ect ivity of values. The subjectiv-
ist is int ending to say that his value theory is t he right 
one or at least the best one, ~~., the most valuable inde-
pendent of what one's s ub j ective thoug ht s and desires are. 
Joad h a s offered some i nteresting ideas on the subtle 
errors invol ved in a subject ivist's theory of ethi cs. Joa.d 
sa ys that if the subjectivist's analysis of moral value is 
true , eith er there is no meaning to moral judgments , or it 
means t hat moral judgments are made by a statis ~ical count. 2 
If the first is true then g ood j udgment in reference to mo-
rals is meaning less. All op in i ons are of e qual value, 11 the 
chi ld's as g ood as the a dult's, t h e idiot's as t h e sag e's, 
the savag e's as the civilized man 1 s."3 No one really be-
lieves the fore going to be true. If the second is true then 
ethics is a matt er of statistical count. 4 
1. Russell, Art . (1944 ), 720. 
2 . Parker g ives a leg a l rat h er t h ru1 
tion to h uss e ll 1 s subjecti vism. 
0 . Joad, DPI , 151. 
4 . See Buch ler, Art. (1944), 515. 
statistical interpreta-
~ee his Art . (1949 ), 238. 
97 
J oad has a better argu.'Tient ag ainst sub j ectivism . He 
sa ys that before ther·mometers were invented people h a d to 
g uess a t the temperature of a room. A person encerins a 
room from the cold. outside vvould say the room was warm and 
the person entering the same room from a warmer r·o om would 
fe e l cold. ~he amount of heat whi ch was really in the room 
independ ent of the g uesses could n ot be establis hed and was 
conside red unverifiable. Joa.d concludes, lf Are we, then, to 
suppose t h at t h e judgment, 1 the temperature of the room is so 
and so,' was a s ubjecti ve judgment before there were therm.o-
1 
meters but became objective when they were invented?" 
fhe same holds true in moral matters. Simply because o p ini-
ons differ tha t does not mean that an objective jud,.;ment is 
i mpossible. It means, merely, that one of the twc contrary 
v iews is erroneous or tha t both are i n error, but not that 
truth or moral value is subjective. 
Joad ar•gues t;hat if subjectiv lsm is true then com-
mun i cation os subjective values is impossible f or '1there 
is ••• no corrliD on ob j ect of judgment. u2 I f John judges that 
James is s ufferi ng , according to sub j ectivism, John is judg -
ing h is ovm menta l s t ate and cannot tell what state or feel-
ing J-ames is underg oing . Whenever John mak es a stat ement 
about t t. e experiences of James, John is merely making a 
1. Joad, DPI, 148. 
2. Joad, .LJPI, 150. 
98 
statement a bout his own. 
·J: here is, then, on this view, no log ical basis 
for fellow feeling or· f or sympathet ic emot i on. Hence, 
wh en I extend sympathy t o some body wh o is i n trouble, 
l mi ght j ust as well, so far as the lo gic of the mat-
ter g oes, extend cong ratulation. ~~hy, then, it may 
be ask ed, do many peo p le concur in feeling sympathy 
on hear i n g of X's misfortune, instea d of re j oicing 
at it. 
Russell says that he is a sub j ectivist b ec ause he 
think s that the propert y 1t trut h;1 cannot be applied to eth ical 
judgments. That is, value jud gments a r e not inde p endent of 
what persons may or may not think about them. 'l'here are 
two difficulties involved in hussell's thinking at this 
point. r h e first is t hat value jud gments do have ob jectivi-
ty a nd are capable of the propert y celled tru t h . The value 
judgment .;You ought t o do what is ri ght' is both true and 
indep endent of wh at persons ma y or may not think about it. 
It is true t hat t h ere may be wide differences as to wh at is 
right but t h at does no t affec t its val idity. Scientists are 
in disag reement as to the nature of t h e atom but that does 
not mean t h ere is no atom. Second ly, nothin3 is completely 
ind ependent of a person's t h ink ing of it. If tru th is the 
corresp on de n ce of an idea with its ob j ect; at least t h e i d ea 
is not ind e p endent of man's thinking it. Simply b ecause a 
man thi nk s t h at moral values are to be found within t h e human 
personalit y , t h at does no t pr ove that it is sub j ective. The 
l. J oad , D? I, 150. 
truth of the matter may be that, that is where moral value 
is t;o be found. 
Another inconsistency in Russell's emotive theory of 
values which Russell a pparently does no t see is in the mat-
t er of the expression of ethi cal o p inions and t h e insistence 
that othe rs be · ·bound to them in spite of the fact that Rus-
sell thinks them to be subjective. Russell says: 
buppose, for example, that someone were to 
advocate the introduction of bull-fighting in this 
country. In opposin,:s the propose_l, I should feel, 
not only that I was expressing my desires, bu_t __ _ 
t h a t my desires in t he matter are right.l 
.hussell believes that in making the above statement 
h e is not guilty of any inconsistency. How he is able to 
mab. e such a claim without abusin g the term "right it is d iffi-
cult to understand. n y ttri ght 11 one means an objectlvity and 
truth in moral matters. How can one be objective and sub-
jective at the same time about the same thing ? Moreover, 
how can one be right about moral matters when by his own 
standards there is no rig ht in moral matters? Althoug h 
Russell thinks that he has not been gu i lty of lo 1~ ical incon-
sistency, apparently he has g rave d oubts for he a dmits the 
fact that although holding to such an inte rpretation of ethics, 
he is not satisfied and add s, "While my own opinions as to 
ethics do not satisfy me, other people's satisfy me still lessJ12 
1. Russell, Art. (1944), &24. 
2. Bussell, Art. (1944), 724. 
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In conclu sion, it mi g h t be said t h at Russell is, 
fundament al l y , not a subjectivist in ethics, a t least the 
ethi cs he is committ e d to, as far as practice is concerned, 
h e is not s ub j ectivistic. F'c r he conclud es, tr ·wh s.t is horrible 
I will see as horrible, 11 i.e., wh at is in truth horrible, 
irrespective of what people t h ink , f>.ussell will make t h e 
jud3ment of moral value that it is in truth horrible. 
8. C. K. Ogden and I.A. Richa rds 
Stat ement of the position of Ogden and h icnards. 
Ogden and Hichards pres ent an e motive concept of ethics 1 at 
whi ch they have arrived from a se eminsly literary point of 
view- . At leas t their emphasis is primarily u pon the literary . 
'l'his view is pr e s ented prLnarily i n their work , 'l'he iviean ing 
of Meaning . Hc wever, Rich ards in oth er work s of h is pre s ent s 
an ethi cal view wh ich is fundrunentally h edonis t ic rather 
t h an emotivistlc. Good, for him, is redu ced to p leasure and 
''an evil exp erience is one wb.ich is self-thwa r ting or con -
duel ve to stul t ifying conflicts. 11 2 Hov1ever, s i nce our pro b-
l em concern s t h e emotive it is best t h at we restrict the d is-
cussion here to t h e emotive. 
3 
'rhese men cl a im that lan5uag e h as two functions: 
1. Richards, ? LC and SAP , 03-42. 
2. Richa rds, SAP , 42. 
3. Par ticuls.rly in Og den an d Ei cha rds, ~Vllvi , and hi cllards, 
PLC. 
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(1) symbolic and (2) emotive. 1 ·.J.·he symbolic function of 
le.n .suag e is to descrioe and make cog n i tive statements as is 
done in the sciences • .l'he emotive functi on of languag e, 
on the ocher hand, is not to make cognitive statements at 
all but simply to express or evince emotions. Og den believes 
t h at l&ngua~ e ori ·3inally was 11 almos·t purely emotive. \1 2 This 
function of languag e is more commonly found in e thics, reli-
g ion, poetry and those thing s which are not matters of sci-
entific description but rather, emotional expression. hmo-
tive terms do not have corresponding objects which are open 
to public investig ation. Rat her t h an · having any scientific 
value they have a suasory or persuasive value. ttrn actual 
discussion terms are used at least as much for their suasory 
and emotive effects as for their strictly symbolic value. 113 
Em9tive lan~uag e is used to express attitudes, emotions, 
feeling s, and the like and therefore does not mak e state-
ments of fact. Often the written word loses much of its 
emotive function which is retained in the manner and tone of 
the spoken word and therefore g rammatical devices are used 
to compensate for it. 
l' h ere are s:ttuations which derl ve from atti-
tudes, such as amity an. d hostility, of t he speaker 
1. Ogden and f, ichards, MJ1·f, 10, 149, Rich ards, PLC, 267-268, 
and in Og den, PC, 210, 353. 
2. Og den, PC, 353. 
3. Og den and Richards, MM , 123. 
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to his audience. In writ&en lan guag e many o f the 
most ob vious signs are necessarily lost. Manner 
and tone of voice h ave to be replaced by t h e vari-
ous devices, conventional formulae, exag~erations 1 under-statements, fi ;_s ures of speech, underlinin:<J,; • 
:Emotive ter;.ns are si,gns of attitudes, moods, interest, 
temper , set of mind , purpose. 'rhey have no ref'erent; they 
are the setting orbackg round in wh i ch the references occur. 
Terms that symbolize have a reference. ''One [s ;y-mbolic] is 
interpreted from symbols to references and so to referent; 
t h e other [emotive] is interpret e d f rom verbal signs to the 
attitude, moo d , interest, purpose, desire . n2 
Descrip tive statements and analyses are used to com-
municate fa c ts . They are g enuine statements. They ha ve 
co :;ni ti ve value. ·l'hey have ob jective or common meanine.; s. 
~hey supply one with facts. They h ave a factual content. 
They may be true or false statement s. They are vehicles of 
reference. 
If we say, "The heig ht of the .t:: iffel Tower is 900 
feet , li we are making a s tatement , we are using sym-
bols in order to record or communicate a reference, 
a nd our symbol is true or false in a strict sense 
and is theoretically v e rifiable .3 
Emo t ive terms on the other hand do not co~nuni cate 
facts but rather are used to excite emotion , to stimulate 
a desired attitude. Emotive terms solicit emotions, atti-
1. Og den and Richards , Ivfl\1 , 224 . 
2. Og den and Richards, MM, 283. Brackets mine. 
6 . Ogden and Richards , MM , 1 49 . 
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tud es, mo od s, intentions , and the like. .c;mo-r;ive "Germs do 
not d es crib e, they evoke. ~hey have n o fac t ual content. 
ihey cannot be true or false for t hey do not fall within 
·the reference of truth or falsity. 'rhey are not even state-
ments . Og den and Richards are influenced by Ben-r;hem 's 
theory of fictions in the matter of ethics. For Benth am, 
'the word ri ~ht is the name of a fi ctitious en~ity; one of 
those objects the existence o f which is fei .gned .f'or the pur-
pose of discourse--by a fi ction so n e cessar y t h at without it 
human d iscourse could not be carried on. 11 1 Og den and nich-
ard s s ay that if you can predica te truth or falsity to a 
statement then you h ave a sci ent i fi c statement, you have a 
s ~nbo lic use of l anguag e, and you do not have an emotive 
2 
u tcerance. '1I f we say ' Hurraht' or ' Po etry iss s pirit ' 
or 111an is a worm,' we may not be making statements, not 
even false s tatement s; we are most probably using words 
.me rely to evoke certa i n a ttl tudes, 1' 3 Often terms that are 
va gue and ambiguous, i.e., with out exp licit meaning , are 
used and h ave conside rable mea n ins simply be caus e of their 
emotive fun ction. Al though they d o not sug g est clear i dea s 
they are st imulants o f attitudes a Ld e vok e emotions. As 
such they s tate nothin3 and therefore c annot be said to be 
l. O;den, BTF , 118. 
2. O,?; d en and Richa.rds, Ivu'V[ , 150. 
~. Og d en and Richards, MM, 149, 151. 
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true or false. 
In ~ eneral that affect i on for a word even when it 
is admitt e d to be ambiguous, which is such a com-
mon feature of d iscussion , is very often due to its 
emot ive efficiency rather than to a.n y real diffi-
culty in finding alter nativi symbols which will 
sup~)ort t; h e s a1ne refe rence. 
In our own d ay h ere in America, l abor leaders ·tell us t h at 
all you ha ve to do i n a labor union to prevent a certain 
person from being elected to a hi3h labor office is simp ly 
to label him a •Communist.' However, if' you were to label 
the same man a socialis t it would not g et the same results. 
'I' h e emotive function o f the term ' Qommunist' h as tremendous 
emotive value today in America, wh ereas during World War II 
wh e n Russia was an Am erican Ally it had no such emotive 
eff eci:i. Not too lon;:; a~ o, the Committee on Un - Ame rican Ac-
tivities a ttempting to expose Communistic ac t ivitie s f'rom 
this country s ummoned some actors f rom Hollywood for trial. 
Cne actor w11o was a witness for tl: s trial ma d e the state-
ment to t h e eff ect t h at h e did not know wha t Communism was 
but h e knew tha t he didn't like i t . Thus we see i t as pure-
ly an emotive attitud e with no symbolic meaning . 
Eichards illustrates the foregoing by saying ths.t 
11 A boy's 1 Idea' of Friendship or of Sur!Lmer or of his Country 
is no t , thoug h uhe name would seem to imply it, primarily an 
intellectual affair. I ~ is rat he r an attitude or set of 
l. Og d en and Rich ards, MM, 150. 
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at t itudes, of tendenc i es to act in certain fashions rather 
than others • 1 1 
Et h ics is one f ield in wh ich emotive terms have been 
misconstrued as having symbolic mean ing . IG is not surpris-
ing that Ogden and h ich ards would p l a ce ethics in the reaj_m 
of t h e e :no t i ve for they consid er some aspects of mathematics 
as emotive. They write, 
Ail such terms as Intuition, Emotion, Freedom, Lo-
gic, I mme diacy, are already famous for their po wer 
to confuse and frustrate discussion ••• not even 
!Y!at hema t ics is free as a whole f rom emotive comp li-
cations.2 
'l' h e f ield of ethics is full with the emo t ive. 'r he 
g ood as f ound used by moralists is an emotive term and de-
scr·ibes nothing , therefore truth or falsity cannot be predi-
cated of moral statements. Richards says that Good as an 
unanalyzable idea is a special twist iig iven to some of our 
im~ulses b y habits deriving ult i mately from desires. They 
linrr er in our minds because to t hink of a thin~ as G- ood or 
Beautiful gives more i®nediate emotional satisfa ction t h an 
t o refer to it as satisfyin6 our impulses in one s p ecial 
fashion or other. 11 3 'I'here are no moral statements; they 
are emo t ive suasions. 11 Good 11 has no meaning except to evoke 
an attitude in ano t h er person. It is a term expressin3 emo-
1. Rich a rds, PLC, 202. 
2. Og den and Richa rds, MM, 153 . 
3. Rich ard s, PLC, 264. 
tion. G . E . Moore is ch alleng ed for his use of the word 
11 Good 11 by Og d en an d Richards. 'l' hey write: 1 
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1 Good' is alleg ed to stand f or a unique, unan-
alysable concept. This concept , it is said, is the 
sub j ect-matter of Ethics. I'his pe culiar use of t h e 
word ' good' is, we susgest, a purely emotive use. 
when so used t h e word stand s for nothing whatever , 
and has no syrr1bolic fun ction . Thus when we so use 
it i n the sentence , ' This is g ood,' we meraly re-
fer to ~his, and the add j_ tion of 'is good' mak es no 
diff'ere~whatever to our reference. - 'hnen, on the 
oth er hand , we say, ' This is red,' the addition of 
'is red' to ' this' does-8~nbolize an extension of 
our reference, namely, t o some other red t h ing . 
But 'is good' has no comparable symbolic function; 
it serves only as an emotive sig n expressing our 
attitude to this, and p e r hap s evok ing similar atti-
tudes in o ther persons, o r inciting t h em to actions 
of one k ind or ano ~her ••• Tne indefin able ' good' ••• 
we su~g est t o be a purely emotive sign. I'he 's ome -
thing more' or 'somethine; else' wh ich , it is al-
leg ed, is not covered b y an y definition of ' g ood' 
is t h e emotiona l aura of t he word. 
Richards h as g one to the extreme of assertion t h at 
even the metaphysical assertions of the philosophers are not 
statements at all. £hey are simp ly emotive e x citations. 
The persistent mind-body problem of t h e philosophers, h e 
t hink s to be a pseudo prob l em . Wnat t h e Ideal i sts and i.v!ate-
r ialists are doing is simply forcing their attitudes upon 
each other . " 'I' he Mind-Bod y p roblem is strictly speaking no 
problem; it is an imbro ·:; lio due to failure to settle a real 
problem.;; namely, as to when we are makin:7 a statement and 
when mere ly inciting an attitude. 112 Richards believes that 
1. Og den and Eichards, 1\11\'I , 125. 
2 . Richard s, PLC, 84 . 
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many apparent ques t ions that beg in as questions ~ i th words 
like 'what, ' 'why,' and the like are not questions at all . 
They are "re que sts for emotive satisfaction." 1 For example , 
man y of t h e questions raised in the field of relig .Lon are 
of thi s nature. 
9 . Criti que of the Eth ics of C. K. Og den 
and I . A. Richards 
O~ den and Richa rds have reduced terms to a dual clas-
sifi cation of either havin~ informative value or emotive 
value. 'rhey have attempted to show that only the informa-
tive , i.e., ~he symbolic, has mean ing whereas the ffinotive 
merely evinces emotions. ~nat they s hould have said is t h at 
t h ey b oth have meanin:; but not the same kind of meaning , 
e. g. (l) symbolic meaning , (2) emotive meaning . They have 
in so doing been victimized by their ovm language . Osoorne 
says of 0g d en and Richards that " ••• certain philosophers have 
been systema~ically trained to mistak e the g rammar of l an-
g uaz e for t h e g r ammar of Reality ." 2 It is true that t h e in-
formative use of lanGuag e does have meaning , but i t is also 
true t hat the emotive use of langu2.;; e a l so ha s me aninry . If 
it were not true t hat the emoti ve use of lan~ua ge had meaning 
1. Richards , PLC, 84 . 
2 . Osborne , FPV, 17. 
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then i ~ could not b e c apable of p r o duc i n g emotion. More-
over, it could n ot be csps.ble of produ c lng the des i red emo-
tion rath er t h a n just a n y emotion. Certain words with emo-
tive meanins produce one k i nd of emotion whereas oth er emo-
tive words produce another kind of emotion. 
It is not the emotive term per se that produces the 
emotion but rather, the mean i nJ that it holds for t h e hearer . 
A ch ild recitin6 ~hakespeare well before an audience ffiay 
cause the audience t o experience emotions. However , the 
child not understanding the meaning o f the words t h a t h e is 
recitin3 ma y experience no emo tion whatsoever • 
.Poe t ry, of ten wit h words whose meaning s e_re va 3ue , 
must s t ill h ave some meaning or else it could not excite 
a ny emotion in a person . If it h ad no meanin3 whatsoever 
~hen t hese emotive words would be opaque and not phase i t s 
listen er i n t he least --as in the po e try of ~dgar Allen Poe 
wh ose g enius i n poetry it is said lies in the fact t h at n e 
i~ able to use words wh ich are vague in meaning and yet have 
meaning enous h to produce emotion. 
Og den and Rich&rds are attempting t o prove that 
t h ere ar·e emotive terms &nd t h at the only mean in.:; s ethical 
terms have are emotive . As was just shown this is not the 
cas e . No ter·m excitin3 emotion can be completely withou t 
meaninc; • I n the c ase of ethical ter·ms it is true that 
sometimes they do excite emotion. However, this does not 
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mean that -che y are without meaning as Og den and Richards and 
the o ther radical emotivists are attempting t;o prove, but 
rather on the contrary it proves that they must have meani n g 
in order to excite emotion. 
!Vi:oreover , simply because a term is capable of' excit-
ing emotion, it does not mean that that is its sole func-
tion for the term ma~r have other functions also as a s ym-
bolic or informative fun ction. For example, a man address-
ing an aud i ence concerning the extremely bad state of sl~~s 
in his ci ty may not only be informing them of the undesirable 
state t ha t exists but he may also seek to excite them emo-
tionally in order that they mi ght do something about t h e 
clearance thereof. 
'rhe basic fallacy that Og den and Richards have com-
m.i tted is ass u...~ine; that since there are words that excite 
emotions , that the y therefore have no meaning or that they 
have no other function. 
10. Concluding Remarks Concernin;; the 
E.adi cal Zn1oti vists 
The pre ceding g roup of men have been calle d radical 
emotivists because of the rollowing reasons: 
l. Th ey a gree that etrilcal propositions are non-
co gnitive. That is, ther8 are no value judgments . E thi cal 
statement s are non - meanin,z;ful statements. Ethical st a te-
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ments do noc convey information. 
2. They a~ree that there are neibher no~ms nor obli-
g ations. Et hi cal principles do not exist. 
3. They ag ree that ethics is not even a subjective 
matter. That is, ethics is not even a matter of opinion, 
interest, or subjective ju~sment. 
4. 'l'hey a=:_s ree that ethi cs is merely a m&.tter of emo-
tion. It is an evincin ~ , an ejaculation about which propo-
sitions cannot be made. 
5. They a g ree t hat there is no objectivity in ethics. 
In all major respects the radical emotivists are in 
a g reement with each other. Later, the resemblances and dif-
ferences will be shown concern ins the re.di cal emo t i vists, 
the psycholo g ical emotivist;s, the moder&_te emotivists, t h e 
liberal emotivists, and the personalis ~ ic emotivists. A 




1. Relation betwe en Psychologi cal Emotivism and 
Radical Emotivi sm. Between t he psychologica l s ystem of 
log~ cal pos i t i vistic ethics exemplified by Schlick and the 
radica l emotivist i c system of e th i cs exemplified by the lo-
gical positivists Carnap, Ayer , Russell , Ogden a nd Richards 
there is a d efinite difference . Thi s difference i s the 
f irst major step or log ical devel opment f r om t he extreme 
s keptical p o sition he ld by logical po s i tivists in matters 
of e thi cs to a more conventional f o rm . That is , there are 
var i ed differences among the l ogical p ositivis t s i n etJ:1i cs 
all the way from denying obligati on as a reality to a com-
plete s kept ic i sm as f ound in t he systems of the r a dical 
emotivist s. 
The r a dical e motivist s are out - and- out skep t i c s i n 
the matter of ethics , whereas psychol og ical em~t·vism a s 
ex ~:nnplit ied in the interpretation ') f moral experience by 
Schlick r epresent s the first ma j or difference i n the 
ethics of the logical p osit i vists . As was p o int .d out in 
t h e pre vi ous chapter , t he rad ical emot1_v i s t s have d e ni_e d al l 
ethica l bel5_e.fs. They have r e jectGd t h e val i d i ty of v a l ue 
j ude;ments so t h a t one cannot cla im moral truth . Ethical 
j ud gments c a nnot b e ma "e f o r there are n o p r oposi t i ons i n 
t h e .field o f' e thi cs. An act c a nnot b e go od o r b a d i n an y 
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eth::i.cal s ense for there c an b e no r igh t o r . V'i-rong propo s i -
tions i n the fie l d of ethics. Ethics i s a misnome r and 
ethi c a l di scus s i on must be rele g a. t ed. to the f ie ld of oc -
cult stud le s . 
Psych ologi ca l e motiv l s m of t h e l ogi c a l positivis t ic 
school r e j e ct s such conclus 1ons as unf ounded and extreme . 
The psyc}lOl ogi.c a l emotiv ists bel i..eve t h at t here :i. s more to 
e t hics and do n o t strip ethi c s s o comple t e l y o f i ts c h a r -
a c ter . S chli ck b e lieve s t hat ethics 1as a mo st lmport nt 
place in so c iety and c annot b e d ·;_scarded a s t he radical 
emo t i v lst s a re s e eking t o do . I n the f i rst p l a c e ethi cal 
p r opositions c an be made and A.re made and, moreo ver , are 
valid . To den y propos i tions in t he f ield of ethi cs i s to 
repudiat e psy chology as a s c i~nce , for ethic a l propositions 
are psych o l ogi c a l propos i tions . Va lue judgments are made and 
belong; t o t h e prrJ v ince of p s y cholngy . 1JVhe ree.s , the radi cal 
emotiv is ts rule out of philosophy any cognl.t ive examination 
of ethlc a l propositions , the psych:J l ogi c a l emot i v is t claims 
tha t the prope r task of philosopher s i s t o interpre t or to 
e; ive meaning to sc ient ific propo s :l t ions . Si nce ethic a l 
p r opositions are sclent i fic p r opositions , e t hics is t here -
f ore a val id tas k to be undertaken by the phi losophe r . 
Mo reo ver , the psycholo?:; i c a l emot i vist makes a sharp 
break a way f r om the r a dic a l emot i v :L sts conce rning the matt e r 
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o f eth i c al a ction . Th e re are n o eth i c a l a c ts f or the 
r a d i c a l e mot i v i st , bu t f o r t h e p s y ch o l og i c a l emot i v i s t 
t he re are. Th e i nte r p re t c: .t i on r::. i v en t o psychol o~ica l 
p r op os ition s , i n t h e r e alm of e t hi cs , a ct s a s a stimulu s 
to c o:rrmri.. t ce r t ain a cts vhi..ch hav e mor a l s i gn i fi c a nce . 
Howe v e r , the p r op o si t ion s of eth i cs a re n o t n ·'J r ma t i v e , 
t h e y a re de scr ip t i ve . 
The rad i c a l e mot iv i.s bs re ject e t h i c s as a meani n g l ess 
study whe re a s t he p s y cho l og i c a l e mo t i v i s ts a c c ep t ethi c s 
a s me anin0 fu l a nd c on c e rn t he mselve s wi t h the d i s cussion 
of moral c o11du ct . Th ere j_s n o activ ity whi ch may be 
con s idered moral f o r t h e r a di ca l emo t i v i st wherea s f :) r 
t h e p s y c ho l og i c al e mot ivi s t conduct and de c i s i on s are 
p r op er f a cts of mo r a l exper i ence and mor a l ac t i v i t y . 
Th e ma j o r d iffe r e n c e betwe e n the et h i cs )f t h e 
r ad i c a l e mo t i v i st and t h e p sycho l o ~~ ica l e mo t i v is t i s 
t ha.t f r t he r 2.d ica l e mo t i v i s t t h e r e are n o mor a l value s 
whe r e a s f -:Jr t h e psy ch o l ogi c a l e motiv i st t h e r e are mor a l 
va l ue s . Th e t wo ou t sta n d i.ng prop on e n ts of th ·i.s s choo l 
are Sch lick and Fe i e; l . 
2 . Mori t z Schlick 
Mo r i tz S ch l ick i s a lso a me mb e r of t h e s ch ool of 
Logica l Po s i tiv i s m a nd ha s made a con tr j_b u t i on t o t he stu d y 
of the e motiv e ethic . F or S ch l i c k , t h e r e are n o phi l o s op h i -
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c a l p r oposit ions . Ev en scientifi c p r opo sit ions are 
only de finition s wh ich "are i n n o way bo und u p with 
natura l l aw s 11 • 1 Hov1ever , Schl i ck believe s t hat he h a s 
w~de some j udgments j_n h is treatment of eth i cs 2 bu t t h ese 
h e bel l eve s to be scie n t ific j udgme n ts in t he field of 
psycho l ogy . Philo s ophy , f or h i m, i s no t a scienc e , its 
t ask is to g i ve mean-i.n g t o sc i ent ific p rop o s i t lons . Philo -
s ophy is a c tiv:Lty '!Jhere as scienc e deal s with tl1 e des c r i p -
tive . T 1e questi on a r i s es , !!How c an Schl i ck wri t e a phi l -
os oph ical b ook on et ic s s inc e one c an_rwt pu t act ivlty :nto 
a b o ok ?" Sch lic k give s a t wofo ld answe r to thi s que s t i on . 
Firs t of al l , h e bel i.. eves thG. t he is communica ti g so me 
t r ue propositi ons in t hat 11.e is ma king some s c i enti f i c 
ones i n t he fie ld of psych ol oc; i c a l s cienc e . Second , . e 
b e l ieves t h a t he has c ontributed some thin g to phil osophi -
c a l ac t i v .i.ty (ethics ) i . e ., a lthough t he se a re n ot s. c t u al 
propo s itions, t hey serv e as " s t imu li f or the r eade r to 
c arry out th 1s e a cts b y virtue o f whi ch c ertain propos i tions 
ob t ain a cl ear meanj_ng .il3 
Ethi c s , the refore , j_f it is t o hav e meanin.::; must 
b e a sc ience a nd we r e l egate i t t o t he p r ov i nce of psy ch o l ogy . 
The re fo re , the p r op os it i ons o f e thics a re de scriptive , n o t 
1 . Schl i c k , Art . {1936 ), 352 . 
2 . Schlie ~ , PE , Dav t d Rynin ( tr .). 
3. Schl i c k , PE , x :tv . 
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normat i ve. The ph i l o s ,)pher is conce rned with tru th and 
t r uth ab :mt p r opositions concern ing ethics must the :t·efore 
be descr iptive . All else belong s to the moral j_ st and 
reformer. Ethics which deals with the pra ctical is n ot 
philo s ophy f or the philosopher's only goal i s . truth. 
The or e t i cal questions are indepen dent of human intere st. 
Ethics, f or Schlick , is not a question of norms, 
1 b ut a question of the motive s of conduct in genera l. 
Et h ics is a matter of inquir i ng into the caus e s, regu-
larity, and order of huma n actions in o r d e r t o arr i ve at 
the m·ltive s of moral a ctions. "Thus the central problem 
of ethics concern s the c ausal explana tion of moral be-
havior.112 Althou gh this makes ethi cs a branch of psychol -
ogy, Schlick ins i sts that it does n o t me a n that the r e is 
there f ore n o truth in ethics. The entire que stion for 
him is merely a terminc) logical one. 
Not all psychological activity can be considere d 
mora l conduct. We must distinguish between mere psychologi-
c a l activity and conduct. Condu ct constitu tes act s whi ch 
represent the d e cisions of life; they constitute moral 
activ i ty or e thi cs which is a matt e r of mak ing r esolutions. 
1. S chlick, PE , 27. 
2. Schlick, PE, 28. 
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Mere activity is ext e rnal or supe r f icia l a nd o f ten d oes 
n 'J t reach c on s ciousnes s . Conduct is concer ne d wi th will-
ful acts or de cis idns. If it were n ot f or acts of wi ll 
a ll life would be me re a ctivi ty. Howeve r, acts of will 
or choosing a r e n ot a matt e r o f a special power, i.e., 
t he will. The will is d e t e r mined i n its decis i ons by 
the v a r i ous motives. The ent i r e motiva ting proc e ss is 
what Schlicl';: calls "act s of will." 
In the conf lict of mot i ves, tha t ide a which tri-
umphs over all others is an act of will and is governed 
by the law of motiva tion. The idea that ge ts the upper 
hand is v:rhat the individu a l pref'ers or wills. Howeve r, 
it i s s till only a matter of t h e motiva t i on o f human con -
duct. The "plea sur e v a lue " of anidea1 g ives one its 
nmotivat i v e p ower.n 
The l aw of motivat ion or that which govern s our 
cho i ce is d e t e rmined by that wh i ch i s most plea s ant or 
lea s t unp le a s ant. Ev en i n i n s tance s of s a crif i ce psycho -
logical h edonism holds . Fo r examp l e , a girl b e cause of 
prope r breeding mak es a sacrifi ce and s e l e cts t h e smaller 
p i e ce of cake f or h e rse lf when she d es i res the larger. 
She does so b e c ause she h a s ideas in mind of plea s ed or 
d i s p l e a s ed p a rent s tog e ther with t h eir a t titude of praise 
1. Schlick oft en uses the te r m i d e a a s me aning motiv e. 
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or censu e . T e "martyr a c cepts pain and death or t he 
sal{e of a ide a , a f rj end e; i ves h is l ife or ' h appine s s 1 
for his fr end ••• . e desir e s t o carry out or realize a 
def · n i te goal . nl The 1.U1i versal 1aw gave rning a ll our 
cho ice s , accord ing to Schli ck , is that motive wh ich has 
the "great e st dee;ree of pleasar t feeling conne c ted with 
• t 11 2 l. • 
To desire i s n ot the same t h i ne; as to · ill . : i ll -
i n e; is j o i ne d to action an conduct . Desire is imag i ned ; 
ho~ever , that whi ch is imae;ined with t he great e st amount 
of p le asure is v·illed . 
Sch llc k is n ot a n eg ois t :i_ c hedon ist . He conde mn.:s. 
e goism as i mrooral . Ego ism i s n ot an i mpulse n or is it 
the vrill to p leasure . I t is not se lf-preserva t ion . The 
bes t def i nition of e coism is !! i n c onsiderateness . " At 
lea s t it i s t he pe cu liar charact eristi c of th e egois t . 
"Ego ist i c volition is for us an example of i mmor al voli -
tion , v olition t hat is condemned ."J We condemn e e;o i sm be -
cause i t is s lf i sh and the se l fislmess of a nother a l ways 
cause s us pain directly . "For it s essenc e is just in-
cons i de r ateness with r ·?.Spe ct to the intere s t s of fel l ow 
men , the pur suit of per s onal ends at the c ost of those of 
1 . Sch l i ck , PE, 45. 
2 . Sch lick , PE , 1!-7. 




To condenm an act as iwmoral is to desire that 
it should n ot occur . I n othe r words it is the i dea t ha t 
should the thing tak e place it would be unpleas ant . 
Tl: e mora l valuations of modes of behavior and 
characters are nothine; but t he emot i onal react i ons 
with wh:i.ch human s o c iety responds to pleasant nd 
sorrowful c onsequences t ha t , a c c ordi ng to the aver -
age experience , p roc e e d from those modes o f be-
havior and charac ters . Z 
The centra l point of morality is n ot a question 
of "Wha t is demande d of me?il but rather a que stion o f 
"How must I liv e to be happy ? 11 Morality is not a matter 
of demand but rather of desire . It is n ot a question of 
what is demanded of you as a moral being but rather a 
quest ion o f what y ou desire to d o f or others . A morality 
of d e sire is one of self- assertion , it emphasizes the af -
fi rmat ' ve whereas the morality of demand is an eth i cs of 
self- limitation and i t emphasizes the ne gative . The basic 
d i f f'e ren c e between t he t vo lies i n the conc e pt of " good~' 
Good may mean a demand {obligation ) or a desire . Good i n 
the moral sense of the term refer s t o ( 1 ) human decisions 
and ( 2 ) t h e app r obations of society . Moral demands are 
the expressions of the desires of soc iety ; they are s ocial 
a p pr ob a ti ons . Good as desire results in a uti l it a rian doc -
1 . S chli c k , PE , 77. 
2 . S chli ck , PE , 78 . 
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trine . 
Are there absolute value s? Schlick would answer 
"no 11 f o r t wo re a sons . The first is that the term " a bs o-
lute 11 ha s no meaning. Secondly, even if s ome mea.ning 
c ould be found so as to b e able to d e termine a hierarc hy 
of ob ject i ve v a lues , e l!len then, v a lues would be purely 
of sc ient ific inte re st . Schlick defend s this by say i ng : 
To my quest ion , 11 'Nl:1e.t d o t hese objective 
v a lues mean to me ?" t he ab s oluti s t answers, "They 
c onst itute the gu i d ing l i nes of your c on duct ! I n 
s et ting up your goals of a ct ion you should pre _er 
the higher to t he l o"~Jve r." If I then a sk, "Vhy1'1 
the abs olutist c annot g i v e any answe r . Th l s i s 
the deci s i ve p oint , t ha t b e c ause of h i s the s i s of 
the independence of v a l ue s , the abs ~ lut i st has 
cut l i mse lf oJ.f from all pos s ibil i ty of g iving a ny 
other ansvv-e r to my questi on, "!ha t happens if I 
don ' t d o it ? 11 than , "Then you d on't d o it , that i s 
a ll ! 11 Should he answer , n I n th a t c a se y ou are n o t 
a good man , 11 t hen we should 1mow t hat this answer 
is r e levant and can influence my ac t i on on ly i f I 
desi r e • • • to be a " g ood man , " tha t is , only if i t 
i s p resuppose d that cer t a in fee l i n g s a re c onne c te d 
with that conc ept . l 
More over , value j udgment s do n o t have t he v a lid i t y 
of log ico - mat hematica l prop o siti ons . Howeve r , Schl i ck d oe s 
not d eny thRt v a lues exis t , but th e ir exi stence is re l ative 
to persons . To insi st t hat they al s o have an absolute e x -
i s tence i s to s tate something unver i f iable . 
Are there worth l e ss j oys and v a l u able s orrows? 
The ans1ver i s "ye s 11 s i nce there i s a pleasurable expe rience 
l . Sch lick , PE , 116- 117. 
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in c ert ain sorrows and u ndes irable experience in certain 
j oys . The onl y measure of the v a lue of anything :ls the 
j oy that it promise s. 
As f or the problem of r e s p onsibi lity , Schl ick cla ims 
t hat there is no freedom of t he will . He labels fre e dom 
of t h e wi l l a "pseudo - p rob lem" which sb_ould never have 
entered into d iscus sion of phil o s ophers . The task of 
ethic s is to explain moral b ehavi or i n terms of causal 
laws and not in t erms of the fr eedom of the will . To 
explain is to re fe r to l aws n ot to fr eedom of '~Nil l. 
Responsib i lity lies i n motiv ation. Consci ousness of 
responsibility is "merely the know l e d g e o f having a cted 
o f one ' s own desire s. " l 
As to the question , "What i s moral conduc t?" t he 
answer wou ld be , "That condu ct which society believes 
will best furthe r its ovm welfare . 112 To t he quest i on , 
"Why do person s a ct morally ?" t he a nswer would be , 
"Because the things which are useful t o society n:ake for 
the happiness of t he indiv idual." 
In con clu s ion , Schl ick ra:i.se s t he question as to 
\'ihat paths l ead to v alue . He answers it by sayi '-:tg "tha t 
personal i ty and k indness are the bas i c conditions of a 
l . Schlick , PE , 155. 
2 . Sch lick , PE, 160, 
valuable existence."1 The Kantian hymn to duty may 
just as well apnly to k indness: 
Kindness, thou de a r great name, that 
containest n o thing in the e demano i ng love l ess 
e steem, but prayest to be foll owed; thou dost 
not menace and needst n C.Jt establish any law, 
but of thy self findest entrance into feel ing , 
a n d willingly art revered; whose smile dis-
arms all sist e r inclinations; thou art so 
glorious that we need n :.l t ask a f ter t hy de-
scent, for what ever be thy origi n it i s en-
n obled through theeJ2 
J. Critique of the Psychological 
Emotivism of Schlick 
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To the extent of the de gree that the psychological 
emotivists departed from the rad ical emotivists they are to 
be commended. However, that they did not go far enough is 
apparent from Schlick's system of ethics. Schlick seems 
t o attempt to bring about a synthesis between ethics and 
log i cal positivism. 
The logi cal po sitivists d islike intensely t o grant 
the f a ct of the existence of v a lue judgments. Schlick , 
although he does n ot care to a dmit the v a lidity of v a lue 
judgments, has conceded s omethL 1g on this p oint. Schlick, 
unlik e the r adical posit i vists, refuses to relinqui sh the 
reality of values and therefore accepts the fact of value, 
l~ Schlick, PE, 205. 
2. Schlick, PE, 208-209. 
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but he does not grant values the same validity that the 
log ical posit i vists g ive to log ico-mathematical proposi-
tion s. For this compromise and the exact place or values 
the r e is no justiried explanation given by Schlick . It 
appears as thou gh there is a dual system of validity, one 
f or logico-matherr~tical propo sit i ons and the other f o r 
value judgments. 
Schlick is a psychologi c a l hedonist, but he is 
one of an unusua l type. He is a hedonist in that he 
insists that "if there were no p leasure and pain in the 
world the re would be n o values."1 Schlick has a very 
peculiar c oncept of re sponsibility, f or he den i es tha t 
there is any fr e edom of will. In Schlick 's system one 
is motivate d by causal psycholog ical laws ~~d yet he 
may be consciously respons i ble f or his actions. Although 
one is motivated by causal psycholog ica l laws h e is re-
sp onsible f or his behav i or beca use he is motivat e d psycho-
log ically and h e becomes consciously responsible f or his 
actions when he h as the knowledg e of having act e d accord-
ing to his own desire s. Accor d ing t o this system of 
e t h ics it seems as though the psychol ogist or the psychi-
atrist is t he onl y one who can be moral. Moreover, re-
membering that Schlick repudiates the doctrine of the 
freedom of the will as a pseudo-problem, how can one pos-
1. Schl i ck , PE , 120. 
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sibly be responsibl~ f or his actions? If man is a 
mechanism a n_d without choice of any k ind then responsi-
b i l i ty i s meaningl e ss. 
Schlick makes t he claim tha t persons a ct mora l ly 
b e cause it mak e s fo r their indi vidual h app iness 2nd yet 
h e say s tha t t h e mor a l act which makes pe r s ons hap py 
also makes f or the s urviva l and enhancement of soc i ety . 
This is, indee d, a very happy and opt i mi s tic view o f 
thi ::1gs but such a view canno t be cohe r ent in a positiv-
istic s y stem, especially one that denies t h eism. Should 
Schlick rebut and say t hat h e i s an adhe r ent of the ist i c1 
thought the n the p r oblem a rises "How is t heism p ossible 
on t h e princip l e s of pos i tivi sm?" Theism an d pos i tivism 
are l og ica lly contra r y p o s i t i ons. Then, a gain, Schlick 
c -Juld b e a posit i vist about nature a n d a persona li s t about 
persons. This, h owever, ne ed not be t he case f or Schlick. 
Schlick's positivistic principles are s o defined as to en-
compass both concepts. Verif i c a tion for Schl i ck is a ma tter 
of defini tions vvhich are a rbitrarily fixed. One may, 
therefore, include among ·s u ch de f initions, thei sm. Schlick 
writes, "The poss i bility of verificat i on d o es n ot rest on 
any 'experimenta l truth,' on a law of n a ture or any othe r 
gene ral proposition, but is dete rmined solely by our defini-
1. On Zi lzel's word, Schl i ck was a theist. 
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tions, by the rules which have been fixed for our lang-
uage, or which we can fix a rbitrarily at any moment. ,,r 
Schlick is very l oose antl. free on this matt e r of 
logical cons i stency. Not only does he at t empt to re-
concile the i sm with logica l pos i tivism, and an ethics 
of r e sponsibil ity with t h e pr i nciples of logica l po s i -
tivi sm, but he l ays gr eat st r ess on the freedom and a-
bil:tty of man t o rec on struc t and a lter h i s p ersona lity 
t h at it may be moral, i.e., t ake on moral qua l i t i es or 
mo ral value. At times i t is dif ficult t o see the d iffe r -
ence betwe en the ethi cal syst em of Schl i ck and t hat of 
the mor e convent i onal ethicist s who maintain such d :J c.;.. 
t rine s as freedom of t h e will and obligation. The h i gh-
e st va lue s in t he est i mat i on of Schlick are personal i ty 
and k i ndne ss. For this he sh ould be h i ghly commended but 
it i s again di f ficult to see h ow th i s i s logically com-
patible with p sycholog i cal h edon ism or the principles of 
logical positiv i sm. 
It w·.mld be a mistake to interpret the et h ical 
sy stem propoQ~ded by Schlick as egoistic hedonism, i.e., 
the t heor y tha t teaches that one is justif ied i n seek i ng 
his ovm s elf i sh pleasure s wh e ther or not it is a t the 
expen se of another person. Schl i ck, h i ms e l f , condemns 
1. Schli ck , Art. (1936), 353. 
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egoism as immoral and identifies its characteristic qual-
ity as inconsiderateness. The form of hedonism to which 
Schlick is most allied is a qualitative type of hedonism 
like the utilitarian ethics of Mill. 
The psychological hedonism of Schlick requir e s 
some doctrine of the freedom of the will and obligation 
in order to remove its inconsistencies and make it more 
coherent. For example, values such as kindness and a good 
personality may give ple a sur e, but one must be free to se-
lect those pleasur e s of kindness and personality rather 
than some base pleasures. Moreover, obligation also must 
be introduce d here, for one must sense an obligation to 
prefer the higher pleasures to the base. Schlick admits 
th~ fact that one should prefer the higher values to the 
lower for the guidance of life and e onduct and yet he fails 
to see that thi s requires the doctr ine of obligati on. 
Shou ld one examine Schlick's ethics closely he will 
understand why Schlick rejects the concept of obligation 
and yet it is a necessary postulate to his ethical system. 
The reason is, he is rebelling a gainst the formalism of the 
ethica l intuitionists as Kant's type. The utilitarians did 
the same and the outcome was hedonism. Schlick also re-
belled against the formalism of Kant but felt that its 
emptiness lay in the fact of an i mpersonal conception of ob-
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ligation. He; therefore. replaced obligation with desire. 
Obligations and the moral commands that follow therefrom 
are, for Schlick, a negative system of ethics that results 
in self-limitation. Desire makes f or self-assertion, 
p leasure, private and social good. Rather than rejecting 
the ethics of obligation, Schlick should have reinterpreted 
obligation i n the form which is suitable to his theory and 
the implicit use of the concept as found in his eth i cs. 
The psychological emotivism of Schlick and Fe igl 
repre sents the first sign of d eparture in l og ical po s it i vism 
away from the completely skeptical position of the rad ical 
emotivi sts, the d i ff e rence being that Schlick and Feigl 
make of ethics a matter of psychol ogical science, whereas 
the othe rs h old to a comple t e l y s keptica l v i ew about ethical 
propositions, attempting to claim that t h ere are no valid 
prop ~ sitions in eth ical theory , i.e., value judgme nts do 
not ex i st o r t hat there is no right or wrong in moral mat-
t e rs. The next p r ogre s sive step away from the h opelessly 
skept i cal stand of the r adica l emotivists is t he view which 
is called nmoderate emot i v i sm" and vi'.n ich is t h e s u bject 
matter of the next chapter. 
4. Herbert Feig l 
Herbert Feigl, an outstanding repre s entat i ve of the 
p o s i tivistic school of ph ilosophy, a lso had s ome very defi-
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nite comments to make concerning the emotive ethic. 
The se are found mainly in Re adin g s in Philo sophical 
Analysis which he e dit e d with Wilfred Sellars and in 
Twentieth Centu ry Philosophy which was edited by Dagobert 
D. Runes. The trea tment is similar except that it is 
somewhat abridged in Readings in Phil~sophical Analysis. 
Feigl calls his system log ical empiricism. As 
did the others, so do e s Feigl make a two-fold division 
of'the functi on of language. The t wo fun ctions bf language 
constitu te the "two mean ings of 'reality': one c ognitive 
(empirical) the other non-cognitive (emotive)."1 
{1) Cognitive meanings 
(Inrormational function) 
Purely f ormal 
Logico-arithmetical 
Factual (: Empirical) 
(2) Non-cognitive meanings 
(Emotive Expression and appeal function) 
Pictorial (Imaginative) 
Emotional (Affective) 
Volitional-motivational (D i rective)2 
This is the table that Feigl uses f or the disen-
tang lement of ethi c al and other philosophical problems. 
1. Feigl, Art. (19)4), 423. 
2. Feigl, Art. {1947), 379. 
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He feels that many of the problems of philosophy would solve 
themse lves if they were properly classified and analyzed as 
having eithe r factual or emot i ve meaning. Scientific state -
ments have f a ctual or cognitive meaning whereas eth i cs has 
an emotive or non-c ognitive meaning. However, unlike Ayer 
and some others, Feigl thinks more highly of the place and 
f unction of ethics. He think s tha t morality or ethics has 
a r ole of importance to play in our educational and every-
day life. Ethics is not non-significant; it is merely 
emotive and non-cognitive, i.e., non-factual. Feigl wants 
to distinguish between the various kinds of meaning. Fact-
ual meanings must be set off from those things which have 
some other significance as emotive (religion, ethics, 
literature), logico-mathematical {logic, mathematics), 
the purely formal and if there is such a thing, the non-sig-
nificant. Emotive appeals are quite use f ul in ethics, reli-
gion, literature and the like. He writes: 
Emotive appeals are i ndispensable in the pur-
suits of practical life, in education , in propaganda 
(good or bad), in poetry, in literature, in reli-
gious edification and moral exhortation. Some of 
the highest refinements of our civilized existence 
depend upon the epot ional overtone of spoken and 
written language. 
Feigl unlike Carnap and Ayer does give a ki nd of signifi-
cance to the mind of man also. In so doing he is seeking to 
1. Feigl, Art. (1949), 7. 
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avoid the pitfall of solipsism of ~ich Ayer and Car.nap 
are guilty. The concept of mind does have meaning because 
t h e belief in the mind of the other person has most 
important emotional and motivational meaning in our 
social and ethical life. ( ••• We do not deny the 
mental life i n others, that in a certain sense, as 
everybody does, we assert it, but that all our ef-
forts are devoted only to make clear what we mean 
by that a s sertion.) nl: 
Feigl also points out that by using his procedure, 
one avoids the difficulties involved in the cogn i tive or 
psychologi stic approach to ethics. The psychologistic 
approach to ethics attempts to make cognitive or factual 
statements of a non-cognitive matter and therefore has to 
resort to pictorial connotations and imagery. 
One may classify the different types of meaning as: 
(1) Logically true sentences (formal or analytic) 
(2) Logically false sentences (formal or analytic) 
(3) Factually true sentences (empirical) 
(4) Factually false sentences (empirical) 
' (5) Emotive expressions (non-cognitive) 
Ethics are emotive expressions and theref ore with-
out cognitive meaning and also non-factual. "Pictorial, 
fi gura tive, and metaphorical expressions, exclamations, 
interjections, words of praise or blame, appeals, suggest-
ions, requests, imperatives, commands, questions, and 
1. Feigl, Ar t. (1934), 427. 
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prayers belong to this category. 111 
Feigl has no intention of rejecting or denying 
morals or ethics. \Vhat he is attempting to do is to 
clarify the situation and give ethics its proper mean-
ing. Facts have factual meaning and all else is factu-
ally meaningless and can be classified in one of the fol-
lowing groups: 
(1) Expressions violati~g the syntactical form-
ation--rules of a given language. 
(2) Analytic sentences. 
(3) Contradictory sentences. 
(4) Sentences containing extra-logical terms for 
which no experimenta l or operational definitions can be 
provided. 
(5) Sentences whose confirmability, i.e., even 
indirect and incomplete te stability-in-principle, is logi -
cally excluded by the assumptions of the system of which 
they are a part. 2 
Feigl att empting to analyze the ethical problem 
begins by analyzing the term itself. The term as he Shows 
is quite ambiguous and is use d in at least five different 
ways: 
1. Feigl, Art. (1947), 383-384. 
l. Feigl, Art. (1947), 384. 
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(1) Moral "vision11 , i.e., the recognition, dis-
covery, or (alleged) demonstration of a 'right" or "good" 
way of life or of an uppermost standard of moral evalua-
tion. 
(2) Moral exhortation., education and propaganda. 
(3) Empirical studies of actual moral evaluation, 
either descriptive or explanatory. 
(4) The technology of the "goodu life--a branch 
of applied science concerned with the discernment and 
perfecting of means (instrumental values) in view of 
certain ends (terminal values). 
(5) The logical analysis of ethical terms and 
sentences--either by the casuistic Socratic method or 
by the elaboration of a hypothetico-deductive system of 
e thical norms.1 
Ethics as found under the f irst classification 
above is a matter of proclamations. The second class con-
tains those moral precepts that one wo~d advocate. Clas-
sification number three is a scientific matter; it is 
ethics factually stud i ed. The fourth classification 
stands f or ethical norms practically implemented. The 
fifth classification of ethics is t he meaning given by 
the logical emp i ricists and is a matt e r of sentence analysis 
and emotive me aning . 
1. Feigl, Art. (19L~7), 4o2. 
The Golden Rule positivistically interpreted 
would mean: "Would that everybody behaved toward his 
fellovr.men as he expects them to behave toward him."1 
In other words then the only meaning the Golden Rule 
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has is an emotional one. It is a desire, it is an emot -
ive appeal and is extra-factual. Moreover, since it is 
not in the realm of facts it is non-cogn i tive or has n o 
cognitive meaning and therefore it cannot be said to be 
true or false. It cannot be validated on grounds of rev-
elation, logic or a priori intuition. There is nothing 
absolute or objective about it. It is simply an invita-
tion or exhortation or command. To claim absoluteness 
or objectivity for it is to do so on dogmatic grounds 
since it is incapable of being tested. "Absolute values 
as well as categorical imperatives can be expressed only 
in emotive language."2 
On the other hand relative values are a matter of 
psychological facts or a scientific matter and as such 
they are f actually meaningful. Relative values are a 
matter of psychological needs, interests and hypothetical 
imperatives; they are empirical data and therefore of 
scientific concern. Predications of truth and falsity 
are here ~D~~p~~~ One can speak of truth and falsity 
1. Feig1, Art. (1947), 4o2. 
2. Feigl, Art. (1947), 4o3. 
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in relation to these sentences. Disagreement in ethics 
here is a matter of opinion and the pr Jblem may be empir-
ically approached. Instrumental values are factually-
meaningful whereas idealistic absolute values are without 
cognitive content. 
The question raised (and sometimes answered 
negatively) by metaphy sicians, "Is the satisfy-
ing of human interests morally valuable?" is 
therefore not a factual question at all. As 
long as it is not specified to whose interests 
or to which interests re f erence is made, it is 
the vagueness of the question t hat renders it 
meaningless.l 
That is, it is meaningless if one attempts to 
g ive to it any meaning other than an emotive one; since 
it is an emotive one whose purpose is to solicit a change 
in attitude. To maintain that it is absolute is not to 
be liberated from a "pre-scientific type of mind. 11 2 
Even the principle of induction is not "a bit of knowl-
edge ••• It is, rather the principle of a procedure, a 
regulative maxim, an operational rule. 113 A mature soci-
ety will use only an experimental method. Beyond t h e 
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Feigl believe s t h at h is c oncept of ethics does 
not imply either moral cynic i s m or p e ssimi sm, but that 
the moral intere sts of society will be kep t and t h at 
persons will be s ensitive to them and will be disturbed 
over t h e ir violation. At this point, Feigl lapses into 
ethi cal relat i vism and identifies it as his own position. 
5. Critique of the Ethical The ory of Feigl 
Feigl would accept a dualistic system o f eth i cal 
thou ght: the one, a psy chological system of ethics, and 
the other, a relative system of ethics. The psy chological 
ethics is n othing but psy chologic a l scie'nce. That is, it 
is a d e scription of the cause and effects of behavior. His 
ethical relativity resu lts from h i s denial tha t e t h ics is 
a factual matter. Since eth i cs is outside of t h e realm of 
fact it is the refore non-cognit i ve and one cannot mak e 
judgments of moral value. However, unlik e t h e radical 
emot i v i sm, h e d oes n o t conclude t hat ethical considerations 
are meaningless. on t h e con t rary, ethical e xpr e ssions are 
mean i ngful and have a si gnificance in mouldin g and influ -
encing the thought and b ehavior of the indivi duals of a 
society. However, ethi cal exp ressions are not absolute 
pri ncip les or norms. Ethical considerations are not for 
men of science but for preachers and ot hers whose task is 
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to mould and influence people. This being the case, Feigl 
would not attempt to set up a s y stem of values since he 
does not consider himself as one of those whose business 
is to influence society. 
The ethical theory of Feigl amounts to a relativ i sm 
or subjectivism. It is simply relativism adopted or incorp-
orated into positivism. Feigl in attempting to effect this 
compromise has n o t f ound favor with instrumentalists. Emo-
tivists seem to seek to ally themselves with pragmatists. 
Dewey would hardly permit ~he adherents of positivism or 
any other philosophy to say that there are no ethical 
statements or propositions and t hat value judgments are 
non-existen t. 11For the new posit i vism, metaphysical proposi-
tions are, strictly speak ing, meaningless, sin ce a proposi-
tion has meaning only when we know Q~der what conditions it 
is true or false." 1 For Dewey, value judgments are genuine 
propositions and have cognitive meaning whereas, for Feigl, 
ethical statements have none of these qualities. 
Although Feigl attempts to, he has no logical right 
to claim any k ind of meaning whatever for his ethical theory 
for the simple reason that his p remises will not allow him 
to do so. Since Feigl concludes that ethical expressions 
have n e ither factual meaning nor log ical meaning, and that 
1. Blumberg and Feigl, Art. {1931), 293. 
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"metaphysical propositions are, st rictly speaking , meaning-
less," he, therefore, has no grounds for saying that they 
have any meaning whatever. 
Feigl seems to be speak ing in contradiction s for he 
speak s ~f non-cognitive meanings . The only thing that 
one can make a statement about is that which h as cognitive 
meaning. Since ethica l expressions have no cognitive 
meanin g t h en how is it possible t o speak intell igibly about 
t h em. It amounts simply to this: "Ethical expressions 
have meaningles s meanings." 
It seems that Feigl's attempt to clarify the problem 
of ethics and t hereby solve it on ly confuse s the i ssue even 
more ., and make s of it a still worse problem. Moreover, 
rather than untangling the problem of ethics, Feig l throws 
it i n to a still greater confu s ion by logically con tradict-
ing himself. 
One of the principle object ions to p s ych olog i cal 
emotivism, or for that matter , any value theory that is 
reduced to a descriptive level is that it is self-contra-
dictory. A descriptive ethics is purely quantitative whereas 
value is qualitative. To reduce ethics to psychologica l 
science is to have a quantitative criterion f or a qualitative 
value. "As soon as a critic takes up the position that state-
ments about the value of exper i ences (the major concern of 
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the crit i c) belong to psychology, he has no better re-
course than to use some g.uantitative criterion of value. 111 
In the denial of value one is i n fact affirming it because 
in the act or process of discussing va lue the ethicist 
who is reducing value to pure description is evaluating. 
Feigl and Schlick represent the first important 
deviation to be f ound in the camp of the logical positivists 
in this matter of ethical theory. Both men attempted to 
maintain the theory that eth i cs is a scient i fic matter 
of explaining the cause and effects of human behavior. 
Schlick condoned hedonism while Feigl tended towards in-
stumentalism or r elativism. The next important departure 
in the ethical the o1~ of t he logical positivists of today 
i s that of moderate emotivism, t he outstanding proponent 
of whi ch i s Stevenson. 
1. Black , LP, 209. 
CHAPTER IV 
MODERATE EMOTIVISM 
1. Relation of the Moderate Emotivistic Ethics 
of Stevenson to Radical and 
Psychological Emotivism 
Moderate emotivism as exemplified by Stevenson 
differs from radical emotivism in that it repudiates much 
of the skept i c i sm of the radical emotivists. In the first 
place, a conflict in ethics is a real c onflict and not one 
of mere ejaculation and evincing. However, a conflict in 
ethics is n ot a conflict in belief, but a conflict in atti-
tude. 
The ethical the ory of Stevenson differs from the 
p rece ding ones in that ethics for him has cognitive value. 
Aiken also agrees with this distinction. 1 Ethical discussion 
is significant and its significance lies in the fact that 
ethics is a matter of attitude. Ethical disputes are disagree'-
ments in attitude. Belief is n o t of primary concern, but 
emotions and feelings are. Ethics is not a matter of hedonism 
or psy chological science, but ethical principles are expressions 
of attitude. An exhortation is a plea for a change of atti-
tude. However, it is to be noticed that obligations are ab-
1. Aiken, Art. {1949), 31. 
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sent in the thought of all the se men. Moreover,' moral 
principles are also absent. To make a value claim is to 
approve of something. To censure an act is to look at it 
with condemnation. 
The statements of p sychologica l science are not 
for stevenson ethical stat ement s. Ethical statements are 
not descriptive, they are imperative and call for a change 
of attitude. To seek a cha n g e of attitude in a person 
is to b e concerned with an ethical endeavor. Stevenson 
says that his emotive e t hics falls in the province of 
morals or values and not in the fi e ld of psychology. The 
psycholog ist is concerned with the causes and effects of 
behavior, whereas the task of the moralist is to influence 
or a ffect a change in at t itude. The psychologist describes, 
whereas the moralist is active in bringing about these de-
s i r e d changes. An elaborat i on of this feature of moderate 
emotivism is to be found in the summary of the ethics of 
Stevenson, which follows immediately. 
2. Charles L. Stevenson 
c.L. Stevenson i s also an adherent of the emotive 
school of ethics. However, he is n o t quite as r adical in 
his thinking as are the others. Whereas the other emoti-
vists have deleted the cognitive aspect of ethics altogether, 
stevenson has made room for it. 
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Stevenson summarize s his position in the "Bulletin 
of t he Eastern Div i sion of the American Philosophical Asso-
ciat ion." At the Association's 46th annual meeting held 
i n Dec emb er of 1949 Stevenson in a Symposium on the emot i ve 
conce ption of ethi cs presented his position under the t opic 
"The Emotive Conception of Ethics and its Cogni tive Impli-
cat i on." Its summary is as f ollows: 
When a man is mak ing an evaluative decision he 
is try ing to res olve a conflict in h is attitudes. 
For his beliefs serve as intermediaries betwe en his 
a ttitudes, and by uniting them in new ways may alter 
their combined strength. The resolution of h i s con-
flict, then, will intimately depend up on his be-
liefs, which themselves will be of great variety. 
An emotive conception of e .'bhics--one that t akes 
the ethical terms to express or evoke attitudes--
may at first seem to ignor e the bel i efs tha t are in 
question. The pres ent paper argues that it does n ot: 
that it allows an intelligible place for t h em all. 
And it argue s that any non-emotive analys i s will be 
likely to fail in that respect: it will be unable 
to i ntroduce all the cognitive topics that are rele-
vant; so it will either b e incomplete or else obta i n 
comple teness at the cost of being too simple.l 
Stevenson claims that h i s primary task in the f ield 
of ethi cs is twofold. First of a ll h e is attempting to 
clarify the meaning of ethical terms. The second task that 
h e has se t f or himsel~ is that of presenting methods and 
proof of ethical judgments. 
The central problem in normative ethics is not one 
about agreement or disagreement of b e lief bu t basically a 
1. Bulletin of t he Eastern Divi sion of the Ameri can Ph ilo-
sophical Association, ]7~49 , 7. 
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matter of agreement or disagreement in attitude. This 
has a t wofold connotation. First of all, ethics is a 
matter of attitudes and secondly, agre ement or disagreement 
in ethics is not about objective facts but rather disagree-
ment in attitude. However, ethical controversies involve 
both disagreement in belief and disagreement in attitude. 
Stevenson does not seek to eliminate beliefs from 
their rightful piace in e thical thought but merely in-
sists that attitudes be given hheir proper place. At 
the basis of all ethical problems are therefore att i tudes 
and beliefs; both play a major role and must be understood 
in their mutual relationship. 
Ethica l disagreements are disagreements in attitudes 
and for a person to say, "This is wrong," does not mean 
that he is so much disputing ab out a norm as he is saying: 
"'This is wrong' means I disapprove of this; do so as well;" 
or "'This is good' means I approve of this; do so as well;" 
or "'He ought to do this' means I disapprove of his leaving 
this undone; do so as well."l 
The meaning of any ethical statement has to do with 
an agreement or disagreement in attitude, whereas, a greement 
or disagreement in belief has to do with the analysis of 
methods. 
1. Stevenson, EL, 21. 
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Two objectively contradictory statements may both 
be subjectively true. \Vhen one person approves of some-
thing and another person disapproves of it; each may be 
correct in that each is describing his state of mind, and 
since their states of mind may differ then each may be 
correct in his statement. 
In almost the same way we can distinguish between 
ethical and scientific statements. Ethical statements 
have an imperative overtone and result in agreements and 
disagreements in attitudes. This is the procedure of 
normative ethics which is to be d i stingui shed from psychol-
ogy or scient i fic statements about ethics. 
Ethical terms cannot be taken as ful}yc ompar-
able to scientific ones. They have a quasi-impera-
tive function which, poorly preserved by the working 
models, must be explai~ed with careful attention to 
emotive meaning; and they have a descriptive fQnC-
tion which is attended by ambiguity and vagueness, 
requiring a particularly detailed study of linguis-
tic flexibility. Both of these aspects of lan~uage 
are intimately related to ethical methodology. 
We may say that normative ethics is emotive and sub-
ject to agreement or disagreement in respect to attitude 
whereas descriptive meaning is scientific. Nevertheless, 
they are related. The emotive meanings of words are ex-
pressions or symptoms of emotions, e.g. laughs, sighs, 
groans, and the like. Interjections give vent to the emo-
tions o r a ttitudes, wh ereas words describing emotions denote 
1. Stevenson, EL, 36. 
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them. The habitual use of particular words is r e sponsible 
for our mode of emotional expression or attitude. So that 
interjectional expressions result from :Coree of habit. 
"For one who assorts mail, 'Connecticut' may cau se only 
a toss of the hand, but f or an old resident it may bring 
a train of reminiscence s."l 
Stevenson is · of the opinion t hat t h e wh ole idea 
i n emotive or normat i ve ethj_cs is soliciting a certa in 
attitude or in redirecting one's attitude. He says that 
often the value term 11 t::rood 11 doe s no more than "indicate 0 
agreement or disagreement in attitude. 112 However, emotive 
terms as "good" do not always express exhortation, often 
good is used to mean "e:f.fective," etc. Sometimes "good" 
has an i nformative meaning , e.g., "This is good writing 
paper." 
An analysis of normative ethics amounts simply to 
this: To say, "This is good" is identically the same as 
saying , "I ap:9rove of this; do so as well." The "Do so 
as well," is a discrepancy in attitude and not one of ob-
jective fact. The term "good" as used above has an emotive 
me aning, not a factual one. 
To say that nx is good" is to say, "Psychologica lly, 
I approve of x and hope t o influence you to do so as well." 
1. Stevenson, EL, ~3. 
2. Stevenson, EL, 83. 
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The goal or purpose of ethica l judgments is to influence, 
guide, and remold attitudes. 
Emotive ethics falls in the province of morals or 
values a nd n o t in the field of psychology. The task of 
the p sychologist is to show how attitudes are influenced 
(the cause and effect of such) whereas the concern of 
ethics is to influence them. One merely describes how 
it is done, whereas, the other accepts the task of do ing 
it. The descriptive is scientific (psychology) whe reas 
the emotive (ethics) is active. The first is to know h ow 
to do it; the latter is to do it. 
An ethical judgment is not a psych ological state-
ment; that is granted. A characterization o f its 
emotive meaning in psychological te rms s e rves to 
distinguish it from a psycholog ical statement, not 
to make it one . It exerts its influence upon atti-
tudes in a much more direct way than any statement 
of science, and lends itse lf t o a different sort of 
agreement and disagreement.l 
We have seen that ethics is a matter of attitudes. 
We turn now to the resolution of ethical disputes and prob-
lems. Since ethics is a matter of differences in attitudes 
the resolving of ethical differences would be the re d irect-
ing or changing of attitudes. It is therefore a matter of' 
persuading the opposite party to your point of view. "The 
resolution of an ethical argument require s a resolution of' 
1. Stevenson, EL, 108. 
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disagreement in attitude, and so requires that the atti-
tudes of one party or the other (or both) be changed or 
redirected."! 
There are several ways in which attitudes are 
changed. They may be brought about by changes in beliefs, 
psychological f a c t ors, or persuasion. The l atter is con-
sidered by Stevenson to be the most important. Persuasion 
to put it in the words of Stevension "depends on the sheer, 
direct emotional impact of words--on emotive meaning; rhet-
orical cadence, apt metaphor, stentorian, stimulating, or 
pleading tones of voice, dramatic gestures, care in estab-
lishing rapport with the hearer or audience, and so on."2 
Persuasion is neither rational nor irrational; 
it is non-rational.3 Its methods go b eyond the rat ional 
in the sense that it is not con cerned with belief. Ra-
tional methods deal with belief, while irrational methods 
deal with fallacious reasoni ng , but non-rational methods 
are concerned with attitudes. Non-rational methods of 
persuasion are primarily concerned with the emotive use 
of words. One may even use these same methods for the pur-
pose of self-persuasion, or may persuade himself by project-
ing h imself into a social setting and fancying himself in 
debate with another, preferably a superior. Often when one 
1. Stevenson, EL, 139. 
2. Stevensmn, EL, 139. 
3. see Pepper, Art. (1950), 501 for a relation between 
Stevenson's concept of "persuasive definit ion" and :Moore's 
"indefinable good." 
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is trying to persuade another it is not always the ot her 
that he really wishes to convince, but rather himself. 
One may also be persuasive in the definition of 
terms. A "persuasive definition" is one 
which gives a new conceptual meaning to a familiar 
word without substantially changing its emotive 
meaning, and which is used with the conscious or 
unconscious purpose of changing, by this means, 
the direction of people's i nterests.l 
Validity has nothing to do with persuasion or atti-
tudes. They cannot be spoken of as being valid or invalid. 
11 To evaluate or recommend an ethical method {whenever va-
lidity can have no bearing on the case) is to moralize about 
the ways of moralists."2 We may speak of attitudes being 
valid in the same sense that we can say "That's true" re-
ferring to agreement in attitude rather than in belief. 
Stevenson is primarily concerned with the method of 
ethics and not with moralizing. He distinguishes himself 
from the moralist in that he is concerned with the method 
of ethi cs and the moralist is concerned with ethical judgments. 
Even the person who condemns tlie ~ judgments of the moralist 
is himself moralizing and therefore is himself a moralist. 
Propagandists are moralists and vice versa. 
Stevenson, like so many of the other emotivists, al-
so claims that language has two different functions or pur-
1. Stevenson, Art. (1938), 331. 
2. Stevenson, EL, 158. 
147 
poses. One purpose of language is to communicate be-
liefs; this is the scientific function of language. 
The second use of language is to incite attitudes or 
persons to action, to give vent to feelings, or to ere-
ate moods. This latter is the emotive use of language; 
it is concerned with interjections, oratory, or poetry. 
The first purpose of language, Stevenson calls "descrip-
tive" whereas the second use he calls !!dynamic". An 
example of the first is "Hydrogen is the l ightest lmown 
gas" whereas "'When a pe ~C' son cuts himself and says 'Damn r 
his purpose is not ordinarily to record, clarify, or com-
nru.nicate any belief. The word is used dynamically."1 
Thus, in conclusion, it may be said that for Stev-
enson ethics is a mat ter of attitudes and persuasion. 
"Ethical judgments have a quasi-imperative force, because 
of the i r emot i ve meaning. They influence people t s attitudes, 
rather than describe what t hese attitudes already are. 112 
The task of the ethi cist is the study of the 
methods of ethics. Psy chologi sts determine the cause 
and effects of behavior or attitudes, i.e., they tell us 
the most e ffe ctive way of changing one's attitude s. The 
moralist is one who effects these change s in attitudes. 
1. Stevenson, Art. (1937), 21. 
2. Stevenson, Art. (1938), 49. 
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Fun damentally , the entire proce ss is a non-rational 
or e motive one. 
3. Critique of t h e Et h ics of Stevenson 
One of t he best cr i ti ques on the ethics of Steven-
s on is the art i cle by Brandt, "The Emotive Theory of 
Ethics." 1 Another good crit i que d e aling with the ling-
u i stic pha se of Stevenson's emotivism is offered by Blaclc .2 
Th i s article was a paper read as part of a sympo s i u m on 
t h e e motive the ory of ethics a t a meet ing of the Ame rican 
Phi l o sophical Asso ciation. Stevenson re a d his paper a nd 
Brandt later followed. Perhaps t h e g reatest shortcoming 
of the ethica l t h eory of Stevenson, and thi s i n cludes all 
of the e motivi sts in t h e precedin g discuss i ons, is the 
fact tha t none of t h em seem to offer any valid or cogent 
arguments for the i r p osit ion. Too often they simply state 
their position as thou gh they a re recordin g facts a nd let 
it go at that. It is a philo sophy of dece leration, a cre ed, 
and not a t hesis with any adequat e d e fence o r ground. The i r 
writings seem to read as though they were present ing a n ovel 
rather t h an a d i scourse on philosophy . They mak e altoge ther 
too many sta tements wi thou t supporting them.3 
1. ·Br-ana t, -: Art.·:: (19 .50), 30.5-319. 
2. Black , LP, 217 ff 
3. See Brandt, Art. (19.50), 309. 
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The very heart of Stevenson's emotive theory .is th:Ls: 
moral dec i sion s are res olutions of conflicts of attitude. 
This is, no doubt, correct; but St e venson has omitted much 
relevant data. To be sure, vvhen one is concerned with moral 
decisions his attitude is of supreme importance, but, also 
involved i s the fact of personality. Why does one in a 
moral decision attempt to resolve a conflict in attitude? 
He does so because attitudes are t hemselve s of moral value. 
They make a pe r son a better one o r an innnoral one. This 
f a ct is discussed in full in a subsequent chapter.1 
Stevenson is of the belief that the central problem 
of normative ethics is not one of a greement or d isagreement 
in belief but one of a greemen t or disagreement in attitude. 
Here he has overlooked two difficulties: one, beliefs ten d 
to mold attitudes; 2 and two, he has failed to see that 
attitudes are in t h e realm of obligation. One is obligated 
to develop and assume g ood attitude s. To say that ethics 
is a matt e r of attitude is not to take it out of the realm 
of the moral, but, rather, it places it squarely in the 
heart of the moral. To be moral is to assume a good 
attitude; one that makes fo r the good of the i ndividual spirit-
ually and enhances t h e g ood of o thers. 
Stevenson in presenting h i s ethics of attitudes does 
not reject beliefs from the p icture. Nevertheless, he does 
1. The chapter on "Personalistic Emotivism." 
2. w:.-J. Pinard supports this contention that beliefs mould 
attitudes, ~n private conversation~. 
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not show t h e full import of the place of belie f s in 
forming , molding, and chang i n g attitudes. A child 6n 
his way to the store to buy some ice-cream may b e qu i te 
dejected in attitude a s a result of h a v i n g lost the money 
with which to mak e the purchase. His attitude of dejecti on 
may be turned into hope and joy shou ld one convince h im of 
the belief that t h e money will surely be found. 
Another point on which it seems right to t ake issu e 
wi t h the emotive ethi cs of Stevenson i s on this matter of 
the i nt e r pretation of attitudes. Fo r Ste venson , to say 
t h at, "X i s wrong ," is to say, "I disapprove of this; 
d o so as well. 111 Th i s, however, is n o t a true analy s i s 
of t h e case. lm analysis of t h a t s entence mean s, " I dis-
a pp r ove of t h is because I ou ght to; and f eel an obl igation 
2 
to enl ighten you upon the matt e r." Stevenson's failure 
is i n hi s a ttempt to describe what i s in fact t ak i ng p lace 
and n ot the reasoning or t h e nrin ciple behi nd what is 
t a k i n g p lace. He is analyzing the situation as a sc ientist 
or psy chologist a nd not as a philosopher. Joad adds, "Vihy 
moral a pp r oval and disappr ov a l, if there is no uniquely 
moral fact or in t h e unive rse to be at once t h e s ource and 
· object of the moral feelings which are our response to it."3 
1. Stevenson, EL, 21. 
2. An elabora tion of th i s stat ement will b e found in the 
chapter on "Persona li s tic Mo tivism." 
3. Joad, CLP, 131. 
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one last p oint that should be discussed in the 
emotiva theory of moderate emotivism is the use of the 
term "good!' Stevenson says that the term good has an 
emotive me a ning and n o t a factual one. For Stevenson , 
good means, "I approve of this; do so as well." An 
attitude is involved in the concept go od a nd not an 
objective fact. The term good as Stevenson uses it has 
a subject i v e connotation; this is an erroneous analysis 
of the matter. It is true that moral good is a matter 
of attitude1 but it i s not true that it is subjective. 
Good in the moral sense of the word means a good attitude. 
An attitude, however, that is good f or one p erson is g ood 
for all and one that is bad f or one person is evil for 
anyone to assume it. This is what Brightman calls one 
of the · pillars of ethics, viz., the principle of the 
universal. 2 Good must be un i v e rsal. 
Many of the objections which have been mentioned 
in this present section on the shortcomings of the ethics 
of Stevenson will be f ully tre a ted in part four. 
The next emotive the ory which will be u p fo r dis-
cussion is that of the liberal emotivists. This type 
of emotivism differs from the preceding in that it allows 
for objectivity in moral values. 
1. This idea is defended in the chapter on "Personalistic 
Emotivism." 
2. Brightman, ML, 1~, 30. 
CHAPT ER V 
LI BERAL E1il0 11IVISM 
1. h ela ti on of Libe!'al Emotivism to the Other 
Fonns of Emotivism 
The out standing feature of liberal emotivism that 
differentiates it from the previous forms of e mot i vism is 
that liberal emotivism holds to e.n objectivity in moral val-
ues.1 'I'he radical emotivists do not even allow for a sub-
jectivity in moral values; and only a kind of subjectivity 
is to be had in the t h eory of the psycholog ical emoti vists. 
'The moderate emoti vism of ~tevenson allows for only a sub-
jectivity in that the proposition, "xis ri ght 11 for him 
mean s, 11 I approve of x; do so as well." Approbation is an 
individual's peculiar attitude in the ethics of ~tevenson . 
However , whe n considerin?:; the liberal emoti vism of Britton, 
there is a definite place for objectivity in the attitudes 
of men . 
For Britt on, when a man assumes an attitude, e motive 
or ot herwi se, tha t attitude may be prized as g ood or con-
demned as bad on ob je ctive s rounds, independent of the sub-
jective likes or dislikes of the individual. There are ob-
jective standards of measurement for calculating t h ese 
1. Britton , CPSL, 9-10. 
t hin g s. Moreover, an outstanding feature of Britton's 
emoti vis m that overshadows the rest is that he maintains 
t h at ethical propositions are valid and that one ma y speak 
1 
of the tr-uth and falsit y of ethical statements. Value 
judgments, f or the first time, have been admitted into the 
ethi cal philosophy of t h e log ical positivists. 
2. Karl Britton 
Karl Britton makes perhaps the most i mportant contri-
bution to the emotive theory of ethics particularly in his 
treatment of the matter in Communica tion: A Philosophical 
Study of Languag e. He takes his lead primarily from Steven-
son, Og den and Richards. 
Just as Og den and Richard s dichotomi ze t he ftmction 
of words, so does Britton. The only real difference is that 
Og den and Rich ards classify terms as h&ving either an "emo-
tive" funct i on or "symbolic" function, whereas Br it ton's 
division of terms is called 11 Informati ve 11 and "Dyn amic. " 2 
The dynamic use of languag e is important in that it 
conveys anoti ve meanin g , i.e., it is a 11 sie;n of emotional 
response which a sign reg ularly produces in any normal lis-
tener who is familiar with its use. " 3 Sentences of this 
1. Bri tton, CPSL, 9 -10. 
2. See Britton, CPSL, 1. 
3. Britton, CPSL, 13 . 
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t ype i3ri ttcn calls 11 Emotional Property dent ences. 11 'l'hey 
includ e such examples as: 
The moon is looking lovell· 
. l 
The radiator is a nuisance. 
One wou l d be committing the "pathetic fallacy" if he supposed 
that he were conveying information a bout the phys i cal world 
when he wa s really arousing emotions. 2 On the other hand 
sentences or propositions also serve an informative pur-
pose. :P re dica t ions such as t hese may be found in a list of 
illustrations which Britton calls " Physical Property :::> en-
tences • 11 .t<lor ex8.mple: 
The moon will be full toni ght. 
3 This radiator is very hot. 
Britton says that ethical terms serve two p urposes. 
In the flr·st place ethi cal terms convey information and in 
the second place they serve to create at t itudes or feelings. 
Concerning the two-fold purpose of ethical predications h e 
writes: 
First, they are ased t o convey informat ion about 
t h e way in which events or other objects s atisfy the 
i nterests of the spe ak er and his h earers (and even, 
sometimes, of mankind in g eneral): s e cond ly, to 
create i n the hearers a not-yet-exis ting in t erest in 
certain thing s. 4 
l. Britton, CPSL, 41. 
2. Britton, CPSL, 280 . 
3. Britton, CPSL, 41. 
4 . Bri t ton, CPSL, 8 -9. 
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Concerning t h e informa ti ve purp ose o f e t h ical state -
ments one may stimglate a personal i nterest or h e may at-
tempt to stimulate a uni v ersal interest, i.e., a whole sys-
tem of interest s. For exarnple, \~ Honesty is the b est policy11 
holds universal interest. 'I'he particular or narrow inte rest 
on the ot her hand may b e exemplified b y the statement, 11 I t 1 s 
g ood to be cheerful. 11 
l'he second purpose of ethi cal predications or sen-
t ences is t o influence or persuade. In this res p ect Brit-
ton adopt s Stevens on ' s treatment of the emotive e t hi c and 
quote s him : 
Their maj or use is not t o indi cate facts, b u t 
to create an i nf l uence. I n st ead of mere l y describ-
i n g peop le 1 s interests t h ey ch ang e and intensify 
t h em . 'rhey re commend an interest in an ob j ect, 
ra t her than state that t he in terest already exists •1 
Althou.; h Britton menti on s an d lists two purposes of 
ethi cal pr edi cation he argues, and rig htly so, that eth ical 
pro positions h ave a third purpose, viz., tbat of expressing 
universally true value-statements. 'l'he se u nivers a lly t rue 
value-statements can be proved b y ob j ective meth od s. Fo r 
example , Britton believes chat emotions such as anger, a nxi -
ety, he.tre d , and the lik e are ob j ec t ively bad a nd evidence 
of such may be ob~ained from the science of me dicine and 
psych olog y. He writes in this r eg ard: 
1. S t evenson, Art. ( 1937) , 18 -19 . 
I t is sensible ( I t h ink) to speak of the ob-
je ct ivit y an d t h e truth a nd falsity of ethi cal state -
ments. It seems to me that t h ere are value-state-
ments that are universally true ; e. g ., it may b e 
true that ang er, hatred, resentment, fear, anxie ty 
a-re , in the rnselves, bad t n ing s: t h a t is are contra-
ry to t he broad, s ystemati c, and far-sighted inter -
ests of every man--of the h ater no less than of the 
h ate d . 'l' o reg ard t h e s tetement 11 Hatred is bad ," as 
nothin3 more than noises uttered in order t o arouse 
or to relieve feelin,s s -,-is t o put forward a ~ope­
le ss l y unp lausi b le theory .l 
In thi s re spect Britton is criticizin g the r adical 
emoti vists and in p articular h e h as Hussell in mind . Rus -
sell at tempts to maintain the thesis that we can neve r g et 
an y evidence concernin?.; ul~ imat e g oo d and that e ach d isput-
ant. can do no more than ap p eal to his own emotions and " em-
p lo y s u ch r h etorical devices as shall r ouse similar emo t ions 
2 in ot hers. 
Un d er the chapter head enti t led "Eules, Principles , 
and Ls.ws," Britton takes up t h e consid era t ion of moral, 
eth ical, and aesthet ic judgments. Here, he treats of mora l 
judgments an d value in the light of their d ynamic purp ose. 
In oth er words , their purp ose is to influence ei ther or both 
fee lin.; s and cond uct. He t h en tries to s how that one must 
dis t inguish t he moral proposition 11 Bi g aray is wron,; ," from 
s uch propositions as "I don't want to com.rnit big amy,' ' 11 I 
do n 't lik e the i d ea of bi gamy, 11 an d ''Big amy excites our in-
l. Br i tton, CPSL, 9 -10 . 
2 . Cf. Russell, RS , 22J . 
d ignation. 11 l Only in the fi rst sent ence, nBi gamy i s v1ro n a; , 11 
do we have a p roposition of any real moral cont e nt . For 
in this proposit i on we are try ing t o influ ence both the 
feeling s and condu ct of another; we are try i n g ''to move 
them. 11 This is an ins t an ce of the d ynamic use of words and 
1 t is concerne d wit h moral j ud gments of value . 
Moral judgment s are to be distin_s'Uish e d from othe r 
jud~ment s as: 
(l) Commands and Imperatives. Commands appeal to 
force and coercion. Their persuasiveness l ies i n ti:le 11 su-
peri o r f orce " of t h e one g iving it. Mora l or value judg -
ments, on the o'cher hand, are co ncerned with 11 s omethin .g be -
yond the mere will of the judg e s •112 ivloral judgment s · serve 
the pur pose of persuad ing the audience; to win them over to 
a certain attitude, 11 by referrin;?; (imp licitly or explicitly) 
to something bey ond the fe eling s of the moment --the exp ress 
feelin~ s either o f speaker or hearer." 2 
( 2) Poetry . Moral jud~ment s are to be dis tin guish ed 
from p oetical utt e ra.YJ.ces also. 'l 'h e main purpose· of poetry 
is t o produce an emotional att i tude wi thin us but it is on -
ly for the moment and for i t s own sak e. Moral judgments , on 
the other h~Dd, are f or the producing of permanent chang es 
of emotional attitud es and frequently influence future con-
l. S e e Br i tton, CPSL, 211. 
2 . Bri tton, C? SL, 212. 
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duct. , , . 1 voncern1ng mora jud ~~ment;s g rammat ical f orm or mood 
me ans very li tt le, the y a re simp ly u sed for their forceful 
persuasiveness. 
Br i tton, difl'erins from such men as Ayer, Russ e ll, 
Carnap, and the lik e, maintains that moral j ud gment s c an be 
ma d e. They are bot h cognit ive and inf ormat ive. Moreover, 
t h e y are also emotive: 
.t'h e y mak e statements about the relation b e-
tween t h e interests o f the audience an d certain e-
vent s or obj e c t s and t h e y mak e t h em in such word s 
that the audience is moved i mmedi ately to feel in 
a cert a in way towards or a g ainst the objects con-
cerned .1 
Alth ough in persuasion and t he solici tin~ of prope r 
attitudes t h e words selected are not of real moral value but 
often t he rig ht ch oice of words wi ll accomplish the des i red 
result. 'I his is not merely a matter of 11 word ma gic, 11 for 
t he sentences used convey 11 a.lleg ed facts." 
(3} Ru l es of Skill. Moral judgment s must also be 
distin,<; u ish ed from 11 Rules of ;:;)kill." Rules of s kill are 
not moral j ud gments. To sa y , "If I want to be a g ood lawyer, 
I ough t t o study dilig ent ly 11 is not a moral s tatement. It 
i s a non-moral use of t h e word "ought. 11 It is as if one 
sa id , nit i s a g ood thin~ to wash out vessels a ft er every 
experi ment •112 'r he word "g ood" in the fore g oing sentence d o e s 
l. Brit ton, CPSL, 213 . 
2. Britton, CPSL, 218 . 
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not p ertain to mor a lit y . The y a re simp l y rules of skill. 
A rule of skill is a s tat ement expressed in emotive terms, 
t h e purpose of which is t o brim~ about a c han ·Ye t o a desired 
condition . Statements p e rtai nin~ to r u les of s kill are veri -
f i ab le b y methods o f' observation and experiment. 
(4 ) Counsels of Prudence. 1 Moral judgments mu s t al-
so be d i fferent i ated from counsels of prudence. Britt on 
t h inks t hat w1~t is colmnonly th ought of as morals or e thics 
is really only counsels of prudence. A coun sel o f pruden ce 
is a ty-pe of advice or corlli.Tiand. It has t o do with mak ine; 
the wisest c hoice. ? or example, 11 If you ·,want to save your 
money, then you mus t cut do wn on unnecessary expenses. 11 It 
is not a matter of morality, it is a matt er of mak ing the 
wi sest ch o i ce or preference. 
(5) Principles of Social Polity. ~hese also are not 
.moral jud.~rments but are rather counsels of prudence on a 
soc i a l level. Couns els of prudence perta i n to individuals 
wh ereas prin ciples of social polity p ertains to g roup s. 
Th is a gain is a matt er of int elligent selection. fhey differ 
f'rom moral judgments in that t h e y are informat ive and a re 
caus a lly determined. Whereas counsels of prudence make f or 
t h e happiness of ind ivid uals, principles of social polity 
ma k e f or the happi ness of socie ty . Princip les of social 
l. 11 Rules of Ski ll 11 and 11Counsels of Prudence 11 have been 
taken from Kant by Britton. 
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polity serve the purpose of brin~ing about law, order, peace, 
a n d p ro ; ress in a society. 
( 6 ) Laws of ~ora lity. Britton has a view co ncerning 
"laws of moralit y ." It consists of (1) a pe culiar interpre-
tation of the prin c ip les of social poli t:;y , ( 2) 11 Principles 
designed solely for the benefit of the ruling g roups, 11 
( 3) 11 Principle s -..mi ch expressed the r eli,q; ious exP._erien ces 
1 
of rulers and ruled." Moral laws g rew out of a combination 
of reli gion, mag ic, and brutality. Guardians of the law 
beg an to defend it by the sword, i.e., by force, to g ether 
with arg ument. i'hey wanted to show that the laws were for 
the best interests of all concerned. 'l'hey attempted to 
justify its claim by uncondi t ional obedience and by eternal 
and immutable validity. Laws of Morality are supposed to 
be of universal interest rather than of individual interest 
(counsels of pr'Udence) or of socia l interest (principles of 
social polity) • 
3. Critique of Britton's Eraotivism 
Of all the forms of emotivism thus far di s cussed , 
t hat of Britton is by far the most satisfactOI"J. It offers 
the most coherent account of the facts of moral experience 
by taking cog nizance of value judgments, i.e., in moral mat-
1. Br i tton, CPSL, 237. 
ters, one may have valid knowledg e of ri ght and wrong . How-
ever, Britton's emotivism is deficient in several points. 
One o.f ·the most i mportant as pe cts of his shortsightedness 
is his failure to give a p roper place to oblig ation in his 
theory of moral value. In fact there is no place at all 
for obligation in his system. \iYhy he d id not take this into 
consideration and incorporate it into his ethical theory is 
difficult to understand for how can there be genuine value 
j u dgments if one is not obli gated to carry them out? Why, 
for example, s hould the value statement : 11 kindness is good" 
b e mo rally ri ght if one is no t ob lig ated to co mmi t h i ms elf 
to t he prin ciple'? Un less ther e is a true ob ligation, t here 
can be no g enuine morality. 1 
The section on personalistic emotivism bring s into 
the consi d eration of emotivistic t hink ing the fact of obli-
g ation. Personalistic emo tivi sm throws a new ligh t upon 
e motivistic t h ink ing . It places it upon a personalistic ba-
sis. It g ives f u ll meaning to ethics by g iving an adequate 
account of the various facts of moral experience. Includ ed 
in its account are value j u dgme nts, ob jec t ive moral values, 
obligation, etc. ~he thinking of this type of emotivism is 
personalistic in character. 
1. For a more complete critical discussion on the matter of 
obli g ation see the section on oblig ation in the following 
chap ter. 
PART THREE 
EVALUATION OF THE EMOTIVE ETHIC 
CHA? 'I' ER VI 
DEFEN CE OF THE EMOTIVE ET HIC 
Th ere is much to sa y by wa y of e valuation and cri t i-
cism of t h e e t hical posit i on of t h e emotivis t s. Let us turn 
ou r attention first to t he posit i ve or f avorab l e as p ec t s of 
t h eir views and second to the inadequacies. 
The first t hing that can be said in favor of the ir 
p o si tion is tha t it is an honest attempt to brin_;s ethical 
s pe cula tion in accord with science. .i'h e emot i vis t s are po-
si t i vists an d as such have a g reat cone ern for bringing 
philosophical tho w; ht in line with science an d ve r if i c a tion. 
Bri ghtman in eva luating the philosophy of the logi cal p osi-
ti vi s t sa ys that the positi vi s t "may well teach us t o be pre-
cise in our concep t i ons of exp erience and of verifi cat ion . 111 
The y h ave t urned their at tent i on particularl y to met h o dolo ·; y 
with the hope that many of t h e va~aries and loose lan ~uag e 
wh ich man y ph i loso phers have re s orted to will be done awa y . 
The y have alwa ys stri ved for t h e ach ievement o f b e tt er me th-
ods i n t echn i que and in lan :~uag e. Hill is also i n a g r e ement 
wi t h t h i s in t h at h e points out: 
The k ind of Lo g ical Pos i tivism und er consi d era-
tion prop erly insists up on t h e i mportan ce of laying 
clear f o und a t ions in ling uistic analysis before pro-
ceeding t o other problems, for, until t h e me aning s 
involved in a g i ven t ype of experience are cle ar, 
l. Bri gh t man, POR , 5. 
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furthe r co nside r ation o f its p roblems is likely to 
be unavai ling ; an d the emph asis of t he Lo :;ical Po -
sitivists u_9on t his point iJ.as been clearer and 
s t rong er tha..11 that of any other t ype of contemporary 
e t -n i ca 1 the ory .J-
In fa ct their entire phi losophy is a method. I t is 
t hi s pur p o s e an d intent t. h a t bB.s led t h em t o t his e mot ive 
interp r e tat ion of etnics. In their at temp t at ana j_yzing 
and evaluating ethi ca l phenomena t h ey have not f ound d ata 
whi ch are ak in to ~he d a ta of the scientist. :Since chere 
were no objective facts exter·nal to persons , t hey soug h t f or 
t he solut ion of the moral pr oblem wi t h in the person . Thi s 
led t hem to loca lize mo r a l p he nornena i n the emotions . A 
trut h that t h e e n10ti vists have po:i.nted out is that much of 
what persons suppose to be et h ical d isp utes is largely a 
metter o f emotional upsets on the part of the pe rsons debat-
ing mora l issues. To be sure , the re are et h ical judgments , 
although t h e emotivists d isagree on this is sue , but o f ten 
t he r e are those pers ons who are lar,s ely mo ·c ivated b y t h eir 
emot ions ra ther than the e t hi c al i ssue at hand. Howe ver, t o 
insist that al l moral j u de;ments are so biase d and tlt..at n o 
obj ectivit y can b e obtaine d in mora l ma tters is t o c arry t h e 
mat ter to an ind efen sible ex treme. HiJ.l, althou~h he be-
li e ves that reason and objectiv ity prevail i n valu e j ud gment s, 
t h ink s that; emotion is never a b sent an d t h e wise man will 
l. Hi ll , GET, 25 . 
tak e a ccount of thi s so that h e ma y rea son more accura t e l y . 
Ee , a lso, credits t he emotivists for stressing this mett er 
of e mot i on in e thi cs. He 'N!' it es ; 
ifto reove r , it seems to be true a t ver ;} l east 
that a ll moral jucJgments are a ccompanied by emo t ion, 
and p r ob a b ly that nearly all of the m are t o so me de -
g r e e bi ased by feeling . To i nsist u p on the se fa cts 
c oncerning emotive as p ects of morality is extremely 
i mport a nt fo r t he reason that t h ose wh o fai l to see 
t h em ar·e all t oo ap t to be presu..rap tuously d o ynati c 
in their own mora l judzment s and g rot esqu ely n!l.ive 
and confused in their interpretations of moral ex-
perien ce in g ener-a 1 .1 
Glosely allied to t hi s i d ea of emot i ons bei ng pre sent 
in ethi cal disputes is the matter o f t h e prominent p lace of 
persuas ion. ii'Iany ethical di sputes are not so muc h 6.i s p u t es 
a bout wl:1at is t rue , but rather , the fact t h at one person 
seek s to p roselyte or· convert the ot h er to hi s own point of 
view. This tendency to persuade or convert on e's opponen t 
to h is own point of view is often present in man y g enui n e 
ethical arg uments . Hi ll also o bserves this as a commend a b le 
point rais e d by t h e po sitivist s. He says; 
The Log ical Pos itivists have also correc tly 
s h ovm that some moral j ud~m2nt s are p rimar i ly ••• 
pe rsuasive; for there can be li t t le d oubt that we 
often intend by sa y-i n_,3 t h a t a certai n thin-s is ;:r, oo d 
or ri 3ht li tt le more than a favorable attitude to-
ward it or an effort to create one in others . 2 
I n their a n alysis of the fa cts of ethi cs the e moti vists 
seek t o ke e p the bus ine ss o f ethi cs allied to s cience and 
1. Hi ll, CE~ , 25-26 . 
2. Hi ll, C~T , 25. 
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rebel a gainst any attempt to permit ethics to ,~o beyond its 
proper limits. 
Thus we see it is their passion for scientific tech-
ni ques that led them to t h ese conclusions. rr he sad part of 
the matt er is that t hey assumed t h at what was no t common 
data as the natural scientists are accustomed to dealing with 
was not ds.ta at all. Yet, how successful are the man y s ci-
ences w.t.ich concern the.rnsel ves with non-physical data as 
psyc11olog y especially that of the psycho-analysts, and. the 
analytical and individual schools founded by .ro 'reud, June; , 
and Adler. lYioreover, even an exact science such as physics 
hs.s found great use in concepts which are used to d escribe 
phenomena of a non-physical nature or at least a non-sensu-
ous nature as the atom. 
fhe second point that is worth mentionin~ about the 
emoti vists and their concept of ethics is their g rea t concern 
for system. This is one of the main reasons for their be-
ing driven to such radical views in ethics. I t seems trmt 
very fe w views concerning ethics would be consistent with 
t he ir position and the emotive interpretation seems to have 
b een made to order. It is this need for consistency with 
the Positivist's system of philosophy that is one of there-
sponsible factors for suc h a theory of ethics • .t>..J. Ayer, 
h imself , adrni ts this. 11 Now I do not d eny that in putting 
forward this theory that I was concerned vfith maintaining 
the g eneral consisten c y of my position; but is not the only 
e thi cal theory t hat wou l d have s ati sfied this re quirement. 11 l 
Thus we see it is t he concern for consistency that resulted 
in such an ethical position. 
Another point t. hat can be mentioned concerninr:; t h is 
position is that it focuses one's attention in et h ical mat -
ters on the individual rather than on externals as acts and 
consequen ces. It does not ma k e sin an objective rea l ity a s 
some philosophers do but could be reinterpret ed to make sin 
reside in persons , i . e ., persons are g ood or s inful, not 
acts. However, s i n mus t be relatively interpret e d . ~ven 
Russell could be open to this interpretation if one cared 
to modify his p osi tion. Russell writes, 
The consequences of t rils doctrine are co nsidera b le. 
I n the first p l a ce, there can be no such t h ing as 
'sin' in an y absolute sense; what one man c a lls 
'sin ' another may call 'virtue,' and though they may 
dislik e each other on account of th i s difference, 
neith er can co nvict the o ther of in t ellectu al error. 2 
'rhus we see that this position centers ethical matters on 
t h e ind ivid ua l and not on conse quences wh ich cannot be said 
tc be moral or iw~oral even if only in a re lative sense. 
1. Ayer , LTL , 20. 
2. Russell, BS, 239. 
CHAPTER VII 
TH E CASE Af"i AINS'r Eri-H CAL EJiO'I'IVISivi 
The adherents and proponents of the emotivi st i c t ype 
of e thics have provok e d a considerab le a mount of crit icism 
a ~ainst their radi cal et hical i d eas. The r e is hardly a 
school of philosophical t houg ht which ha s h ad anything t o 
say about e thics that has not commented u pon t he ideas of 
t he e thi c a l emotivists. Pra smatist s, realis t s, idealists, 
a nd oth ers h ave by t h eir criticisms alig ned thems e l ves a-
g ainst this k i nd of t h inking in e thi cs; an e thi c wh ich seems 
t o r ebel a 2;s.ins t t h e be t te r neture and j ud?;ment of man. 
This chap ter is in the main d evoted to the c r i ti cal 
remark s made by ethical aut h oriti es, whereas , persona l cri-
tical remarks are main l y to be f oun d following the i ndivi-
dual treatment of the various emo t ivists. Moreover, the 
criti c a l remarks in this chapter are almost entire l y direct-
ed towards the school of e motivistic thou:sh t wh ile t h e earlier 
critical remark s pertained ~o individual emotivist i c writers. 
Also, the critical remar k s i n this c bspter- are topically 
arran6 ed and approach ed whereas the criti cal remark s follow-
ing the cha pters on the various emotivists ar e not topical-
ly arran g e d but treat the pe culiar differences of each man 
i n his own ri ~ht . 
The treatment of criti c a l remarks ag ainst the et h ics 
.o f emotivism will take the f ollowing order: 
1. Practical consequences and i mp licat i ons of e :mot. iv i sm . 
2 . Log ical pos it i v i s t s a s t h e guard i a ns of s ci e n c e . 
!} .. Value .i udsmen t s. 
~. The prob lem of obli ga ti on. 
,. The emot i v i st's criterion of truth . 
6. I nternal cr i ticisms. 
1. Pr a ctical Consequences and I mp lication s 
of Emot iv i sm 
E notivism has been the s u bject of much critici sm, 
and ri ·3h tly ·so. Ledd en, an adh erent and defender of e mo-
ti vi sm, s e.ys that 11 It is a theory vih i ell has ca lled fo r th 
se v e r e a n d outsp oken critici sm in virtue of i t s alleg e d ly 
ruinou s i mplicati ons for social and private livin;s . 11 1 
The res u lts or consequen ces which would follow s h o u ld 
one commit himself to an ethi c such as radical emo t ivi sm are 
ove r whebling . I n t h e firs t place the emotivis t 1 s doctrine 
of et n i cs would mak e a farce of t he entire matter. It would 
cut t he r oot of all moral end eavor; it r e sults in moral sui-
cide. I n fact, it would be a farce fer any man to a t tempt 
to be moral. There would be no sense in so acting . 
If we took the emotive ethic seriously and co mmitted 
outselves to such a moral ph ilosophy it would s p ell disaster 
·1. Le d d e n, Art. (1950), 354. 
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for maD and society. Man reflects rationally about his mo-
ral behavior and if he cannot harness it into scientific 
method to ~he satisfaction of the positivists it does not 
mean it is a non-entity. Such a stand taken seriously would 
result in disaster for us all, both moral and otherwise. 
Joad would agree with this criticism. Joad writes, "Can a 
man really continue to feel indigent at cruelty, if he is 
convinced that the statement, 'cruelty is wrong' is meaning-
less? An emotion of indignation may, indeed, be felt; it 
may even be expressed; but it will not long survive the con-
victLon that it is without authority in morals or basis in 
reason."l It is indeed a strange doctrine for i t implies 
that there is no difference in mutilating one's best friend 
by tossing him into a den of lions and tossing a toy doll 
into the same den. For the radical emotivist the only dif-
ference lies in the fact that they are two different acts 
and that should one object to such behavior it is simply 
because he has not adjusted himself to this kind of behavior 
and is therefore reacting emotionally to it. 
Should one ever seriously attempt to carry out such 
an ethical code he would soon lose all of his friends. Should 
a group of persons ever attempt to put into practice such an 
ethic the result would be "bedlam." That group would soon 
1. Joad, CLP, 148. 
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disintegrate and perish. Anti-social and immoral lusts, 
hatreds, murders, would soon come to the forefront and the 
result would be atrocities worse than the worst war-monger 
could possibly imagine. 
An emotive ethic which rejects moral value1 robs the 
world not only of its splendor but strips it o£ its most im-
portant features. 2 Emotivism implies that one cannot place 
a difference of value upon the life and actions of such men 
as Moses, Isaiah, Socrates, Jesus, Paul, Augustine, Aquinas, 
Luther, Lincoln, GandAi and others such as Judas, Herod, 
Nero, the Borgias, Hitler and their like. The emotivists 
are attempting to persuade others that the life of Jesus 
and Nero were equally alike as far as value is concerned, 
equally admirable and should one object that this is not 
the case and that one is good and the other is wi cked, then 
that person is only emotionally upset. It is no wc~der that 
men rebel against such a doctrine. 3 D.S. Miller attacking 
the emotivist's theory writes, "It is completely obvious 
that there is moral truth. Life forces the perception upon 
us. There is something strangely frivolous and shallow in 
the frame of mind that can deny it."4 
1. Here and in the next few pages the author is primarily 
concerned with the radical emotivists. 
2. See Titus, LIP, 204. 
3. See Mead, TPP 89. 
4. Miller, Art. (1950), 45. 
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That mind has not thought thoroughly or seriously 
enough about the problem of ethics which tries to claim that 
it is not bed "to enjoy the infliction of cruelty."! Russell 
says that morality is outside the province of science and 
therefore cannot have any validity. He writes; 
There remains, however, a vast fie l d, tradi-
tionally included in philosophy, where scientific 
methods are inadequate. This field includes ulti-
mate questions of value; science alone, for exam-
ple, cannot prove that it is bad to enjoy the 
infliction of cruelty. Whatever can be known, can 
be known by means of science; but things which are 
legi~imat~ly matters of feeling lie outside its 
. prov~nce. 
Russell does not mean that ethical knowledge is a different 
type of knowledge from scientific knowledge. He means that 
there can be no knowledge of ethics at all; at least for the 
present. In another book he writes, "'Values• ••• lie outside 
the domain of science ••• but I draw the further conclusion ••• 
that questions as to 'value' lie wholly outside the domain 
of knowledge."~ The implication here is tremendous. This 
implies, in the first place, that a man's moral behavior and 
a man's immoral behavior are of equal value. Secondly, it 
implies that all the labor that the men of the human race 
have applied towards the study of ethics has been in vain. 
Thirdly, it implies that at the present day there is no 
knowledge of ethics. Fourthly, it implies that try as one 
1. Russell, HWP, 834 
2. Russell, HWP, 834 
3. Russell, RS, 230 
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may, it is impossible to gain any knowledge of ethics in the 
future. It is as Hill states, "Their conclusion indicates 
that man's whole effort ever to convince anyone of his duty 
upon rational grounds is sheer folly."1 
The logical positivists and emotivists are in a pre-
carious position. Logically it amounts to this: Either 
there are moral values but we have no knowledge of them or 
there are no moral values and of this we have knowledge. It 
is comparable to Kant's thing-in-itself. There is a reality, 
viz., the thing-in-itself, which is unknowable or there is 
no ultimate reality or thing-in-itself of which there is 
knowledge. If the former is true then moral values are ad-
mitted; however, if the latter is true than it must be shown 
to be true and not merely denied as the positivists do. This 
is precisely why A.C. Knudson speaks of logical positivism 
as a philosophy of denial. 2 
The ethics of the logical positivists implies that 
all moral experience is illusory and that anyone who has 
ever committed himself to a system of ethics has been vic-
timized by that phantom. It implies that all the great 
souls of history have labored and died in vain and that the 
wisest course to follow would be the path of selfishness. 
It implies that there is no path of right for men or the 
1. Hill, CET; 26. 
2. In private conversations. 
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race to follow. It implies that justice is opaque and that 
wickedness is as right and good as justice, mercy, and kind-
ness. Concerning the logical positivists-' statement that 
ethics is illusory, Samuel L. Hart takes issue. Hart re-
fers to the ethics of the logical positivists as 'value 
nominalism' and condemns their indifference to value as 
"mental derangement and moral callousness." Pointing out 
the practical consequences and implications of such a skep-
tical value theory, he writes: 
If our values are nothing but mere emotional 
ejaculations or meaningless words (words-designata), 
as logical positiviam wants us to believe , nihilism 
and skepticism must consequently follow. Life does 
not permit of such an attitude. Without preference 
and deliberate choice we cannot exist. A consistent 
skeptic or nihilist must keep himself from all ap-
proval or disapproval, from all judgments concerning 
the degree of importance and the efficacies of the 
objects he is absorbed in or deals with. 
Another argument that proves damaging to the emotivists' 
cause is that which makes use of the method of reductio ad 
absurdum, that is, the deducing of inconsistent consequences 
. 2 from the premises of these ethicists. These men claim an 
ethical philosophy of skepticism and say that there is not 
any right or wrong in ethics and yet these men refuse to 
commit themselves to such a belief, thus reducing their philos-
ophy to an incoherent and inconsistent level. A modern bio-
1. Hart, TOV, 63. 
2. See Bennett and Bayli~, FL, 21. 
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grapher of Russell writes, "It is, of course, obvious 
that a man who, like Russell, has spent much of his life 
in waging the war for freedom on half a dozen different 
fronts must find a plade in his outlook for values; and 
••• he has excluded them along with religion from his phi-
losophy."! It seems that these men refuse to be coherent 
and include all the facts of experience; and if they can-
not include all the facts of experience for some reason, 
then at least they ought to include those facts of experi-
ence which prove most dear to them, viz., moral values. 
This section may well be concluded with a remark 
by Joad concerning the implications of logical positivism. 
He writes, "If one really believed that the doctrine of 
Logical Positivism were true, there would be no bar of 
principle to the leading of that life which Plato called 
'democratic• ••• a Bohemian in art, a Laodicean in affairs, 
a skeptic in philosophy and religion, an inconstant in love 
and a dilettante in life."2 
2. Logical Positivists as the Self-Appointed 
Guardians of Science 
In the eyes of logical positivism, it almost seems as 
though science could not get along without the watchful eye 
1. Leggett, BR, 66-67 
2. Joad, CLP, 145 
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of positivism. Logical positivists not only make other phi-
los9phers appear to be the enemy of science but they have 
taken the task upon themselves of keeping science pure. 
"Positivism assumes the somewhat embarrassing guize of legis-
lator to science. 111 Barnes says that the logical positivists 
have elected themselves as the "dogmatic theologians and 
heresiologists of the Orthodox Church of Natural Science."2 
They have assumed that the only valid scientific method is 
that which follows along the lines of the logical positivist's 
prescription in spite of the fact that many successful devel-
opments in science have come about by other than strictly 
positivistic methods. Scientific empirical investigation is 
seldom purely positivistic and to cast the results of such 
scientific endeavor into the flames as Hume suggested and 
modern positivists endorse is to destroy a major portion of 
science. To be a strict positivist would force one to dis-
card as unverifiable all facts of the past. 
If A says it is raining, the process of [sci-
entific)verification does not consist in going out 
to see if it is raining, (positivistic), for the 
rain may have stopped. It consists in seeing that 
all relevant facts can be rationally correlated 
with A's statement./ 
Logical positivistists think of science as dealing with 
P-statements, that is "protocol" statements or statements of 
physical facts which are publically observable. They thought 
1. Randall and Buchler, PAL, 104. 
2. Barnes, TPP, 101. Also see McElroy, MP, 213. 
3. Dingle, TSP, 339. 
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that scientific method restricted itself to such. This is 
not the case, however, for ultimately scientific verifica-
tion is rational in nature. "The hunt for ultimate protocol 
statements needing no verification is thus a wild goose chase, 
for the process of verification is rational not empirical."1 
Dingle further disproves the positivist's interpretation of 
science by pointing out the fact that since the atomic weight 
of carbon is 12, even though a value of 56 were found, the 
statement of the atomic weight of carbon as being 12 would 
not be falsified. 
The positivist's principles of science and the prin-
ciples employed by scientists differ. Logical positivists 
·reject the concept of probability as nonsense. Lately, how-
ever, the concept of probability has been incorporated into 
the philosophy of logical positivists. Ayer in his revision 
of Language, Truth and Logic has made room for the concept 
since probability is indispensable to science. However, in 
making such a compromise the structure of positivism collapses. 
The other positivists who do not accept the principle of proba-
bility are not only unscientific in their approach but are un-
wise in so doing. For example, if an astronomer wishes to 
observe the eclipse of the sun and there are two places of 
observation equally well for such a purpose except for the fact 
that weather conditions are more favorable at one. The first 
1. Dingle, TSP, 339. 
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station has wether conditions that are fair five out of six 
days and the second has weather conditions cloudy five out 
of six days. The astronomer would (if he were not a logical 
positivist) select the first place for purposes of observe-
tion, 
yet the logical positivists would assur e him that 
in so doing he would be acting nonsenstcally; or 
to be strictly accurate, they would say: 'the 
sentence, "the probability of fine weather on the 
eclipfe day is greater at A than B" is nonsensi-
cal.' 
Since logical positivists reject much of science as 
invalid, it is not surprising, therefore, that they reject 
moral values. Positivists with their inadequate scientific 
method have tried to undermine science, values, and even 
their own philosophy. Aliotta writes, 
"Positivism with its apotheosis of the scientific 
method ••• carried this prejudice to extreme conse-
quences, declaring those problems for which, from 
its one-sided, restricted point of view, it could 
find no adequate solution, to be insoluble, and 
was thus led by faulty perspective to attribute 
to the nature of human knowledge that inadequacy 
which was due rather to its own method and sys-
tem. n2 
Logical positivism is a strange philosophy for it de-
nies the reality of value and yet claims to have the only 
valid system for the discovery of one of the greatest values 
viz., truth.3 Positivism uses the "term 'metaphysics' reck-
1. Dingle, TSP, 338. 
2. Aliotta, IRAS, 4. 
3. See Barrett, PHI, 39. 
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lessly, and in general" narrows "without precise justification the field of speculative philoso-
phizing."l 
The truth of the matter is that if the system of veri-
fication employed by the logical positivists were rigorously 
carried then no proposition of science could be accepted as 
valid, at least as far as scientific laws are concerned. 
Ramsperger points out that, 
Scientific laws are usually stated in the form of 
universal propositions. "All metals expand when 
heated" refers not only to that finite number of 
instances that have been, or ever will be, examined, 
but also to the possible infinite number of other 
instances. How, then, can any scientific law meet 
the positivist demand for verifiability.2 
3. Value Judgments 
I t Is in the matter of value judgments that the emo-
tivists differ most radically from other ethicists. Even 
the subjectivist believes that he is dealing with proposi-
tiona involving value judgments, but the emotivist rules 
out all judgments of value. The ethical philosophy which 
is closesj to emotivism is perhaps, subjectivism. However, 
on this matter of value judgments there is an impassable 
chasm which divides the two forever. The emotivists, espe-
cially those of the radical type, emphatically deny proposi-
tions of value, insisting that ethical disagreement is one 
1. Randall and Buchler, PAl, 103. 
2. Ramsperger, POS, 111. 
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of attitude and not one of belief about attitudes. This 
seems to be merely a verbal dispute, for how can anyone ar-
gue except that he argue about what he believes. Brandt 
says that in the last analysis 
the facts and theories available, or likely to 
be available, are certainly far too crude to 
enbhn~e the probability of the theory that 
ethical disagreements are dis.agreements in 
attitude, as distinct from the theory that 
they are disagreements in belief about atti-
tudes.~ 
It is an illegitimate -argument the emotivists use to 
claim that judgments of value do not exist. When an emo-
tivist claims that value judgments in the field of ethics 
do not exist he does so on grounds that can be applied to 
any study. Hill says, "The Logical Positivists' criteria 
of meaningful statements ••• are arbitrary and so unduly re-
strictive as to exclude along with moral judgments many 
other statements that seem to most men to be significant."2 
To deny truth or falsity to statements of ethics may be ap-
plied to statements in other fields where the statements 
are accepted as genuine propositions. For example, when 
Carnap attempts to maintain that when two persons are ar-
guing whether or not it is right to kill and "A" says it is 
right and "B" says it is wrong, the truth of the matter is 
that neither of them is right for there is no right nor 
1. Brandt, "The Emotive Theory of Ethics," Art. (1950), 318. 
2. Hill, CET, 27. 
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wrong. It is the same thing as several scientists arguing 
about the cause of emotions and "A" claims that the basis 
is physiological and "B" claims that the basis is endo-
crinological, whereas ;~C" claims that the basis is chemical; 
it is possible for a fourth who is a skeptic of Ayer's type 
to claim that they are all wrong for there is no such thing 
as emotion. In other words, it is one thing to interpret 
the facts of experience differently than another person 
would interpret them, but it is another thing to deny that 
there a:!n:e any facts of experience to interpret. It is an un-
fair argument to deny a postulate without consideration of 
any evidence. Just as the scientists set up their hypo-
theses and proceed to prove them, so the ethicist has the 
right to do the same. To deny a postulate before any 
examination is an illegitimate form of argument. Wheel-
wright, aware of the positivists using this subtle tactic, 
writes specifically in reference to Ayer's treatment of 
ethical matters: 
It is possible to adopt this sort of tactic 
in any argument whatever. If two physicists are 
discussing whether, on the basis of experimental 
evidence mathematically interpreted, space is 
Euclidean or curved, it is quite possible for an 
extreme skeptic to undercut the argument by doubt-
ing that objective space exists, (or that any 
geometry is verifiable,) or even whether the con-
tending physicists themselves exist. The strata-
gem is perhaps neither courteous nor persuasive 
but it is not illogical, for it contains no self-
contradiction. Now just as two physicists cannot 
discuss their proper subject unless they postulate 
the existence of some kind of real physical 
world, about the specific nature of which 
they can then proceed to inquire; so too no 
ethical discussion is possible without postu-
lating that there are goods and bads, rights 
and wrongs, in human affairs, and that it is 
the business of ethics to discover these1if possible and raise questions about them. 
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There are very many arguments against the non-cogni-
tive theory of ethics and this one in particular is crucial. 
If ethical or value judgments are non-cognitive then all 
judgments, scientific and otherwise, are non-cognitive. 
The same system of verification used to prove factual pre-
positions can also be used to prove value statements. This 
holds true even when one uses the yardstick of the Logical 
Positivist. Carnap2 speaking for them says that a statement 
must be verified by fact. It may, however, be verified by 
other statements which in turn are eventually verified by 
fact. Value judgments are indeed statements which may ul-
timately be verified by faet. A value judgment as "Panicky 
fear is evil" may be verified by the damaging results of 
fear and panic to one's personality, body, and others. 
Carnap, aware of the fact that the philosophy of logi-
cal positivism is founded upon principles which are metaphys-
ical in nature, says that the philosophy of positivism is 
valid because it yields good results. May not the same be 
said of other ethical systems which are normative in char-
1. Wheelwright, CIE, 48. 
2. Carnap, PLS, Part I. 
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acter? 
For example, an adherent of the perfectionist school 
of ethical thought could point out that the principles upon 
which perfectionism is founded are valid since in being com-
mitted to them a decided improvement in personality, atti-
tude, and actions result. Normative principles have conse-
quential results as well as positivistic principles. If the 
argument that a principle is valid so long as it yields good 
results holds for one philosophical system then by right it 
ought to hold for any other. If logical positivism is to 
protect and maintain itself then it must allow other systems 
to do the same. This is not only a logical principle; it is 
also an ethical principle. The right that one claims for 
himself must also be permitted to others. Brightman says 
that this ethical principle is one of the "three foundation 
pillars of ethics" viz., "I universalize."1 What is valid 
for one is valid for all, and what is invalid for one is in-
valid for all. 2 The only possible way for positivism to 
sustain itself is to permit the validity of other ethical 
systems. 
C.I. Lewis also maintains that value judgments may 
be verified for the simple reason that they are a form of 
empirical knowledge. 
1. Brightman, ML, 14. 
2. See Carritt, TM, 77. 
Predictions of goodness and badness which will 
be disclosed in experience under certain cir-
cumstances and on particular occasions, are 
either true or false, and are capable of veri-
fication in the same manner as other terminat-
ing judgments, whmch pledict accrual of other 
qualities than values. 
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By the foregoing assertion Lewis claims that not only can 
value judgments be made but the same system of verification 
used to prove scientific or other knowledge can be and is 
used to prove propositions of value. Lewis maintains that 
empirical proof is used to substantiate value judgments. 
He says that there are experiences of value which are not 
capable of validation, that is, of these value experiences 
there is no knowledge. He does not mean by this that one 
has an experience of an "ought content." What he means by 
that is one's having an experience of value is not suffi-
cient evidence upon which to base a judgment, particularly, 
a single experience. On the other hand there are judgments 
of value. These judgments of value are in the realm of 
cognition. These judgments of value may be referred to 
experience. Judgments of value "permit of predictions". 
One may predict that a certain experience may prove of 
value. 
The mere apprehension of a value experience is not 
valid knowledge; it is the direct finding of a "value-
1. Lewis, M;.V, 36.5. Also see page 4,56. 
2. Lewis, AKV, 36.5. 
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quality." However, the prediction of a possible realiza-
tion of a value experience is both cognitive and valid. 
This kind of knowledge is one of the most important kinds 
kinds of human knowledge and is the "root of all practical 
wisdom."l To evaluate is to be able to predict potentiali-
ties of that which results in value experiences, i.e., ex-
periences of good or ill. Moreover, such judgments of value 
are true or false. The definition of a value judgment for 
Lewis would be "predictions of the possible realizations of 
these (good or ill) qualities in particular empirical con-
texts, and ••• appraisals of the objective value-quality resi-
dent in existent things."~ 
Therefore value judgments are genuinely cognitive; 
they are evaluations of potentialities, and as such are 
true or false; being validated by experience. "The manner 
of their validation, and of their confirmation, does not 
differ, in general, from that of attributions of other pro-
perties to objects."3 By this, Lewis means that the same 
system of verification used to prove scientific judgments 
may be used to validate value judgments. Both are genuine 
propositions and cognitive. Lewis thinks that perhaps the 
reason why the emotivists mistook ethics as non-cognitive 
1. Lewis, AKV, 365. 
2. Lewis, AKV, 365. 
3. Lewis, AKV, 365. 
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is that they limited action to behavior, and "va l ue-
judgments are so thought of as to be diverted of both 
their cognitive and their imperative significance at one 
and the same time. 111 We deliberate our action, behavior 
is not action in that it lies outside our powers of con-
trol. Actions are purposive, they are intended or willed. 
Intended or purposeful acts are 'sensible.' The results 
of these acts can be verified. 
No intention or pnrpose could be serious, and 
no action could be practically justifiable or 
success, if it wer.e not that there are value-
predications which represant empirical cog-
~~t~~~;ir!~~i~~e8~~e~i~:!!;~r!~~i~~~~e capable 
To divest reality of value would be to take from re-
ality its basis and reason for being. To take from reality 
such concepts as importance, seriousness, goodness, truth, 
beauty, betterment, improvement, perfection, and the like, 
would rob it of all its worth. 
Action is of prime importance in that it leads to 
value. Action is rational and sensible and can be altered 
on reflection. The purpose of action is the realizing of 
value. If there were no value them action would be point-
less. To maintain that action is pointless would be the 
height of incoherence. 
1. Lewis, AKV, 366. 
2. Lewis, AKV, 371-372. 
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Intention or will is the basis of action. By inten-
tion is meant the expected result of one's actions. Intent 
may be considered sensible if the result of one's actions 
... 
is ascribed with value. 
Lepley would agree with Lewis in rejecting the, emo-
tivist's contention that values are purely emotive and there-
fore non-cognitive. Lepley has in mind particularly the 
system of Feigl, Morris, and Stevenson. He claims that their 
conclusions are qnjustifiable on the grounds that it does not 
follow that since facts and values are different as far as 
meaning is concerned that they are therefore non-cognitive. 
Facts have a descriptive meaning, i.e., they are as they 
happen to be. Facts are given. Values have a normative 
significance. They are principles. They are the way things 
ought to be. A value is that which is approved or prized; 
it is that which has importance. The two differ in reference 
and function. The conclusion "that valuative statements are 
essentially and 'irreducibly' expressive or emotive and fac-
tual statements essen~ially descriptive"1 is not justified. 
Lepley says that both facts and values may affirm 
relations which may be true or false. Both may be tested 
experimentally concerning their actual or possible rela-
tions. He writes: 
1. Lepley, VV, 81. 
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The tendency to contrast some valuative 
statements which commonly have a high degree of 
emotive stimulus-capacity with factual statements 
which ordinarily have a high degree of descrip-
tive stimulus-capacity and then to regard this 
difference as an "inherent" or "irreducible" dif-
f,rence between factual and valuative statements 
shows failure to recognize that all events and 
relations may be subject matter for both factual 
and valuative statements and that in different 
contexts and with different intents each f orm of 
statement varies from the completely descriptive 
in reference and function to the completely ex-
pressive and/or emotive in reference and function. 1 
Simply because emotion is involved in ethical disputes it 
does not mean that ethical concerns are void of data both 
factual and otherwise. On the other hand simply because 
certain abstruse facts are not of sufficient importance to 
incite feelings of emotion does not mean that all facts are 
powerless in bringing about emotional excitement. Not only 
has Lepley noticed that the positivists have committed this 
fallacy but it has not escaped the attention of Wheelwright 
eiub~r. 
For Wheelwright the emotive ethic overlooks one im-
portant point, that although involved in many if not all 
ethical judgments is a subjective emotional attitude one 
can by no means preclude that there is nothing more to 
ethical expression. Together with all this evincing and 
emotion is a judgment which is objective and about which we 
can predicate truth or falsity. 
1. Lepley, VV, 82. 
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It may be true that emotions are involved in ethical 
discussion but also involved is a proposition which can be 
examined on its own merits independently of the· person ut-
tering it. Wheelwright thinks that this is not only true 
in the matter of ethics but it also takes place in scienti-
fie matters. 
The proposition "Interstellar space is curved" 
can be examined on its merits independently of who 
says it, and this is the proper way for an investi-
gation of physical science to proceed. But it can 
also be considered in relation to the speaker or 
writer who annunciated it, in which case it 'evinces' 
a certain attitude on his part--an interest in the 
subject and either the possession of a reasonable 
amoun~ or support ing ev id ence or a willingness to 
depend upon hearsay. The difference is one of per-
spective; of whether it suits our purpose to examine 
any statement on its objective merits or in terms of 
the supposed feelings of the person who makes it. 
The latter reference, when introduced into a ques-
tion where it is inappr£priate, becomes the fallacy 
of argument ad hominem. 
What Wheelwright has in mind here is that one cannot 
argue validly by merely t aking into considerat i on the feel-
ings of a person. One must argue the point at issue, i.e., 
the thesis. It is irrelevant what the feelings or emotions 
are that accompany an argument. Simply because a person is 
emotional when he utters that "two plus two equals four" 
does not mean that it is neither true or false and only an 
emotive ejaculation without cognition. This is precisely 
1. Wheelwright, CIE, 49. 
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what the emotivists have been attempting to do. They have 
been victims of the fallacy argumentum ad hominem. Rather 
than basing their arguments on the facts of the case, they 
have attacked the personality and feelings of the one stat-
ing the argument. They have appealed to the personal feel-
ings and interests of their opponent instead of the argument 
that the opponent is offering. 
One could use this illegitimate form of argument, viz., 
argumentum ad hominem, against the positivists by saying the 
same or something similar about them. It may be said that 
the entire positivist philosophy is false because it is 
merely an emotional outburst on the part of the adherents. 
The positivists were emotionally disturbed with the prevail-
ing philosophies and being victimized by their intense feel-
ings founded the philosophy of logical positivism which can-
not be of any value since they are always emotionally dis-
turbed when it comes to offering their school of thought and 
attacking other philosophies. 
According to this line of argument the only philosophy 
which could be valid or that which is most true is the one 
which can be presented with the least or no amount of enthu-
siasm or emotion. 
The positivist's position becomes even worse, says 
Blanshard,when we 
consider the case in which we are calling good or 
bad something that happened in the past. ~he pos-
itivist view requires us to hold (a) that if our 
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statement had not been made, there would have 
been nothing good or bad in the event when it 
occurred, and (b) that if the event had not 
occurred, all the good or evil that ou~ judg-
ment indicates would come into being anyhow, by 
reason of our attitude. Both of these implica-
tions conflict fligrantly with the intention 
of such judgment. 
Ross thinks that much of the difficulty and confusion 
lies in the fact that those (particularly Ayer and Carnap) 
who adhere to a non-cognitive ethic have reasoned that since 
ethical judgments cannot be proved by empirical fact that 
they are therefore without meaning. "Sometimes, indeed, 
they go so far as to say that the meaning of a synthetic 
judgment is its verification." 2 Ross claims that there are 
two ways by which one may verify a general statement: 
If the proposition states that every A has 
the attribute B, we may effect a partial verifi-
cation by producing, one after another, instances 
in which by the u~e of the senses, particular A's 
are perceived to have the attribute B. And in this 
case the facts which form the evidence for the pro-
position are the very facts which ••• are summed up 
in the proposition itself •.• it may, however, well 
be the case that we cannot by the use of the senses 
perceive directly that anv A is B. In such a case 
we may be able to verify the statement by discover-
ing by sensuous experience A's which have~the attri-
bute C, which we already know to imply B.~ 
In this latter type of proof facts which verify the 
proposition are wholly different from the meaning of the 
proposition itself. Propositions of the past, for example, 
1. B1anshard, Art. (1951), 130. 
2. Ross, FE, 37. 
3. Ross, FE, 37. 
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can be verified by this type only. Thus propositions can 
have meanings which differ completely from the facts by 
which they are verified. 
Ayer claims that his theory of ethics escapes certain 
difficulties that the subjectivist ethics does not escape. 
He says that in his system there is no room for argument or 
dispute and that it is impossible to argue about questions 
of value since questions of value are not propositions at 
all. There is a dual objection to this. In the first place 
we do in fact argue about questions pertaining to value as 
we are now doing. Even those that hold to ~he non-cognitive 
ethic argue amongst themselves concerning ethical matters. 
Ross s~ys that if what we call ethical propositions are · not 
propositions at all then they cannot ever be imcompatible: 
If, then, he [Ayer1 is to resist the argu-
ment in question, he must simply deny that in fact 
we ever do dispute about questions of value; for if 
we did dispute about things which on his theory we 
cannot dispute about, his theory would clearly be 
untrue. He boldly adopts the course to which he 
is logically forced, and denies that we ever do 
dispute about questions of value.l 
It is as Ross claims that on the emotivist's theory of moral 
value one cannot dispute about questions of value. There-
fore, the emotivist is clearly in the wrong for the emotivist 
is disputing about questions of value in his debate with the 
traditionalists. 
1. Ross, FE, 39. 
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Finally, Ross would say that the emotivist's dis-
missal of value judgments as meaningless rests upon the 
prejudice or assumption that the only propositions that 
are genuine are those which are empirical or analytic. 
Therefore in order not to invalidate their basic positi-
vistic premises they are obliged to reject ethical prope-
l 
sitions as genuine. To deny value judgments merely because 
they do not suit one's philosophical temperament or system 
is not a grounds for rejecting them as false ideas. In a 
later section in this chapter the biased position of the 
positivists will be examined and discussed more fully. 
This matter that there are no value judgments was 
met with tremendous disapproval on the part of t he opponents 
of logical positivists. No aspect of the emotive ethic has 
been so severely attacked as the denial of moral judgments. 
It is not an easy matter for men to sit back and believe 
that ethics is not a reality. It is difficult to accept 
the belief that the only moral difference between a Christ 
and a Nero is an emotional temperament and since emotions 
are neither right nor wrong, true or false, that therefore 
Christ was not moral and Nero, immoral. 
Samuel L. Hart expresses himself as being extremely 
disturbed with the emotive ethic of the logical positivists. 
1. See Pap, EAP, 42-43. 
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In particular he seeks to take issue on this matter of gen-
uine propositions in the realm of value. Hart maintains 
that the value theory of the radical emotivists is not 
plausible since mere ejaculations are not capable of direct-
ing or redirecting our action. Cognition is indispensable 
to action. Mere feelings cannot justify claims nor can they 
expand social life. Even the most extreme of these emoti-
vists "cannot help but choose his friends, make a distinc-
tion between noble and mean motives, enduring and transient 
ends, evanescent and lasting interests."l Value is involved 
in all of these things. 
This matter that value judgments do not exist has 
provoked a good amount of criticism from many quarters of 
the philosophical world. The positivists have made room for 
science in that they allow for descriptiv,e propositions as 
having genuineness. The positivists have also made room for 
mathematics and logic in that they allow analytic proposi-
tions as having cognitive value. However, when they did not 
make room for ethical propositions and rejected them as 
pseudo-propositions the matter became the object of much 
criticism. Pap, aware of the severe criticism which prevails 
concerning this matter of value judgments, attempts to appease 
the situation by modifying the position of the radical emoti-
1. Hart, TOV, b3. 
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vists so as to reject value judgments only of the categori-
cal nature, e.g., "killing is wrong." He writes, 
Certain logical positivists (Ayer, Carnap) 
have enraged "humanistic" philosophers by declar-
ing point-blank that ethical statements are like 
poetic utterances in that they have only emotive 
meaning and are no assertions whose truth or 
falsity could be rationally argued. But their 
position is quite unassailable provided t hey 
make explicit that only unconditional ("categori-
cal") value judgments are thus characterized.l 
This modification of the positivistic position is 
characteristic of the entire positivistic school. Beginning 
with ~he radical emotivists as Ayer, Carnap, Russell, and 
their extreme of emotivism which attempts to claim that unaer 
no circumstances will they permit of value judgments a gra-
dual modification which is perceptible. Schlick, who is 
not willing to reject ethics in its entirety, accepts it as 
a psychological fact. He rests much ethical value on the 
quality of kindness since he feels that it is too great a 
moral value to be ejected from life and reality. From 
Schlick's psychological or descriptive emotivism the next 
noticeable difference takes place in the modified positivism 
of men as Stevenson and Pap who permit a limited amount of 
discourse and debate in the field of ethics. They admit de-
bate but not cognition of value. 2 "They would readily admit 
1. Pap, EAP, 42. 
2. Britton allows cognition of value. 
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that conditional value judgments (x is good as a means to 
~' or~ is better than~ as a means to~) are arguable."1 
The next deviation from the radical positivistic position 
towards liberality is to be found in Britton's interpreta-
tion of ethics from a positivistic position. Bri tton not 
only allows for discussion and debate in ethical matters 
but he permits of ethical objectivity. One fina l step is 
needed, however, to bring ethics into its most coherent form 
and that is to make room for obligation. Up to this point 
the modification of the positivistic position in ethics has 
been one of degree, but with the addition of obligation, 
however, a difference in kind takes place. This last form 
of emotivism is the position taken in this dissertation. 
4. The Problem of Obligation 
• 
When one debates ethical issues even if he maintains 
as Ayer does that it is not a matter of judgment but one of 
liking then he is attempting to convince others that his 
likes are justified on ~he grounds that the character of the 
act is deserving of being liked or good.2 When an act is ad-
judged deserving of being liked or good then it ought to be 
liked. There is an obligation on the part of the subject who 
1. Pap, EAP, 42. 
2. Ross, FE, 41. 
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adjudges it good. To like an act is not the same as being 
obligated to like an act. One may in fact like an act 
which is not deserving of being liked, e.g., acts of per-
version as sadism and the like. One may in fact not like 
an act which is deserving of being liked, as acts of kind-
ness. To like a thing is irrelevant to being obligated to 
like it. When an act is deserving of being liked, then there 
is an obligation to like it. 
A person may like acts ofsggression but that does not 
mean it is an obligation or moral--even for him, as the sub-
jectivists in ethics would attempt to claim. Acts of egres-
sion are not deserving of being liked. There is, therefore, 
an obligation to cultivate a dislike of such acts. 
Ross also elaims that there is little plausibility in 
the emotivist's doctrine that value judgments are not judg-
ments at all but merely commands. He says that they must 
be distinguished from commands in that a command states "do 
so and so" whereas "you ought to do so and so" is a sugges-
tion or inducement to do "so and so" on the grounds that it 
is morally right.l Heteronomous commands differ from obli-
gations in a very important respect. In those commands 
which are enforceable, one does not have a choice. "Theirs 
not to reason why" in a command. One is forced to carry out 
1. Ross, FE, 34. 
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a command even if it is against his will. There is coer-
cion, restraint in a command whereas there is choice, 
freedom, and the opportunity to reason in an obligation. 
One has the freedom or the ability to refuse to carry out 
an obligation, whereas, when one is faced with a command, 
he obeys whether or not he is willing. In an obligation 
one has the power of choice; in a command one obeys the 
will of another. One is self-motivated in an obligatory 
situation; in a commanding situation he is hetero-moti-
vated. In the former situation the will is heteronomous. 
A.C. Ewing, like Ross, has much to say by way of 
criticism concerning the role of obligation in the ethical 
theory of the emotivists. Ewing says that involuntary ex-
clamations even as "Ouch" are more than mere ejaculations. 
Besides being a sign that one is undergoing an emotion, it 
serves a very definite purp.ose. One thing is to have it 
and another is to inform people of it, together with the 
approval or disapproval of it. 
No doubt, when I exclaim with this purpose, I 
may have in mind something other than the mere 
communication of a truth about my emotions, but 
so I may if I state, f£r example, that I am 
sorry about so and so. 
When one expresses horror concerning a heinous crime he is 
not only expressing his emotional disturbances over the 
1. Ewing, DG, 11. 
199 
matter, but he is also registering his express disapprov-
al over the matter. The significance of an emotion cannot 
be limited to the fact that one is undergoing a feeling 
and nothing more. Human beings are not so constructed. 
There is more to the human emotion than the mere experi-
ence of feeling. Present with any human emotion are 
ideas and judgments. In the first place it is the idea 
that brings on many emotions. It is the idea that the 
act in question is an immoral one that brings on emotion 
and horror. Present with any moral emotion is a judgment 
and moral disapproval. Unless the idea that the act is 
immoral is present then there can be no emotions involv-
ing moral decisions. 
Ewing, agreeing with Broad, points out that there 
is a decided difference between saying, "I have an emo-
tion" and simply ejaculating something because one is 
undergoing an emotion. The former is the undergoing of 
an experience whereas the latter is the communication of 
a judgment together with a sense of obligation that one 
is sorry for not living up to his obligation. 
When the emotivist refuses to recognize the fact of 
obligation as a reality, he is leaving out of account an 
important factor which makes the examination of moral ex-
perience more coherent. Even the logical analysis of sen-
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tences requires that one distinguish between commands and 
obligations and conclude as the foregoing examination of 
the matter requires, viz., that obligation is an unfuis-
taken fact. 
The Problem of Obligation (Cont.) 
This section is concerned with an investigation of 
the validity of the experience of obligation.· That is, 
it seeks to raise problems as to the empirical verifiabil-
ity of the "ought" experience and whether obligation may 
be considered ultimate or whether it must be explained in 
terms of something else. 
A dual problem confronts the one who undertakes to 
probe into the nature and empirical proof of obligation 
or duty as a valid moral experience. The first is the 
definition of the term "empirical." How restrictive should 
the term be? The second problem is the meaning of the term 
"obligation" or 'bughtness". However, it is best that an 
attempt at defining the term obligation be reserved for 
later. 
1. The Verification of the Empirical 
Many times when one undertakes to define a term what 
he actually does is color it with his own philosophy. This 
is true, for example, of the wor d , "God." Many persons in 
their attempt to define God are, in reality, offering a 
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theology or philosophy of religion of their own. This is 
somewhat true with the term empiricism or empirical. It 
is difficult to define it as the news analyst says, "with-
out bias and without comment." 
Webster, also, does not help much in the matter of 
a definition for this term empirical. For the definition 
in Webster is in need of further definition and explanation. 
The term "empirical" defined in Webster1 reads, "Pertaining 
to, or founded upon, experiment or experience; as, empirical 
knowledge." The problem, however, still remains, viz., 
'~hat constitutes valid experience?" It is precisely at 
this point that one's own philosophy enters the picture, 
that is, in determining what is to be accepted as "a valid 
experience." 
~funy philosophers claim to be using the empirical 
method, but do so under the objections and protests of those 
who disagree that the former are truly empirical. For ex-
ample, Brightman presented and empirical approach to God, 1 
but positivists and instrumentalists would insist that it 
cannot be said to be empirical. Some logical positivists 
have offered a value theory which they feel has been arrived 
1. Webster Collegiate, 5th. edition. 
2. Brightman, "An Empirical Approach to God." 
dential address to the Eastern Division of 






at empirically and yet the instrumentalists deny that it 
has any empirical validity. The radical emotivists who 
attempt to claim that experience value is ejaculatory 
have been ruled unempirical by Dewey. 1 For Dewey the 
term empirical must be restricted to "public inspection" 
or "public observation." 2 Dewey, however, overlooks the 
fact that it does not make any difference logically ~he-
ther one person has an experience of an objective fact 
or whether a thousand persons have the experience. A 
fact does not become empirical when it is publically ob-
served or publically experienced; a fact is empirical 
when it is experienced by an experiencial being. 
Dewey might object to this line of reasoning by 
saying that what he is interested in is not that a par-
ticular fact is empirical or not; but rather, "Is it em-
pirically verifiable?" His principle concern is there~ore 
verifiability or proof. Moreover, verifiability for Dewey 
is "public inspection." Nevertheless, verification by 
public inspection would limit the empirically valid to ob-
servation. 
The logical positivist's definition of empiricism 
is equally inadequate since the logical positivist holds 
that the verification of the empirical must be limited to 
1. See Dewey, Art. (1939), 10. 
2. Dewey, Art. (1939), 10. 
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sense experience. The criticism against the instrumen-
talists holds true against the positivists. That there 
is valid experience beyond sense is evident in t he ex-
perience of obligation which will be proved later. 
An adequate concept of the empirical must include 
all facts which meet the conditions of verification. The 
fact which was overlooked by the instrumentalists and the 
positivists alike is that there is more than one kind of 
method of verification. The verifying of a value experi-
ence is not the same as verifying the experience of heat. 
This, however, is not sufficient grounds for denying the 
one and validating the other. "The nature and limits of 
verification are determined by the nature and limits of 
the field of investigation."! The verification of the 
experience of obligatio~ would therefore differ from sci-
entific verification, sense verification, or public in-
spection. Value experiences are not tangibles and there-
fore cannot be expected to undergo public verification, 
but that does not mean that they are not experienced or 
empirically verifiable. It is as Brightman argues: 
All verification must begin and end in 
the data of the present experience of a veri-
fying person. This is equally true of formal 
and of factual propositions ••• of factual, be-
cause the very meaning of fact is what is 
1. Brightman, Art. (1940), 512. 
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actually or possibly present in someone's ex-
perience. One may doubt what a person's present 
experience really is ••• but one maJ not rightly 
doubt that all verification berins and ends in 
a present personal experience. 
The above being true then it fomlows that verifica-
tion need not be public since all experience is essentially 
private. One cannot make his experience public. He cannot 
convey that experience to another. He may relate it as 
best he can but he can never make it open to public inspec-
tion. 
If sense experience and public inspection are to be 
rejected as adequate forms of verification what then may be 
considered acceptable? Coherence, that is, systematic con-
sistency or the systematic relation of all the facts of ex-
perience. The more orderly and coherent explanation of all 
the facts of experience the greater the verification of 
that experience. Verification is found in systematic order 
and not in public inspection or sense verification. An ex-
perience of a single fact verifies nothing even though it 
be experienced by sense or publically observable. In coher-
ence, therefore, is verification to be found. 
2. The "Ought" Experience 
The facts of moral experience being open to verifica-
tion, the way is cleared for an examination of obligation 
as a valid fact of experience. The problem now at hand is, 
1. Brightman, Art. (1940), 512. 
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"What is the nature of obligation?" 
The experience of obligation appears to be a univer-
sal one. Brightman says; 
When ••• we ask what obligation is, we are ask-
ing about a universal experience of man. Our start-
ing-pomnt is not any theory or tradition or authority, 
but it is a1fact that is observable by everyone in his own person. 
However, the problem does not rest there. The important issue 
lies in the interpretation of the "ought" experience. For ex-
ample, there are those who would explain away the experience 
of obligation, that is they explain obligation in terms of 
something else. 
Ayer would interpret obligation in terms of command.2 
He would attempt to claim that there are different degrees 
of stating a command and what is called obligation is one of 
the strongest ways of expressing a command. "Tell the truth," 
is a weak form of stating a command. It is on the level of 
a suggestion. The statement, "It is good to tell the truth," 
is a stronger type of command and is more than a mere sugges-
tion. The statement, ''You ought to tell the truth," or "It 
is your duty to tell the truth," is the strongest type of 
command. Thus, forAyer, obligation is synonymous with the 
strongest type of command. This analysis of obligation b y 
1. Brightman, RV 36-·37. 
2. Ayer, LTL, lOS. Carnap is in agreement with Ayer con-
cerning the concept of obligation. 
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Ayer although far from adequate or accurate does have an 
element of truth about it inasmuch as Ayer says that duty 
or obligation is command. Obligation is a command, but 
it is an autonomous one in the Kantian sense of t he word 
and not a heteronomous one as implied by Ayer. "The 
meaning of obligation is the imperative command t o ma ke 
the ideal real."l To say that obligation is a heterono-
mous command is to rob it of its "oughtness." Why should 
one be obligated to obey the commands of another. Unless 
the command is self-willed, obligation is not experienced.2 
An ethical judgment as, "You ought to tell the truth," 
lends itself best to the positivist's erroneous interpreta-
tion of the judgment in terms of a command for it has to do 
with the present and the second person. However, the error 
of reducing such moral judgments to commands becomes evident, 
"Where t.Q.e judgment of obligation has reference 
either to a third person , not to the person 
addressed, or to the past, or to an unfulfilled 
past condition, or to a future treated as merely 
possible, or to the speaker himself, there is no 
plausibility in describing the judgment a s a 
command.j 
If ethical utterances are only commands then how does Ayer 
explain ethical judgments as, 'rNhen John Doe was in court 
1. Brightman, RV, 49. 
2. Irving develops the emotivist's concept of ought as used 
here in Art. (1935), 239 ff. 
3. Ross, FE, 33. 
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last ·Tuesday, he ought to have witnessed truthfully con-
cerning the matter?" How can this possibly be construed 
as a command? How can one command that which has taken 
place contrary to a command. The foregoing illustration 
emphasizes the uniqueness of the ought experience--the 
ought is present although not obeyed. Another example 
of where ought cannot be reduced to a command is , "He 
ought to tell the truth." There is no command expressed 
in the foregoing sentence for a third person has been ad-
dressed. The third person in question may never learn of 
the moral judgment ever being uttered by the one so doing. 
Moreover, even when someone makes the value judg-
ment, "You ought to tell the truth, 11 it need not be a 
commBnd for dten it is used as an inducement1 or to en-
lighten the person, i~e., to call his attention to the 
morality of the situation. 
For Russell, the experience of obligation is an 
exhortation or wish. 2 To say, "I ought to tell the truth" 
is equivalent to saying, "Would that everybody told the 
truth." Russell says, "Primarily, we call something 
'good' when we desire it, and 'bad' when we have an aver-
sion from it."3 Russell, erroneously, confuses obligation 
1. Ross, FE, 34. 
2. Russell, WB and RS, 235 ff. Also see Buchler, Art. 
( 1944) ' 516. 
3. Russell, OP, 242. 
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with desire. Although there is some relation between 
obligation and desire they are far from being identical. 
It is true that one is obligated to take one's desires 
into consideration and evaluate them, moreover, one ought 
to have a desire to fulfill his obligations, 1 but this 
does not equate the two. One interpretation that Perry 
gives to desirable is "the desire of which ought to be."2 
However, Russell's concept of desire or wish is nearer to 
what Westermarck means by the ought experience, viz., an 
impulse.3 The principle objection to Russell's and Wester-
marck's concept of obligation is that it robs "oughtnessn 
of its uniqueness. It explains ought in terms of that 
which is foreign to the nature of obligation. It makes 
the obligatory experience an epiphenomenon of the non-
obligatory; i.e., the natural. It is true that the term 
ought and norm appear in the scientific vocabulary of such 
studies as psychology and sociology but when used here and 
in similar situations it simply means a ~ascription of what 
is. The foregoing is a misuse of the term ought. "There 
is no ought in it except in the sense that one might say 
what usually is ought to be."4 One should not identify the 
1. Brightman, RV, 43. 
2. Perry, GTV, 80. 
3. Westermarck, ER, 123. 
4. Urban, FE, 10. 
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natural with the normal. The ~atural deals with what is, 
whereas the normal is concerned with what ought to be. 
Bertocci clarifying the matter says, 
A value judgment asserts or implies that the 
object ought to be or is worth being; it does not 
mean "I want this; am interested in, or desire 
this," but it means "I ought to do this." Such 
a judgment of moral value claims as much objectiv-
ity as any other judgment of experience for it re-
fers to something beyond the mental state of the 
subject, and, therefore, its emotional or other 
antecedents no more invalidate it than they do ex-
istential judgments. 
A value ~per.i(f.nqe;.:dia. rure of "oughtness" and not of 
"isness." A value is "worth existing or ought to be ••• When 
we predicate worth or value we assert or imply that the ob-
ject is worth being or ought to be."2 If the foregoing 
analysis of the experience of obligation is an accurate one 
then one must say that obligation belongs to a different 
order of experience than the existent. That is, we have.: an 
experience of a dual order (1) existence (2) oughtness. The 
one is independent of the other. That is, one is not a con-
comitant of the other. They are different aspects of the 
real. Bertocci, interpre1;j :hg.. Sorley concerning the topic 
under discussion writes, 
Though insisting that philospphers cease 
regarding the "ought" as an idle epiphenomenon 
of the "is," he (SorleyJ is quite emphatic in 
1. Bertocci, Art. (1936), 270. 
2. Sorley, MVIG, 77. 
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holding that the "ought" and the "is" are dif-
ferent experiences and that the former cannot 
be derived from the latter."! 
The existential order is not the only order in the universe 
for there is also a moral order that man is capable of ex-
periencing; the experience of obligation is so experienced. 
The next problem that arises out of the foregoing 
discussion of ought is its meaning. There are those, as 
Kant and Ross, who restrict the meaning of ought to imply 
only those actions which can be done if willed. However, 
"there is a wider sense in which there is no such implica-
tion. We can say that sorrow ought to have been felt by a 
certain man at the death of a certain relation, though it 
was not in his power to feel sorrow at will. And v1e can 
say that virtue ought to be rewarded." 2 Ross, however, 
attacking Broad, admits that the term ought is used in 
this wider sense but claims that it is a misuse of the 
term.3 Ross maintains that ought could be used in the fore-
going situation only if it were possible for the person to 
summon up the feeling of sorrow at the time of the death of 
the relation. If one were to argue for Broad, he could say 
that in the "ought" order of the universe the feeling of 
sorrow ought to be the feeling experienced even though, in 
1. Bertocci, EAG, 139. 
2. Broad, FTET, 161. 
3. Ross, FE, 4.5. 
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fact, it was not experienced. Ross seems to be too restric-
tive and Kantian in his use of the term ought. A more pref-
erable meaning of the ',term ought is the one employed by 
Hartmann. Hartmann distinguishes between the "ought-to-be" 
and the "ought-to-do~' The ought-to-be is unconditional; 
"irrespective of its actuality or even of its possibility."! 
The ought-to-be ought to be even if it is not in one's 
power to do it. 2 One ought to do what ought to be if it is 
in his power. If, however, it is not in his power, that 
does not repudiate the oughtness of that which ought-to-be.3 
The ought-to-do is subservient to the ought-to-be. 
For the personalistic emotivist ought means ought-
to-be. Ought-to-do is instrumental to the ought to be. 
The moral goal is being not doing. Doing is instrumental 
to bringing about the desired ideal, viz., being. Outside 
of personality there is no moral worth. 4 It. is the person 
that is moral and therefore obligation must be one of being. 
Doing is involved only because it is instrumental to the 
bringing about of the being. This concept of being and do-
ing is developed more fully in the chapter on personalistic 
emotivism. 
1. Hartmann, ETH, I, 248. 
2. Ross identifies the ought to do with character. See Ross, 
RG, 16,5. 
3. See Perry, GTV, 77 ff. 
4. See Hartmann, ETH, I, 343. 
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;. The Emotivist's Criterion of Truth 
Another argument against the logical positivistic 
ethic, which is a crucial one, is the one that is launched 
not only against their ethical theory but against their 
entire system. It undermines the complete philosophy of 
logical positivism. Logical positivism contradicts itself. 
It claims that only those propositions which can be veri-
fied by facts of sense are genuine and yet this proposition 
is not factual, i.e., does not pertain to any sense object. 
Moreover, it presupposes a society of minds. It is there-
fore non-factual and as such meaningless and therefore a 
pseudo-question. The entire philosophy of the logical posi-
tivistic school must be rejected as self-contradi ctory and 
false. The principles of logical positivists undermine it. 
Logical positivism is its own condemnation. It rejects 
metaphysics, but its own position is a metaphysical one. 
Brightman says that logical positivists have championed the 
revolt against metaphysics with their emphasis on things 
that can be verified in experience and thereupon on physi-
cal things, objects (or subjects) of sensory experiences. 
They want only verifiable sensory objects which are intel-
ligible to others and capable of intersubjective communica-
ble experience. However, this must be rejected on the follow-
ing grounds: How can you have a verifiable experience of 
another's mind, or even of your own mind? If positivism is 
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based on the intersubjective communication between minds, 
how can that be possible if minds are not verifiable in 
sense?1 
The criterion of truth used by the logical positiv-
ists is hopelessly inadequate in that it not only rules 
out value judgments, but it also rules out as . invalid both 
scientific propositions and the principles of logical posi-
tivism. Hill, completely diS\.UT:lid with the yardstick of 
the logical positivists writes : 
The rejection as nonsense of all statements 
that cannot be publicly verified is peculiarly 
inappropriate to human experience in that, if it 
is rigidly insisted upon, it excludes not only 
moral, aesthetic, metaphysical, religious, and 
all other statements involving introspection but 
also the statements in terms of which in the last 
analysis the findings of science must be verified. 
For th~se all rest in the end upon private per-
cepts. 
Since consciousness is private, and all the facts of experi-
ence, i.e., all data and evidence are in mind, then public 
verification is in reality many private minds coming to the 
same conclusion. 
This argument that the philosophy of logical positiv-
ism is incoherent since its fundamental principles ar e meta-
physical, has been seized and used by many of the critics of 
the non-cognitive school of ethics, including such men as 
1. Brightman lecture notes. Course at Boston University in 
1947 entitled, "Seminar in Metaphysics." 
2. Hill, GET, 28. 
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W.D. Ross, Brand Blanshard, and P. Wheelwright. The lo-
gical positivists on the other hand are quite aware of the 
fact themselves. Wittgenstein, a father of the school 
aware of the fact maintains perhaps in theory but anyway 
in practice that one can and should indulge in metaphysics.l 
Carnap on the other hand does not agree with Wittgenstein 
but justifies this embarrassing situation on the grounds that 
its system yields results that are good or which can be veri-
by facts of sense. Another logical positivist, Philip Frank, 
also aware of this distressing situation, when mentioning it 
acts as though at this point he is no longer an adherent of 
the school.2 The logical positivists are not only maintaining 
a metaphysical system, but a self-contradictory one. The 
grounds upon which logical positivism is founded is a faulty 
metaphysics. Ritchie says that "any possible account of the 
process of verification is metaphysical and the phenomenalist 
li.e., logical positivist ! account is bad metaphysics."3 
Ayer, however, in his revised edition of Language, 
Truth, and Logic claims that this objection to the emotive 
or non-cognitive ethic is not a valid one on the grounds 
that it is not a genuine objection against his ethical the-
ory but against all logical positivism. He writes, "The 
1. See Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicys. Also 
see the closing paragraphs of Part I of Carnap's PLS. 
2. In classroom lectures. Harvard University, Course en-
titled Physics 813, 1948. 
3. Ritchie, EP, 77. 
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emotive theory of values ••• has provoked a fair amount of 
criticism; but I find that this criticism has been directed 
more often against the positivistic principles on which the 
theory has been assumed to depend than against the theory 
itself. 1 Ayer supposes that this is a good rebuttal but 
he overlooks the fact that if the emotive theory of values 
rests upon the positivistic principles for its validity then 
whatever argument that is launched against the principles on 
which it is founded would necessarily implicate the emotive 
theory. Ayer might argue that the emotive theory could be 
maintained independentVof logical positivism. Nevertheless 
the emotive theory's basis and value lie in the fact that it 
supports or is in _harmony with the principles of logical 
positivism. 
A major fault not only with the emotive or non-cog-
nitive theory of ethics but with the principles of logical 
positivism as a whole is that it is a philosophy of declar-
ation. It is a philosophy that asserts and is not so much 
concerned with proof, defence, or -logical consistency and, 
"seems as untenable as it is presumptuous."2 Brandt says 
that the "critics of the emotive theory have often, I think 
justly, complained that proponents of the theory seldom offer 
any arguments for their position."3 Joad says, "The doctrines 
1. Ayer, LPL, 20. 
2. Urban, Art. (1947) 56. 
3. Brandt, Art. (1950j, 309. Also see Ross, FE, 35. 
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of Logical Positivism are embraced with some of the fervour 
appropriate to a new religious creed. Two characteristics 
have traditionally been observed in the exponents ••• First, 
intolerance and secondly, dogmatism."1 Hill also does not 
let this point go unnoticed. He writes; 
So complete and astonishing a denial of so 
large a segment of what has every appearance of 
being one of the most rational parts of man's 
life and one of the sanest aspects of his dis-
course is such a radical break with that very 
human experience to which the logical positiv-
ists appeal that, if it is to be sustained, the 
evidence must be overwhelmingly convincing. 
But the evidence presented by the logical2posi-tivists has no such convincing character. 
Brightman, evaluating the philosophy of logical posi-
tivism says that it teaches us precision of verification. 
However, logical positivism is hopelessly inadequate. It 
leaves too much out of account. Logical positivism solves 
problems by giving negative conclusions. It arrives at con-
clusions before investigation is even begun. On the other 
hand; 
A broadly empirical philosophy aims to ·inter-
pret the relations of all kinds of experience to 
each other, seeking for some clue to the interre-
lations of logic, sense experience, and value ex-
perience. If we were to accept logical positivism 
the start, it would mean that we regarded the search 
for such a clue as meaningless and our problem would 
be solved negatively before we began. To do this 
would be unempirical and unphilosophical as it would 
be to presuppose that the teachings of some particu-
lar sect or religion are true.3 
1. Joad, CLP, 11. 
2. Hill, CET, 27. 
3. Brightman, POR, 5. 
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The emotive ethic of the logical positivists has not 
only suffered crucial blows under the barrage of external 
criticisms from non-positivists but it has felt the damag-
ing effects of the internal criticisms of kindred philoso-
phies. The logical positivists themselves, aware that the 
radical emotivistic ethic as propounded by some of the mem-
bers of their school is undesirable and inadequate, have 
constantly attempted to modify their extreme ethical posi-
tion. An exhaustive treatment of internal criticisms cannot 
here be given for that would require too much by way of re-
petition. The account of the emotivists together with the 
gradual differences and objections to other emotivists which 
is to be found in earlier chapters will somewhat serve the 
purpose of an internal criticism. In the present section will 
be found the criticisms of those men who were not or could not 
well be placed in the earlier chapters. 
C.D. Broad has made some very searching criticisms of 
the emotive ethic from the internal position. Broad calls 
the emotive ethic of the radical type, "interjectional ana-
lysis." He identifies emotivism by saying that "on this view 
there are no moral judgments; there are only what might be 
called 'obstensible moral judgments.'"l Broad points out 
1. Broad, Art. (1949), 548. 
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that there are serious complications if one were to suppose 
that the interjectional analysis theory were true and that 
moral judgments and moral predicates did not exist. The 
first problem is: "How do we come to make the mistake of 
thinking that we are ascribing to subjects predicates of a 
peculiar kind when in fact we are merely expressing certain 
emotions towards objects?"1 To this question the emotivists 
have not as yet an answer. To attempt to give an an~wer 
to this would probably force the emotivist into some form 
of the ethics of evolutionary naturalism. They would pro-
bably have to resort to the argument used by the evolution-
ary naturalists concerning the matter of value judgments and 
value predicates. For example, they would have to explain 
the value judgment, "stealing is wrong" and any emotion 
which happens to accompany it in somewhat the following 
lines. Stealing is not conducive to the survival of the in-
dividual or the group and therefore it is condemned as evil. 
The evil results of stealing are impressed upon the mind of 
the individuals of the group generation after generation 
and in time the principle becomes innate. Therefore, the 
idea of obligation or moral predicates may be translated 
into inherited fear associated with different lines of 
action. Moral predicates are therefore, socially accepta-
1. Broad, Art. (1949), 562. 
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ble habits which through time have taken on an innate char-
acter.1 
The emotivists, however, are not in a position to 
accept this explanation for several reasons. First of all, 
t hey would have to reject their newly created theory of em-
otivism. Secondly, it would carry them back to the old 
theory of evolutionary naturalism and would make their the-
ory out to be nothing but evolutionary naturalism in a new 
disguise. In the third place they would not like to recog-
nize moral predicates in any form. 
The second problem facing the emotivist suggested by 
Broad is: 
Is it just an ultimate fact about human nature 
that most people tend to feel a certain kind of 
emotion when they contemplate, e.g., an act of 
promise-breaking; or is this explicable by gen-
eral psychological principles and the particular 
influences to which most people are subjected in 
early childhood?2 
If emotivism were correct, then how can one account for the 
emotions coming into play when one is faced with a moral 
situation? The best way for accounting for the se emotions 
. . 
is to say that thinking is transpiring and that one has 
made a moral judgment. The seriousness of the decision 
provokes feelings of emotion. 
1. This is Blanshard's explanation of the situation. In a 
course at Harvard University, 1948, "Types of Ethical 
Theory." 
2. Broad, Art. (1949), 552. 
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The emotive ethic has also left an odious taste 
with John Dewey. Dewey takes issue with this point of 
view at several points in his discussion of it in the In-
ternational Encyclopedia of Unified Science. He identifies 
this view of ethics as "Value Expression as Ejaculatory." 
In the first place Dewey doesnbt care for the emo-
tivist's use of the word "feeling." Dewey's quotation from 
the emotivists although he does not cite the source of them, 
are almost exclusively from A.J. Ayer's Language, Truth, and 
Logic. He claims that the term "feeling" is used vaguely 
and ambiguously. The term is borrowed from psychological the-
ory and is "couched in mentalistic terms." At any rate it is 
a term which describes inner conscious states and as such is 
not open to common observation, moreover, cannot even be a 
subject to description and is therefore "not open to public 
inspection and verification." He says: 
Even if there were a legitimate introspectionist 
theory of states of consciousness or of feelings 
••• the reference to "feelings" is superfluous and 
gratuitous ••• from the standpoint of an empirical 
report it is meaningless, since the interpretation 
is couched in terms of something not open to pub-
lic inspection.! 
Thus we find that the value theory which was to make Positiv-
\ .ism sound and scientific has at Dewey's hands become an un-
sound and unscientific principle. The theory which was sup-
posed to be the final touch of the Positivist's philosophy 
1. Dewey, Art. (1939), 10. 
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has turned out to be a bombshell exploding in their laps. 
Moreover, Dewey rejects the emotivist's thesis that 
moral are in the realm of the non-cognitive and therefore 
not a matter of dispute. For Dewey they are both cogni-
tive and disputable. It is merely a matter of reducing 
differences to the facts of the case, e.g., if a man is 
accused of stealing the dispute may pe one of proof: 
i.e., whether or not the man actually committed the act 
known as stealing. 
Dewey rejects the emotive theory on still other 
grounds.l The emotivists say that ethics is not a matter 
of judgment but one of evincing feelings. Dewey claims 
that even these are not without meaning but rather are 
quite significant. Even a baby's smiles, cooings, gurgl-
ings, and squeals are meaningfuili. They are signs of an 
organic state. 
The cry (gesture, posture) is now made in 
order to evoke the activity and in order to exper-
ience the consequences of that activity. Just as 
with respect to the original response there is a 
difference between the activity that is merely 
caused by the cry as a stimulus ••• and an activity 
that is evoked by the cry interpreted as a sign 
or evidence of something, so there is a difference 
between the original cry--which may properly be 
called purely ejaculatory--and the cry made on 
purpose, that is, with the intent to evoke a re-
sponse that will have certain consequences. The 
1. An attempt to reconcile the ethics of the logical positiv-
ists with pragmatism may be found in Cavell and Sesonske, 
Art. (1951), 5-17. 
latter cry exists in the medium of language; 
it is a linguistic sign that not only says 
somethint but is intended to say, to convey, 
to tell. 
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Hart, an adherent of Dewey's instrumentalism, also 
takes issue with the logical positivists. Among many things, 
he is particularly provoked about their refusal to accept 
judgments of value as being genuine. Concerning this matter 
he has some internal criticisms to offer. 
Hart, following Dewey's i nstrumentalistic interpreta-
tion of the facts of moral experience claims that the radical 
emotivists neglected the fact that words obtain meaning by 
'~irtue of their interaction and association" 2 ~nd that even 
an emotional outburst or ejaculation is meaningful and has 
reference to facts when it "establishes a genuine community 
of action." 2 
Hart says that the conelusion of Carnap's ethical 
ideas, viz., that there is no difference in saying, "killing 
is evil" and "do not kill" except the mood, i.e., one is a 
"command in a misleading grammatical form" is absurd. For 
Hart argues, "'killing is evil' is a concise expression of 
our knowledge about human character and social behavior; its 
meaning can be decided by action upon it."3 
It is not very surprising to find so much by way of 
internal criticism against the emotivists when one considers 
1. Dewey, Art. (1939), 10. 
2. Ratner, (ed.), PJD, 113. 
3 • Hart ,' TOV , 6 6 • 
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the fact the emotivists themselves are in very little agree-
ment among themselves. Moreover, they have gained very few 
adherents and many of them accept emotivism only after a 
careful modification of the matter. Rather than allying 
themselves with their closest neighbors, i.e., the subjec-
tivists, instrumentalists, and evolutionary naturalists, 
the emotivists have antagonized and attacked their positions 
along with the ethical positions of those radica~ly opposed 
to emotivism and logical positivism. 
This dissertation shows that the emotivism of the 
logical positivists is in a logical process of growing from 
the position held by the extreme radical emotivists to the 
modified and liberal emotivists and that with another step 
a "personal" emotivism results. This new type of emotivism 
which is a difference in kind as we~l as degree is the sub-
ject matter of the next chapter. 
PAnT FOUR 
PERSONALIST IC 8:r1WT IVI SM 
CHAPTER VIII 
PERSONALISTIC EMOTIVISM 
1. Definition of Personalistic Emotivism 
The basic thesis of personalistic emotivism, which 
is the position defended in this dissertation, is that to 
regulate good attitudes is to regulate good consequences. 
Morality pertains only to persons. "The moral being is 
not the Absolute nor the State nor anything else in the 
world but, singly and alone, man, the primal carrier of 
moral values and disvalues."l Consequences which are ex-
ternal to personality have no moral value. Moral responsi-
bility is a matter of intent, feeling, attitude. By an at-
titude is meant a predisposition couched in feeling. Cattell 
includes in his definition of attitude the idea that, "it is 
a readiness to implement a certain course of action in regard 
to some objec·t .•t2 However, it is as Joad says, one must dif-
ferentiate an attitude from "feeling and desire by includ-
ing in it an element of will, and more particularly rational 
will."3 A good attitude is one which respects the dignity 
and sacredness of personality. A good attitude is on~ which 
regards human life as being of intrinsic worth. A good atti-
1. Hartmann, ETH, I, 343. 
2. Cattell, PER, 84. 
3. Joad, CLP, 126. 
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tude holds personality in reverence. Evil or immoral atti-
tudes disrespect and disregard the intrinsic value of human 
personality. Attitudes which are immoral, such as an atti-
tude of contempt, deny a man his inalienable infinite worth 
and destroy his self-respect, and he is robbed of the regard 
of others. Moral attitudes as kindness and good-will hold in 
respect the sacredness of personality. The attitude by which 
one holds in respect the personality of himself or another 
is what is meant by moral~ Such attitudes regulate good con-
sequences. 
Morality is grounded in reverence for personality. 
It is the dignity and the intrinsic worth of human person-
ality which is the raison d'~tre of moral value. Reverence 
for the worth of man is the reason, purpose, ground, and 
excuse for morality. 
2. The Role of Consequences 
Merely to regulate consequences, external to person-
ality, is a task for prudence and not for moral endeavor. 
In the regulation of good attitudes is moral worth to be 
found. Overt consequences are not of intrinsic moral value. 
They may be instrumental in helping to bring about good or 
moral attitudes. Judgments concerning consequences are 
morally neutral; they are judgments of prudence. Prudence 
is a good but not necessarily a moral good. Moral value. 
2~7 
is to be found within persons. External to persons there 
is no moral value. Consequences external to personality 
are considered important because they suggest the moral 
kind of person from which those actions and consequences 
spring. In the regulation of good attitudes is t o be 
found the regulation of good consequences. 
Although consequences have no intrinsic moral value 
in personalistic emotivism they do, however, play a very 
important role. In the first place they help to determine 
which attitudes may be considered good. That is, they are 
the instruments which are used in determining which atti-
tudes may be considered moral and which are to be con-
demmed as evil. They are external insights into internal 
morality. It must be admitted that if there were no con-
sequences or actions then one would be hard put to deter-
mine which attitudes are good and which attitudes are im-
moral. 
Even though consequences are taken into account 
they are of no intrinsic value. They simply serve to in-
dicate which of the attitudes or feelings of personality 
are moral. Any theory of ethics which seeks to do away 
with intentions falls under Bowne's condemnation: "And 
when we abstract conduct from the personality in which 
it originates and which it expresses, we have a base, or 
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sordid, externalism which is its own condemnation."! How-
ever, since consciousness is private, one good way of de-
termining the attitude or intent of a person is by his 
actions or the consequences of such. 
It must be kept in mind that to will an act and to 
do an act is not the same thing. It is the willing that 
makes it moral or immoral. The consequences aid us in 
deciding whether or not that will or the attitude out of 
which that . action sprang is good, i.e., moral. Brightman 
stated this idea very well in his interpretation of the 
scholastic ethic which claims that no moral quali ty has 
been added to an internal act by external actions. He 
writes, "If I have sincerely willed an act, my morality 
is no greater if I am able to carry out physically and 
no less if I am not."2 
Consequences are important in coherent living and 
those conse quences which make for coherent living stem 
from motives which are good. To regulate good attitudes 
is to regulate good conse~uences and to determine good 
attitudes is to see them in the light of consequences. 
Attitudes are moral for the fruits which follow from them 
are ~od. The more important consequences by which atti-
tudes are judged as moral or not are subjective rather 
than objective. 
1. Bowne, POE, v. 
2. Brightman, ML, 147. 
229 
In ethical theory, "objective" refers to 
the end or content of the moral act, while "sub-jective" refers to its intent or form. Every 
choice that we make has consequences of both 
sorts; it achieves a series of ends (values 
and disvalues, goods and evils); it also has 
its effects on the will and the character.l 
By reflecting on consequences one is able to general-
ize and come to "moral" laws. By a "moral" law is meant the 
road which generally guides us to morality, viz., moral atti-
tudes. Both consequences and "moral" law are evaluated in-
ternally, that is, they have value in and for personality. 
Moral law is needed otherwise there would be no morality 
at all in the sense everyone would be a law to himself and 
a vicious anarchism would be the result. Law makes moral 
obligation impartial, i.e., universal. In order to escape 
subjectivism of this sort, mora l law is necessary. However, 
laws are not moral, only persons are. Laws are guides, not 
morality. Consequences and moral laws are instrumental to 
morality, they are not intrinsically of moral worth. Atti-
tudes or intents arrived at with complete disregard for 
moral law and consequences lead to anarchism. 
3. The Ideal of Morality 
The ideal of morality for the personalistic emotivist 
is the development of attitudes which are good. One deter-
1. Brightman, ML, 150. 
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mines whether or not an attitude is good by examining it 
in the light of reason or coherence. That is, one takes 
into consideration all the facts of experience which bear 
upon the problem. One must take into account among other 
things the nature of man, his environment, and t he conse-
quences whi ch follow from his actions. However, neither 
man's environment nor the consequences which follow from 
his actions may be regarded as intrinsically moral. They 
serve only as data in determining what may be regarded as 
moral, It is as the form and content. The form may be 
t hought of as reason, environment, and consequences, where-
as the content may be thought of as the moral or attitude. 
The method of arriving at morality is not itself morality. 
Moral laws serve as sign posts to good attitudes. 
4. The Role of Attitudes 
Attitudes play an important part in personalistic 
emotivism. If no attitude can be expressed then the mat-
ter is not one which involves a moral question. The way 
by which to determine whether an act is moral or not is to 
ask whether a good attitude is the motivating factor in 
the individual. Moral goods are attitudes, that is, they 
are matters of intent and feeling. By virtue of the fadt 
that moral attitudes are to be found only in persons then 
it must be concluded that consequences external to person-
ality are not of intrinsic moral worth. 
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By moral or good attitudes are meant those which hold 
in reverence the sacredness of human personality. Attitudes 
such as kindness, love, good-will, sympathy, and the like 
are moral attitudes in that they hold in respect the dignity 
of man. Attitudes as jealously, anger, hate, censoriousness, 
contempt, and the like are disvalues or immoral, for they 
hold in disrespect the value of human life. Although per-
sonalist±c emotivism has many points in commo~ with the 
systems of both Martineau and Kant,l it is not to be con-
fused with either. 
~ 5. The Role of Obligation 
By obligation is meant the duty to strive after and 
develop moral attitudes. One is obligated to express a mo-
ral attitude not only towards others, but towards himself 
also. One must not only respect the value of another person, 
he is also obligated to maintain his own self-respect; in-
asmuch as he is a person also. Persons also have rights. 
By a right is meant another's obligation towards you. The 
person who has an obligation to maintain a good attitude to-
wards another has a right to expect a similar attitude in 
return. 
1. In a later chapter a critical comparison will be found of 
these ethical systems. 
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6. The Relation of Personalistic Emot i vism 
to Other Forms of Emotivism 
Personal Emotivist's Modified Form of Emotivism. Val-
ue theory as developed by Britton represents the latest log-
ical development of the ethics of emotivism. It is interes~-
ing to note that the emotivist original concept of ethics was 
so inadequate that ifi did not merit the ready acceptance of 
the philosophers of this school but rather underwent several 
modifications. 
(1) The radical emotivists sought to repudiate all 
ethical metaphysics but this proved unsuccessful. Not only 
did they find tremendous opposition from the outside and 
from schools of philosophy to which they felt themselves to 
be allied,l but they also met with controversy from members 
of their own school of thought, viz., logical positivists, 
who thought this position to be "hopelessly unplausible." 2 
The radical emotivists made their position still more un-
' tenable and unacceptable when they themselves repudiated 
their own position ·by contradictions and by admitting the in-
adequacy of their ethical philosophy as was evidenced in the 
case of Russell.3 
1. E.g., Instrumentalism. 
2. Britton, CPSL, 10. 
3. See the section, "Russell's Critique of His Own Theory of 
Moral Value." 
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(2) The emotivists, not being satisfied with the 
statement of their position as found developed by the ra-
dical emotivists made their first great concession. This 
concession is found in the presentation of emotivism as 
exhibited in the treatment of the matter by Schl i ck and 
Feigl. These men refused to agree with ~he radical emo-
tivists who were extreme skeptics. Both of these men 
agree that ethics does have meaning. Both agree that 
ethics is to be interpreted in the light of psychological 
science. However, both seem to imply that ethical mean-
ing is not entirely limited to the descriptive in that for 
(1) Schlick, kindness plays an important factor that can-
not be reducible to the terms of descriptive psychological 
science; (2) Feigl thinks that ethics is important for the 
influencing of persons in a society. 
(3) The next concession made by the emotivists is that 
of moderate emotivism or the school represented by Stevenson. 
This school of thought repudiates radical emotivism by ad-
mitting that moral values cannot be interpreted in terms of 
skepticism since statements of moral value are open to dis-
pute. Moral values are essentially attitudes according to 
this view. However, moral attitudes do not gain an objec-
tivity until the matter of moral values is reinterpreted by 
Britton. 
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( 4 ) In t he emot ivism of Britton moral values, viz., 
moral a t t i tudes, are not only valid propos itions but they 
also have an objecti ve val i dity. Note the log ical course 
of events in emotivism. I t began first with an e thi cal 
s k epticism or n i h ilism, then procee ded to scientifi c de-
scription; the next stag e was persuasive definition or sub-
jective a t titudes and f i nally it was cl imaxe d in bri tton's 
emot ivism, i.e., e thi cs as a t t i tudes, objectively verifiable. 
The personalis cic emotivists' modification of the fore-
go ing view is as follows: Fi rs t of all, St even son 's con -
c ept of att itude as being of moral value should be retained. 
More over, the fact that moral a t titud es are ob jec0i vely 
veri f iable ( Britton's position) is ano the r emotivistic con-
cept that s hould be retained. Together with thi s s h ould be 
included S chlick ~s concept of kindne ss as one of the h i gh est 
of mo ral values. Howe ver, kindness should not be cons idered 
the only moral attitude for the re are many oth e r s whi ch added 
to kindne ss mak e a harmonious whole, e. g ., love, sympathy, 
good will, etc. Taking these t h ree emotivis ti c ideas and 
adding to it ob l i3ation and personality one arrives a t the 
core of p e rs onalistic emot ivism. In the et n ical emotivism 
of Britton all of these points are stated with the e x ception 
of obli ~ation and p ersonality; howe ve r, these also, are im-
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plied. Personalistic emotivism would then be a development 
of Britton's emotivism or at least would use his emotivism 
as a nucleus . Britton's emotivism implicitly has all the 
elements that would set the foundation for personalistic 
emotivism. Britton does hold to the objectivity of ethi-
cal statements and claims that ethical statements are true 
or false. Moreover, value statements are statements of 
attitudes as, for example, resentment which Britton thinks 
is bad in itself. 
Critical Analysis of Schlick's Concept of Kindness. 
The place of kindness in the ethics of Schlick deserves 
comment and additional analysis for several reasons. (1) 
"Kindness" plays a major rolel in the ethics of Schlick for 
it climaxes his ethical thought. {2) "Kindness" makes his 
theory of moral value different from all the other emotivists 
except Britton. (3) "Kindness" constitutes a fundamental part 
of the ethics of personalistic emotivism. In fact, with a 
few changes, Schlick's concept of kindness and personality 
form the basis ·_· of a personalistic emotivism. 
Kindness, as found in Schlick's ethics, is almost in-
terchangeable with the concept of moral good. If one were to 
ask Schlick, "What is the summum bonum, i.e~, the greatest 
moral good?" The answer would be kindness. Kindness, for 
1. See the hymn to kindness which concludes the summary of 
Schlick's ethics. 
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Schlick, however, is used in a broa~ sense. Kindness is 
a "working together for goodn of all the moral attitudes 
or inclinations of man. Kindness is the "totality of the 
altruistic impulses."! 
:--_ Some -perso:iJ.s criticize Schlick and say that it is 
not wise always to be kind, for kindness may result in bad 
consequences. There are two objections to this criticism 
from Schlick's point of view. One is that much of what is 
interpreted as kindness ia only undesirable sentimentality. 
Secondly, it would not be kind to do that which brings about 
bad consequences. An act of kindness involves the entire 
personality. All of one's inclinations working together in 
harmony and guided coherently is what Schlick means by kind-
ness. "A man must react as a whole to every influence, 
never with only a small part of himself."2 
An isolated inclination cannot be considered as kind; 
moreover, such does not exist. W~n is a person and as such 
does things as a whole. "The whole man, as it were, enters 
into each act."-' One inclination that a man has may have 
precedence over another because man, acting as a wl).ole per-
sonality, may decide that it is best that way. A single in-
clination having its own way is a sign of a weak character. 
1. Schlick, PE, 205. 
2. Schlick, PE, 205. 
3. Schlick, PE, 203. 
Such a person is not moral and such an inclination . cannot 
be classified under kindness . .An inclination which does 
not spring from the whole man "does not lead to the val-
uable, and will not, in fa9t, be considered moral ."1 For 
an altruistic impulse to become moral, the personality 
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must set them in "order and bring them together into a sys-
tem. " 
Any i nclination is not to be regarded as a kind one . 
For an inclination to qualify under the head of kindness, 
that i nclination must be an altruistic one. This brings 
us to Schlick's concept of personality • .Altruistic im-
pulses deserve the name of kindness, whereas, Schlick 
designates "the firm interconnection of all impulses as 
personality."2 
Schlick's ethics of kindness differs from person-
alistic emotivism in that Schlick insists on the bifur-
cation of the ethics of duty and the ethics of kindness . 
Schlick thinks that the t wo are mutually incompatible. 
He says that in an ethics of duty, where obligation 
plays the dominant role, "moral values have nothing 
to do with pleasure and pain; all inclinations belong to 
man's animal nature, and he rises above this only if his acts 
are determined by higher values."3 The reason that led Schlick 
1. Schlick, PE, 212. 
2 . Schlick, FE, 205. 
3 . Schlick, FE, 205. 
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to make this statement is that he was rebelling against 
Kant's ethical formalism. It i s, however, not valid for 
all systems which employ the concept of duty. An ideal 
ut ilitarian maintains that it often is one's duty to 
do the pleasurable and to follow even those inclinations 
that belong to man's animal nat ure. 
that 
Schlick's ethics of kindness, on the other hand, 
moral behavior ..• has its or1g1n in pleasure and 
pain; man is noble because he enjoys such be-
havior; the moral values rank so high because 
they signify the highest joys; the values do 
not stand above him but reside1within him; it is natural for him to be good. 
Personalistic emotivism agrees that moral values 
reside within personality but the personal emotivist would 
object to some of the other ideas in the foregqing state-
ments. Schlick says that it is natural for man to be 
good. What he probably means is that man's true natur~ 
is for him to be good. However, if man's true nature is 
for him to be good, the statement · implies that man is in 
fact other than in his true state, viz., goodness. What 
Schlick should have said is "Man ought to strive to be in 
his natural state of goodness." Obligation is a factor 
in Schlick's ethics even though Schlick is not aware of it. 
L. Schlick, FE, 205. 
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Obligation is also employed in the ethics of personal-
istic emotivism. 
Schlick says that moral behavior has its origin 
in pleasure and pain. This statement needs explanation. 
The statement does not have the same meaning for Schlick 
that it does for most people. Schlick uses the term 
pleasure in a very broard sense. He is a qualitative 
hedonist. Moreover, one is required to order his plea-
sures and select the nobler. Pleasure~ . for Schlick, 
is not the pleasures of Bentham but is rather orderly al-
truistic inclinations motivated by the whole personality. 
The one so motivated is truely happy. 
Schlick's concept of kindness and Britton 's con-
cept of the objectivity of moral values (attitudes) lays 
the foundation upon which personalistic emotivism is 
built. For personalistic emotivism, moral values are 
not only objective, t hey are to be found only within per-
sons. Outside of personality there i s nc ·moral reality. 
Moral experience exists only for and in persons. 
Moral value, it is true, lies in one's attitude; 
however, reason is not ejected from the realm of moral ex-
perience for the motive of coherence is always present, and 
it holds good in all circumstances. Coherence ought to be 
the motivating feat ure in all situations. Coherence, how-
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ever, is the form of moral experience, not its content. 
Love, kindness, sympathy, and the like are the content 
of moral value. 
7. Problems of Personalistic Emotivism 
Some ethical problems will now be considered in or-
der to see how the personalistic emotivist would explain 
them. Take, for instance, killing . According to the per-
sonalist±c emotivist, the act of killing is neutral, that 
is, killing in and of itself is neither considered moral 
nor immoral. There are many other systems of ethics in 
which the act of killing is not always immoral, as, for 
example, the code of ethics of those who believe in eu-
thanasia. Even in the eyes of the law all killing is not 
criminal. In war, killing the enemy is regarded as a 
duty. In an automobile accident where a child has dashed 
out into the street from between two parked cars where he 
could not have been seen or suspected and yet is run over 
and killed, we do not condemn the man morally for it. On 
an operating table where the physician has done his very 
best and taken every foreseeable precaution and yet the 
patient dies i n the middle of the operation we do not con-
demn the surgeon as an immoral murderer. 
Thus we conclude that the act of killing is neither 
moral nor immoral in and of itself for the personalistic 
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emotivist and many others. Nor is the state usually re-
garded as immoral in inflicting capital punishment; but 
this is debated. Other factors must be present. Accord-
ing to the personalistic emotivist some immoral attitude 
or intent must be present as hate, jealousy, anger, mali-
ciousness or the like in order to condemn it as immoral. 
Even in the eyes of the law it is not murder unless, 
coupled with the act, is malice aforethought, expressed or 
implied . Premeditated malice is an important factor in per-
sonalistic emotivism. 
Murder is immoral because it arises out of an im-
moral attitude ~s hate, jealousy, and the like. Acts are 
not morally good or bad in themselves but persons may be 
moral or immoral by possessing a good or evil attitude. 
One's duty does not lie in selecting the act which brings 
about the best consequences for this is a judgment of pru-
dence . For the evil man the "best" consequences may not 
enhance the cause of good , but rather may promote evil. 
One's duty lies in the bringing about or the developing 
within the personality of moral attitudes as kindness, sym-
pathy , and the like, which results in good consequences. 
By this is meant, that unless these conditions are present, 
that is unless moral attitudes are asswned, then coherent 
results cannot be predicted. However, the morality lies 
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in the attitude and not in the external consequences. 
The question might be raised: "Suppose kindness is mis-
taken and results in harm, what then?" In the first 
place, kindness is not mistaken, but rather, the indi-
vidual reasoning is amiss. Should this take place it 
would not be a moral matter, but a tragedy as a result 
of faulty reasoning. The person with the kind attitude 
is, nevertheless, morally praiseworthy. 
The question may be asked, "Is it not the~ my duty 
to overcome ignorance and develop my intelligence?" Yes, 
it is one's responsibility to rid oneself of his ignorance, 
not because ignorance is moral or immoral, but because ig-
norance is a stumbling-block to the development of moral 
attitudes, i.e., a moral person. Persons are moral or 
immoral, not consequences or things. It is as Martineau1 
writes: 
Self-evidently, it is persons exclusively, 
and not things, that we approve or condemn. The 
more given objects of nature, or the fabricated 
products of art,--the rock, the stream, the star; 
or the house, the ship, the lamp,--are perfectly 
indifferent to the conscience; and though they 
may become the centres of various feelings, we 
recognize the absurdity o~ applying to them epi-
thets distinctly ethical. 
1. Martineau is not a personalistic emotivist. The follow-
ing chapter will point out the relation of Martineau's 
intuitionism to personalistic emotivism. 
2. Martineau, TET, I, 1. 
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Even when we use a moral term in reference to ob-
jects other than persons it is neither our intention or 
our understanding to ascribe to it any moral significance. 
When we say that "the house on 36 Vine Street has been con-
demned," the word "condemn" does not carry any moral sig-
nificance. However, if the man who was responsible for 
building the house did not build it according to specified 
regulations because he had intentions of evading the law 
in order to increase his profits then we condemn the man 
as immoral for his immoral intentions. Moraltty must al-
ways be interpreted as internal. Morality, as Stephen 
points out, is to be something, not to do something.2 
One's obligation is to become something, not to do some-
thing. Moral value is one of personality development, 
not of consequences per se. 
Consequences could not be the essence of morality. 
If mora l value consisted of consequences only t hen any 
thing causing consequences to resuat would be moral, in-
eluding the lower animals and inanimate objects. Moral 
law is a matter of attitude, a matter of being something 
internally; not doing something externally or evertly. 
Green says: 
1. Martineau, TET, I, 1. 
2. Stephen, SE, 155. 
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It is true that it makes no difference to 
the outward form of an action whether it is so 
related to a motive or no; whether it has a mo-
ral quality or--as would be the case, if it were 
determined directly by animal want ••• But i t is 
not by the outward form, thus understood, that 
we know what moral action is. We know it so 
to speak, on the inner side. We know what it 
is in relation to us, the agents; what it is 
as our expression. Only thus indeed do we know 
it at all.l 
If. overt actions are not of the essence of moral val-
ue, why then do we refer to them as being moral or immoral? 
If actions have no moral value why then do we judge mo- - . . 
rality in the light of consequences? The answer is simply 
that we judge one's attitude and intent from his actions. 
The housewife in America, during World War II, who through 
fear of sevemrationing or an impending lack of sugar 
supply bought as much sugar as we could get from the var-
ious merchants and hoarded it in her cellar might have 
thought she was sagacious, or, as Kant would say that she 
was commit ting an act of prudence.! However, we should 
say that she was acting immorally. Her actions would sug-
gest that she was a victim of a greedy attitude and such an 
attitude is indeed to be considered immoral. 
There are persons who pride themselves on always 
telling the truth. Sometimes the truth is pretty harsh and 
1. Green, PTE, 104-109. 
2. See Kant's MM, 41. 
when such persons are criticized for so doin~ , they reply : 
11 Well , it is the truth, isn't it?" There are times when 
unde r t h is same g ui se the se persons foster their ma l i c i ous 
a"Gtitud es and intentions. For example, a person may be ug -
ly and. fat ; but does that give another the righ t to tell her 
so even if t h e one modelling a new dress should ask for com-
ments u pon her appearance? Man y persons take such an oppor-
t unity to express some harbored malicious attitudes. l''or 
the personalis ·tic emotivist, it is not what you do that 
makes you moral ; it is what you are. Actions s y1nbolically 
serve to express what you are. So crates testifies to t:t--Lis 
when he says, ''False words are not only evil in t hemselves, 
but t h ey infect the soul with evil. 111 Moral ity is not c a. l-
culable in terms of con sequences but in t erms of motive and 
attitude. 0pen cer also confes ses to this fact when he says: 
~very moment we pass instantly from men 's per-
eel ved actions to the motives i mp lied by them ; and 
so ar e led to formulate t he se a ctions in menta l 
terms rather than in bodily terms. 'l'hou.:shts and 
feelin ?; s are referred to when we speak of any one's 
deeds wit;h praise or blame ; not those outer ma ni-
fest&.tions which reveal the tholl[~hts and feeling s .2 
The only moral value actions h ave are in t he fee l in~ 
or attit ude from wt1ich they sprin;; . Any action whi ch has 
its ori :; in in any ill fe eling is immoral, not because of the 
consequen ces which flow from such feelin gs but be ca use the 
l. Phae do. 
2 . Spen cer, DOE , 75. 
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feelin ~,; i t; self is mor ally bad. I"G is tru e t l1a t one me t h od 
of d e terminin; wLic h feelin,~ s or a t t i tud es are ba d i s by 
t he t ype of consequen ces wh ich g enerally f o llow f ro m sucn 
a tt i tudes; but; t h e con sequ ences alon e are n o'c s uff i cient --
pers onali ty d e velopment and s piritual deve lopmen t must a lso 
be tak e n int o cons id e r a~ ion . Moreove r, consequences are 
neu tra l, t h e y a r 0 op a que as t o mor al value. 
For the pe 1:·s onal ist i c emo t i v i s t , con s equences do have 
value, but it is not moral value . l 'h ey he.ve a value of pru -
den ce or wi s dom. I n f ac t , the y h ave mu ch v alue an d many 
t yp e s of valu e, but no t mor al value. External conse qu enc e s 
h ave, a t b e s t , on ly i nstrumental value. Gonsequen ces, for 
examp le, have value as to what t ype of pena l inst i tuti on i s 
best o r a s t o wh a t typ e of ~ overnment is most e ff e cti ve a n d 
b e st s erv e s t h e ne e d s of i t s p eopl e , o r in det e rmini n g t h e 
b e st poli cies in t he f i e l d of e du ca t ion . fhis v a l ue , ne v e r -
the less, is no t moral. I t be comes moral wh e n a tti t udes, 
fe eli n ?; s, or int enti on s are i nvolved . I f out of nalice, 
h a t e, or· re sen t ment we ma ke our pol i cies i n t h e fie l c, of 
p en al refo r m severe, t h en it be comes a mor al issue and t h ose 
res p ons i ble are i mmoral. Conseque n ces, wh ich are a mc. t t er 
of' prud ent ial j u dgment are as lviart i neau sa ys , 0 An affair· of 
foresi ~ht; mor·al judgment, of insi ~-;h t • 111 1Ji e.rti n eau also 
1. Martineau, TET , 71. 
write s, " '.~ ... ~11e the ob jects of mora l preference are the 
s pring s of ac tion within us, the ob j ects of p rudential p re-
ference are the effects. of action upon us.nl :::>ince man is 
a rational being as we ll as a moral being t h en all he is or 
does will be colored by reason. 
External c onsequen ces d1i ch are sole l y a ma tt er of 
j ud 2;ment are of aes thetic value rat h er t h an of moral value. 
As we marvel a t an orator or comedian fo r h is wit a nd app re-
ci ate it for aesth etic reasons, so conseque n ces which result 
from cleve r or 1g ood 11 j u dgment are of aesth etic value a lso. 
Th e y acquire moral merit only insofar as moral att i t ud es are 
involved. l<' or ljocrates, the wise man was good for the one 
who k new the good would do it. 2 :t-...nowled;5e and virtue were 
iden t i cal. Socrates fell s h ort on two counts: he did not 
mak e suffi c ient room for will and oblig ation nor did he take 
suff icient account of moral attit udes. Kno wl edg e is a wea-
pon whi ch ma y be used f or g ood or for evil, as we are learn-
ing today in reference to atomic energ y. 
Attitudes and intentions mak e a world of aifference 
as 1's.r as acts and consequences are concerne d . An ill wi ll 
or a malicious attitud e chan~ es an act from a neutral or 
g ood one to an i mrnora l one. Prac t leal j oke rs at a birthday 
1. Mar~ineau , ~ET , 70. 
2 . 'Vindelband, HP, 79 . Also Ros ers, SHE , o5ff. 
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party may play a game of truth and consequences. The person 
who loses has to pay a penalty, as putting on the costume of 
a dunce so as to look ridiculous. If the spirit in which 
this is done is good and all are simply doing their best to 
make everyone feel merry, then all is well. However, if 
the person who has charge of stating what the punishment 
shall be sets a severe penalty with malicious intent or re-
sentment then the act is not one of joviality but of im-
morality. So Green writes: "It is true that the moral qual-
i ty of this act, its virtue or its vice, depends on the char-
acter of the agent."l Consequences in and for persons and 
their attitudes are vital to personalism. 
Josiah Royce's ethics of loyalty has much in common 
with personalistic emotivism. Royce is concerned more with 
attitudes than he is with consequences. He interprets overt 
acts as expressions of attitude, viz., the attitude of loy-
alty. "Do what you can to make men loyal, and to keep them 
in a l loyal attitude." 2 Later he goes on to show that in the 
last analysis ethics is a matter of attitude, an attitude 
of loyalty, and not a matter of infallible judgment as the 
ethics of consequences would demand of one. He says, W¥ou 
and I may be wrong, the last word of conscience is, We are 
fallible, but we can be decisive and faithful; and this is 
loyalty. n3 
1. Green, PTE, 107. 
2. Royce, POL, 151. 
3. Royce, POL, 196. 
13.4:9 
Often ethical consi d eration s are confused with po li-
cies. l 'h ere are pers ons who look upon t h eir stand ards o r 
practi ces as hs.r d an d fast rules. The rules of a colle g e 
o r baseball g ai!1e are somet imes c on ft1.sed with moral laws. 
The rules of baseball chan ge from year to year; do they 
therefore h ave any moral si gni f icance or is one privileg ed 
to br·eak t h em at wi 11 '? 'l'he answer is that t h e rules of 
baseball a.re Ill>t mora 1 laws but they do have moral si gn ifi-
c ance . For a b aseball player to break tb.e rule s of the g ame 
i n orc.er to bring about hi s own d esired ends is indulg ing 
i n i mmor·al attitudes of deceit and s h ows a lack of sp orts-
manship. Policies and principles in and of t h emselves ha.ve 
no mora l sign ifi cance. It i s onl y when they have a bearing 
on at titud es that t h ey have any moral sig nific ance. 
·rhere are many so -called s por t s wh ich ought t o be 
cond emned as i 1mnoral in the lig ht o f personalistic emoti v-
i sm. 'l' ake, for e xemple, the American " s port 11 of boxing or 
wrestling . These have won wide f'a.me and popular i ty in t h is 
country and yet those involved in this activity are foster-
ing i mmorality. Boxing and wrestling mak e for b arbarous 
spirits; they cultivate an atti tude of callousnes s and cru-
elty. They insti ll in one masochistic feelings . The sa-
dis t ic expression on the faces of those in the audience whi le 
a wrest ling mat ch is taking place is a p Ethetic si gh t to 
witness. ~::>uch attitudes are i mmoral. 
:2.50 
The reason we condemn certain a cts and laud others is 
t h at the acts which we call g ood indicate a g oo d att i tude 
and the acts we c ond emn as evil s p ring from i mmoral atti tud es . 
Even an Ideal Uti litari an as Rashdall ap; rees with this. He 
says, 11The h i gh value which we assig n t o all natural kind-
linesses of feelin,?; and to parental affection ••• is , I b e-
lieve , one of the main g rounds f or our condemna t ion o f in-
1 
f'anticide. " It is the attitude of a person , h is fee ling 
i n the matte r, that is moral or not an d t hat mak e s acts mo-
rally prai seworthy or sinful. Consequence s whi c h result 
from impersonal causes are morally neutral. 
The ethi cs of the ideal utilitarian would cond ew..n 
t he persona l i s t ic emoti vist as being sen t i mental and unreal-
is t ic i n that as he says it would not p ermit t h e b est re-
sults always to take p lace as the "extin ction of life in the 
c a se of the old or the sick or t h e insai1e , a nd g enerally 
s p e akin s , persons whose exi stence is a burden to the cor!1_.mu-
ni ty .112 In t h e first place, it is debatable whet her it is 
wi ses t to carry ou t suc h a prc s ram and secon d l y , one ' s sym-
path e t ic feeling and attitude of und. erstandinr; is one of the 
reasons for many mercy d eaths. 'l'he best g round for believ-
i n s in merc y k illing is that off e red by personalistic emo-
tivism. fje s eek t o do the best for t he person when motivated 
1. Rashdall, TGE, I , 189 . 
2. Rashdall, TGE, I , 18 9 . 
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by a feelin g of mercy, compa.ssion, and sympathy . 
Often ·IJhe conclusion that we ought to extenninate 
t hos e wh o are a burden to the community as do some ideal 
utilitarians is not only heartless but it is indicative of 
selfishness. One seems to have his own g ood ou iJwei ghinrs the 
g ood of others. Moreove r bhe life and persona lit y of others 
is certainly more itflpor tant than the alleviation of a few 
of our burdens . 'l' o exterminate persons is an admission that 
we are at our wit 's end and have g iven up hope of findin g a 
goo d solution. It is neither g oo d for ourselves nor for 
our victims . 
Let us move next to a consideration -of how the per-
sonalis ti c emotivist wou l d explain the ethics of lyin c;; and 
telling the truth . Many ethical systems cond emn lying as 
im.noral and approve of honesty. ·r:tms we find that the ten 
commandments teach so , the c ate:sorical i mperative of Kant 
would d emand it of us, and even the subjectivism of Hume to-
g ethe r with the utilitarianism of l\H ll for the di s in-terested 
bystander of these two latter philosophies woul d say that 
in this society, "Honesty is the best policy" is the app roved 
ethic . ·rruth-speaang also has a place in this ethic. r he 
act of s p eak ing the truth, however, is not the morally praise-
worthy t h ing , alt h ough it has other value. 'I'he thing about 
tellin'j the truth which h as intrins ic moral value, h owever , 
i s that t rut h speaking makes for an attitu d e of integ rity. 
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If the mora l value of truth-speakin g lay in the s.ct of te ll-
ing the trut h , then, at best , a small f r action of the thin '! s 
we ever say convey any object ive truth. v~h en we cons ide r the 
He g elian teachin z; that "the true is the whole 11 t h en we won -
der if we ever can s peak the tr·uth. 'l'ruth-speaking is mora l 
because it arises out of that u inward love of trut h of which 
1 1 truth-speaking is the expression and g u8rentee. 1 It is im-
possible to know or ever to know that what you say is the 
whole truth, but one can develop an attitude of truth-loving . 
The que stion arises as to what to do in a case where 
one 1 s moral attitudes conflic t . The personalistic emo t i vist 
wo u ld answer that by saying t hat moral attitudes or i n cen-
tives do no t con flict. Professor brand blanshard i n a class 
in ethical theory2 claimed tba t t h ere are exceptiona l times 
when i t is the moral thing to tell a lie. He cit ed t h e il-
l ustration of the physician who wh en as k ed a question by his 
patient kn ew that if h e g ave her t h e true answer i t would be 
disastrously harmful but s h ould he for the time being , at 
leas t , lie to her it wou l d be for the g ood of all concerned. 
Out o f a hw.vnanitarian consid eration he was f orced t o lie. 
The question may be raised , "Is not here an instan ce where 
the spirit o f tellin;;;; the truth is in conflict with a humane 
l. Rashdall, TGE, I, 1 9 4. 
2. Course entitle d , 11 'l'ype s of Ethical Theo r y 11 6 iven at Har-
vard University i n the fall o f 1948. 
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spirit?" ?he ans wer is no . The spirit of veracity never 
conf l icts with the hu..'Tlani tar ian attitude . 'rhi s sit nation is 
not one of a conflict of attitude s b ut one of f acts . The 
fact whi c h was true was i n conflict w th other facts . The 
physician maintained bis trustworthiness and his a c tions 
still s p rang forth from a love of truth. The statement whi ch 
he made -..vas a fa lse one t o be sure but it was a judgment of' 
prudence . It is as h o yce says, that when particular loyal-
ties conflict t he n b e lo yal to lo yalty . One has not s a cri-
ficed his loyalty . I n the same way one has neither sacri -
ficed his lo ve of truth n or his love o f humanity . 
Obje cts of o ur attitude are not in t h e realm of in -
trinsic mora l va lue; they are in t he realm of consequences 
and therefore a matter of prudence. ·rhey are of prudential 
value, not moral value. 
It is as Kant says , that one c an a c t accordin::; to mo-
rali~y but not ne cessarily o ut of moral ity . He ma y act as 
thou ::;h he were mo ral. Hi s actions may appear as on e who is 
behaving morally but is not a cting ou t of reverence for mo -
ral law a t al l. Actions have de ce i tfu l mora l worth ; mora l-
ity is inner . Moral i ty is· in willins , not in b eha v ing . Be -
havior is mis leadin"s . A person who is k nown as and c alled 
a phi lant h ropi st for ;s iving g reat sums of money to cbaritab le 
institut i ons «illY not be actin3 out of moral consi d e r ations 
at all . He may h ave in mind the f osterinc, of rrl.s own privat e 
interest and the belief that it is best a ccomplish ed by 
such g estures as vlin t h e favor of the populace . 
I d eal ut i litarians attempt t o solve this problem by 
sayin :-: t h a i:; the r e are cases when a lie mu st be tol d in the 
i nte rests of tru th . hashdall s ays: 
An unt rue statement must be ma de to one man in o rder 
to keep a secret which one h as p r omis ed to respect; 
a stat ement literally untrue mu s t be mad e that a 
higher truth may be -yaught or real liberty of t h oue; ht 
and speech advan ced. 
'rhis defence is a dmirably _, put, an d is .in line with personal-
ism. It is not the overt act that counts bll't the inner 
trustwort h i ness. Another p ersonalistic •N ay of putting it 
is as H8ffding writes : 2 
Daraus, dass die Wahrheit immer g esucht warden 
soll , fol gt nicht, da ss sie iramer g esag t werden soll. 
Di e ilahrh ei tJ zur Herrschaf't zu bring en ; dieser Zwack 
kann jedoch oft durch das Aussprechen der ha h r hei t 
werhindert werden.3 
It is t h e concern for truth that count s, not t he fa ct of 
making correct stat ements. Por· the fact or act o f ma king 
corr ect state cnents leads to Pharisaism. Truth is a matter 
of the soul , not a matte r of mal{ ing 11 abstra c ta corre ct 
statements, as Heg el would say . Truth is a matter of b eing 
somethin.'~ ; it is an e.ttitude, no t a matter of makin3 o bj e c-
tively correct utterances. One does not speak the truth ; he 
1. Rashdall, T ~E , I , 194 . 
2 • .tnthough H8ffd ing is not an ethical personalist . 
3 . Hoff'ding , ErR , 178 . 
is truthful. Objectively correct statements are a factual 
mat;ter and a matt e r of prudence, not of moral worth . Trut h -
ful s t atements are valuab le and t hey are another's indica~ 
tion t hat t h e person uttering them is a truthful or trust -
worthy one; and t h erefore morally praisewort hy. 
Stephen, also, wrestles with this same pro blem . He 
says that in the realm of morality there are two l aws; the 
one is external and the ot h er is internal. ~he ex ternal 
lavv has to do with actions or consequences and the internal 
1 . t " • . th • l aw Wl n oe1ng some 1ng . T'he first woul d exp ec t you to 
act morally and the second would require you to be moral. 
"Li e not" would b e the moral co mmand of the external law 
and this would correspond to the internal law, 11 Be trust-
wo r t hy ." However, p reeminence is g iven to t h e in te rnal mo-
ral law. 11 Truthfulness 11 is never violated ; h owever, external 
rules may have exce ptions, as when the "mutual conf i dence 
would be violated v.it1en the truth, not when the lie is spok en. 
I n such cases ••• moral law admits of an ap parent exce ption . 112 
'l' hus i s the case for personalistic emotivism. One's 
duty is always to be trustworthy , not always to u tt er s tate-
ments tha t are corre ct. F'or 11 no one but a fanatic t h inks 
it a duty to proclaim the truth on every subject, at all 
1. Bowne's explanat;ion of the matter will be discussed later. 
2 . ~tephen, op. cit., 208 . 
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times and unde r all circumstances." 1 If it were one's duty 
to do so then no one con.ld possibly be moral or ever h ope 
to attain morality. Mo reover, it ma y be added that; if s u ch 
were the case t h en who has ever told t he truth? 
'l'he cheat wh o h as not had any opportunity to deceive--
is he not still a cheat? fhe misanthropist who h as had no 
opportunity to harm h is fellow men- -is he not immoral? 
I.1oral laws are not abstract pr inciples d ivorced from 
personality, but rather are vital components of the human 
person. The moral law s hould no t be expre ssed as "kill nota 
but rather it s h ould be expressed as 11 hate not. 11 .lhe irn-
morality of murder is in the he art or the attitude, not in 
the hand or one's actions. It is as Jesus said: 11 Ye have 
heard that it was said to them of old time, Thou shalt not 
ki ll; and whosoever shall k ill shall be in dans er of the 
judgment; but I say unto you, that every one who i s ang ry 
with his brother shall be in danger of the j udgme nt. 112 The 
impersonal moral code is stated thus: 11 Thou sh alt not com-
mit adultery . " ~he personal moral co de of personalistic 
emotivism is stated; 11Thou shalt not lust after anot h er. 113 
Control or d e velop a man 1 s feeling s or c:.tti t udes and a con-
comitant chang e takes place in actions. To regulate good 
1. Ras h dall, TGE , I, 1 96 . 
2 . Mat thew 5:21-22. 
3 . See Matthew 5:27-28 . 
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attit ud es is to regulate goo d conseque n ces. 
By changing our att i tud es we cont r ol an d d i rect our 
ac tions . Induce a man to love hi s nei ghbor and you have 
tau.gh t him not to murder . It is the qua l ity of character 
that is morall y valuable, not t he mode of conduct. Stephen 
believes t h at the e xte r nal law, i.e., the mode of c ond uct , 
is for the primitive mi nd. The primitive co u l d not g rasp 
t h e i n t ernal law an d it was t h e only wa y that he could be 
i1 0rally t rained. 
Act i ons a re wr on :; or ri ght in t h at t h e y ~~ en erally i m-
p l y a g ood or evi l attitude. That wh i ch is unjus t to per -
son s is i r•m10ra l. Ki lling , for e xamp le, is wrong b e c ause it 
g enerally i mplies hatred . Lyi n :; is wron ~5 because it g eneral -
l y imp lies ma l iciousnes s . Adu ltery is wrong be cau se it 
g enera ll y implies l u s t . Theft i s wron,s for the f a c t t hat it 
often imp lies envy and covetousness. l'llo r ali ty pertains on-
l y to persons . 
In t hose systems of ebhi cs in wh ich t he moral law is 
re g a rded a s external contradictory exceptions an d ot h er dif -
fi cu l ties resu l t . 'r h ey claim that killi n g is evil and then 
allow euth anasia, war, etc. They cla i m t hat l ying is wrong 
a n d allow exceptions. I n personalistic emo t ivism thes e dif-
fi cult ies are overcome. I n perso na l i stic emoti v i sm, " Rules 
of act ion imp l y a classification of' thin~ s in g eneral ac-
cordin ?,; to t heir relat ions t o the feelin gs of the a g en t , and 
t h us t h e f o rmation of primary rules corre s pond ing to h is 
primitive sensibilitie s, and ha rmonized by t h e unit y of t h e 
or:~ ani sa t ion con s t it u t ed b y t h ose sen si b i l ii::;i e s . n l li oral 
l aws must be ab le to b e transl a ted into att i tud e , i nten \jion , 
moral character. A g ood d isposition h as g oo d f rui t s. F'eel -
in; s, no t con se quences , determine motive or i n t e n t . l'v o r al 
l aws must ·oe stated in terms of c h ar acter . Moral laws do 
no t be lons to classes but to h uman being s. 
Immoral attitud es as jealousy, a ng er, h e.t e, censor-
iousness an d t he like all serve to defend an e ;s o tha t h as 
no t been a b le to f u lf i ll its e lf morally . AnGer is the h and-
maiden of an e mbarrassed or humiliat ed e go; ha t e is r;h e wea-
pon of a frus t rated e go; censoriousness is t h e d efen se of 
an e g o rua d e t o feel inferior . r hese attitudes whic h are 
disvalues not only \IDrk as a disease in the pe rso nalit y but 
t h e pe r son w11o is motivat e d by t h em will i ndulg e in beh avior 
w.nich wi 11 prove dama s;ing to others. Moral dis values as 
malice , res entment, g reed , susp ici ousness, spite lead on l y 
to vain f rustrations a nd result in unh appy consequ e n c e s. 
I n t h e last aBalys i s, morality is a mat t er of attitud e and 
no t of con s e quences or actions. Actions serve t;o reflect 
attitudes and in t entions. Oblig ation is a matter of ac-
qu iring moral attitudes. Obli gation and morality ai':B inner. 
1. St ephen , SE , 157 . 
To be moral is t o be someth i ng , not t o do somethin~ or t o 
have a genius for ~ redicting consequences. To be mor a l is 
to de velop. It is g rowth . It is to maintain morally valu-
able attitudes . 
CHAP'r.c!;R IX 
PERSONALISTIC EivlOTIVIS.M AND R.EL!-\'l'B:D THEORI:~S 
It would contribute to t h e und erstandinrs o f the p er -
sonalis ti c emotive ethi c to compare it v1i th other ethical 
t heories. Although personalistic emotivism d iffers in many 
respects from ot h er etn ical systems, yet it also h as many 
elements of resamblance. ·r here is no intention t o make the 
comparison ex..'laustive. '.i.'he t as k here is merely -co cover 
some of the high lir; hts o f those t heori es which can be com-
pa red, contras t e d , or cri t ically evalua t ed i n the ll ~ht of 
the persona l istic emotive ethic. 
'l'he sys t ems and men selected t; ak e t he fol lowin2; order : 
1. Int uit i on ism: 
J ames rllartineau 
Jo seph But ler 
2 • . Formalism : 
I mmanuel Kant 
3. Christian Et h ics: 
J esus Christ 
4 . Teleolo %ical Perfectionism: 
Borden ? . Bowne 
1. The Intuitionism of J ames Martineau 
One of the eth ical t he ories closest to persona list i c 
emotiv i sm is the ethi cal int uit i onism of Martine au . In the 
fi rst p l a c e , Marti n eau does n o t consi d er conseque n ces as 
havin ~  mora l value . Con sequences external to r..onscio u sness 
.must be di sregarde d . lYloral v alue i s within the mind . •-.i- ood-
ness is a matter of pe rsona l it y . He writes : 
Instead of me&suring the worth of .:~o o dn ess by 
the s cale of it s external benefits , our rl.:Le re -
qui res that we at t ach n o moral value to t h ese bene -
f it s , exc ept a s siq;ns a nd exponents of t h e g oodn ess 
wh en c e they sprlng ; and 12.; raduate our approva l by 
t he purit v of the sour ce , not the ma:2:nitu de of h e -~ 1 ~ -
res u l u . 
In t.b.is respect h e is in a c cor d with personal i s tic emot ivism 
ex ce ;>t for the facr; that h e does not consider s ubJective 
consequence s and f o r t h e fa c t that h e does not consj_ d er cno -
ral laws wh i ch t end t o gui de one to moral values and fi n ally 
f or the fact t h at he d oes not con s id er t h e i n strumentsl val-
ue of consequenc es or a s he ca lls them "ext e rnal benefits . !! 
!Viartineau s h ould c onside r· t h e f;;ct chat consequence s do 
have a. bear in.~ upon the probl em in that consequences may 
he l p t o de ve l op inner g oo dness . By doing deeds of .h indness 
to a tyrant one may by such deeds t each him kindness so th& t 
the t y rant be c ome s kind to h is fe l l ow me n . Con s equenc es 
affecr; atti t u de s . 'l'his i de a of consequen c es afi'ecGin;; atti -
tude s i s quite anc i ent . St . Paul , quoting the Bo ok of ro-
verb s , says , 1 I f thine enemy hung er , feed him; if he t hirst, 
1. Martin eau , TE'r , II , 2 6 . 
262 
~ ive h i m t o d rink: for in so doin cs thou s halt h eap conls 
0 I~ f . ' i t " 11 ..L lre upcn n s 1e ao . • 
Mart ineau also does not see t hat c ons eque nces, al-
t h ough t h e y h av e no intrin sic mora l value, do h ave instru -
menta l mor al value . 'l h ey are g; uides as to wh ich at ti t udes 
are morally ~ood . Conse quences serve as g uides to g oo d 
a t titudes. Consequences are more than me r e si gn s of 11 t h e 
uoo dne ss whence t h ev sprin~ " they are the proof of that 
C) J. I tl '~ ' 
g ood ness . 11hat is, with out co nsi de ring c onsequences and 
tha rest of the fa cts of experience , there is no p os sible 
wa y t h at one may sa y that one a t t itude is mor a.l and an ot h er 
is evil . ivlartin eau mi ght cla.im that we know thi s by intui-
tion . I t is true that many of them can be kn own by intui -
t ion , but on the o ther hand many o f th em c annot . How m ay 
one d etermine wheth er or not fear is a .-; oo d or bad atti t u de 
e x ce :r; t by exarnln ing the psych olog ical conse quences both in-
di vi dual and so cial wt ti ch g enera lly follow from suc h an at-
ti t u d e. 
Unlike personalisti c emot i vism, Martineau 1 s intuition-
ism has a tab l e called 11 spri n s s of ac t ion. 112 He rms listed 
thirte en s p rings of action rang ing all the way fro m secondary 
passions to the p rimar·y sentiment of revere n ce. One deter-
1. Romans 12:20, Proverb s 25:21-22. 
2. Martineau, TET , II , 266 . 
mine s whether or not an act is ri .-sh t b y c ons ultin ~ chis 
t ab le. uEv e r y action is RTCI HT , which , i n the p resence of a 
lower princi ) le, follows a h i :.zhe r: every action is ' v"RONG, 
which , in presence of a higher principle, fol lows a lower. rl 
The problem is how can Mart ineau possibly set up these thir -
teen g radu a t e d pr·inc iples or sprin rs s of act ion with out re-
sort in :; to consequences, i.e., the values which t hey tend 
to produce. A teleo lo;:;ical ethi cs is need e d . That is , h e 
must ha ve examined very carefully the g enera l type of co n -
sequ ence which usually follows from the v arious spri n gs of 
ac"Gio n and t he n in t h e li ght of the b e t ter conse quences de-
termined w:r.J.ch may be cons idere d t h e h i g her s prin .~z of ac-
tion. Rashd a ll, also has this criticism to make pertaining 
to thi s feature of Martineau's t heory . He wri te s, 1 It is 
no us e to sa y with Dr. Mart ineau, 'Act in ob~dience to t h e 
highest motive'; fer it is impossi b le t o pronounce one mo-
tive h i g h er than another in the a bstract, without reference 
to the circumstances. 112 This is a valid cr·iticism f or most 
mo ti v e s but it d oes not bld true for t h e motive of coherence 
which is g ood in al l circllinstanc es. 
P ersonalis ~ ic emotivism differs from Martineau 1 s 
i ntui t ioni sm in that it claims thst certain atti tudes are 
1. Il'lartineau, 'I'E'l' , II , 270. 
2 . Rashdall, TGE, I , 89 . 
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morally prai seworthy and o t;hers are morally shameful . A 
g ood attitud e is always e;ood and a bad attitud e is a lways 
evil and it is not a matter of selectin :; the hi ~her atti -
tude . At t icude s are not classified on vari ous leve l s . Th ey 
are either goo d or bad , mora l or immoral. It ls always i ra-
moral to act out of hate and it is a l ways moral to act out 
of kindness . According to Martineau unless a hisher mo t ive 
be pre sent in the mind, action which fol lows from a lower 
motive cannot be considered wrong . Whereas, accordin s to 
persona l i s ti c emotivism , motives as cen s oriousness , mali-
c iousness , spite, g reed, an d the l ike are always wrong re-
g ard less o f whether a h i gher motive is present or not. 
Another po int in which the ethi cs of Martineau i s 
i n accord with the emotive ethic i s in the matt er of duties . 
According to Martineau it is one 1 s duty to create circmn -
s t an ces wh i ch wi ll be co nducive t o the hig h e r motiv es . One 
is not suppo s ed to sit a nd wait Ul'1ti l a motive is prod u ced 
by circums -r:; ance. He is oblizat ed t o look ah ead and if h e 
is a b l e , to c reate or avoid circumstan ces which brin~ about 
the hi ghe r or lowe r mo t ive s. He writes, !I Ous ht we to con-
tent ourselves 'Ni th treat in~ the s pri n z s of action a s our 
data, with whi c h we h ave nothin~ to do but t o wait t ill 
the y are flung upon us by c ircumstances , and then to f ollow 
the best thac t urns up? 111 Ni:artineau me e t s thi s o bje ction 
1. Martineau, 1' .d.'1' , II , 257. 
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by saying that we ought not merely to sit b y and wait and 
take what come s t;o us but we should work to brin.;;.:; a bout the 
better spring of a ct ion . He says: 
I f t h ere be at the c orrLmand of our will, not on-
ly the selecti on of the better side of an a l ternative, 
but also a predetermination of what kind the al ter-
native shall be , the rang e of our duty will undoubt -
edly be extended to the cre ati on of a hi -5her p lane 
of c·.ir•curnstance , in addition to the higher preferenc e 
within i t . No parent is justified in p lacing his 
child , no youth in p lac in; himseli' , in ·: a p osition or 
occas ion which is sure to abound in low temptations 
and to blunt and enfeeble t he sprin3 s of action that 
would rally the wi ll a gainst them . .n.nd so far is 
thi s anx iety to moul d the external con diti ons to the 
moral wants of' l ife sometimes c e.rrie d. , t hat a pro-
fession reached through a costly training is aban -
doned , be cause it is no t pure enough and d isappoints 
the best affe c ti ons .l 
According to Mart ineau, a person i s obli gated to seek 
after 1 that p ls.ne of cir cumstance 11 in which the richest or 
the hi ghest moti ves 1N il l be found in mos t a b undance . 
One other point at whi ch these two systems of ethic s 
de viate one from the other is i n the matte r of whetl'h er the 
love of dut y c an be a spri n g of action . I'iartin eau in his 
t reatment of obje ctions to his ethical theory raises the 
ques t ion, 11 Is the l ove of vir tue s.mong the spring s of ac -
tion'i'112 This, he answers in the neg a t ive. His reason f or 
doing so ia to avoid any ut i litarian criterion of moral ity . 
He thinks thac should one accept the love o f duty as a spring 
l. Martineau, TET , II , 257 - 258 . 
2 . ivlartineau , TB:T , II , 279ff' . 
of a c t i on t hen veracit y wi 11 co nflict with ben avo len ce and 
one is f or ced to u se con sequen ces a s the cri ter i on as to 
whi c h of the tw o will b e f ollo we d in a r; i ven c ir cums t an ce. 
The ~ersona l i s t ic emotivi st doe s not be lie~e that this is 
the case, n o r d oes Hu t ch es on •1 Tr uthful n ess n e e d not con -
f li ct with ben e volenc e as was poi n ted ou t a t some l ength in 
a f ore going ch apter. The mot ivat i on o f coh erence wou l d 
c2r r y one t h rough this d i f f i cult y . 
I n the last ana l ysis on e mi ght sa y t hat t he ethics 
of Mart ineau is close t o person alis t ic emotivism in t hat one 
i s moti vate d by i n t ent an d fe e ling a n d t hat obje c t ive con-
s equences h ave no t intrinsic moral valu e. Ob j ective co n se-
quenc e s are of pruden tial or instrumental value. 'rhe mo-
ra l i t y i n speaking t r uthfu lly i s in on e's repuls i on f o r l y -
in.~ ; on e re l i eves a n other 1 s s ufferi n g be cau se one cann ot 
stand t o se e another in p a i n. 'I' he mora li t y of a man 1 s d o in~ 
g oo d f or hi s family li es i n h is love f or them . I t i s as St . 
Paul wri tes , "And if I be s t ow a ll my g oo d s t o fe ed t h e poor, 
a n d if I .?; i ve my body t o be burn e d , out b£. ve no t lov e , it 
profi t e th me nothin -:e; . 112 
2. The Int ui t ionism of J ose ph Butler 
Bish op Butle r also h as a s yst em o f e t;h ics .whi ch at 
1. Cf. J:i 'r an c i s Hut ch es on , An Inquiry i n t o the OrL:; ina l of 
Our I deas of Beaut y and Virtue. 
2 . I Corinthians, 10 ; 3 . 
first g l an ce ap pears to be si milar to per scnalisti c emo-
tivism but in . reali ty is far f rom' it. But l e r dif fe rs ra-
dically from per sona li stic em otivism in that the re is no 
a dequate p l a c e f o r ob lie; at i on in the ethical i ntuiti onism 
of butle r • .b'or .but ler, obli ~at ion :iinv0:l>ve.is; interest and 
therefore he is to b e class ified wich t h e subjectivism of 
Burne's or Perry ' s type or else a f orm of ethical h e d onism. 
But l er· wri te s, 11 Duty a nd i nte res t are perfec 'cl y coincident; 
for the mos t pa r t in this world , bu t entirely and in every 
instan c e i f we t a k e in the future , and t h e whole . 11 l Obli-
g a~ ion p la ys an i mportant role in personalistic emo tivism 
in that on e is obligated to have mora l attitudes . Interest 
is o f no moral consequence • 
.Ou t ler's intuitionism bas a quality of ne.tu r al i s m 
about i t . Pa r .dutler , reason able self -love is a lmo st s yno-
nymou_s with vi r·tue . Moreover , s e l f -love wi th c or:science wa s 
- ' 2 s up reme and like co ns cience it was a judi c i al facul~ y . 
Re as onable self-love an d cons cien ce are the 
ch i ef or super ior principles in the nat ure of man : 
because an act i on may be s ui t able to this natur e , 
thou~h all other principles be violat e d ; ~ut be-
comes uns ui t a b le, if either of those are. 0 
Personalisti c emot iv i sm diffe rs fr·om .Outler's i n tui-
ti on i s m in t hi s resp e ct in that consequence and i ntuit ion 
1 . But ler, .':)ern:ton s , III , 13. 
2 . Se e Glad stone , SJa , 76 . 
3 . nut l ar, vermons , III , 13 . 
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supplant cons cienc e . Conscience ha s on l y a very li tt le 
pla c e in the et h i c s of pe rsonalisti c emo~ivism . 
butler is a kind of natural is t who reasons -r:;he.t s in ce 
our nature is g iven by God it is therefore ·:?;ood . ..:..veryt hin.~ 
t bat proceeds frDm our -c;rue nature is mora l. I 1:rrmors.l i ty , 
on t h e ot her hand , "is & violation or break i n :; in u p oL1 our 
own nature . tt 1 
However , the ethics of ~he persona l i sti c e moti vist 
i s &kin to the ethi c s o f Butler in that ea ch claims that mo-
ral ity is inner and that morality i s a matter of oeing s ome-
thin~ and no t doins somethin~ . The r u l i n g features i n the 
ethi ca l s ystem of .uutler are benevo l en c e and se l f - love . 
Benevo l en c e i s that nature of man that seek s t h e z, oo d of 
o t h ers , i. e ., pub l i c g ood . Self -love is that nature of ma n 
t hat seeks one' s own g oo d , i . e ., private 2 good . Added t o 
benevolence and se l f - l o ve as mo ti vating features in ma n and 
c on c erne d bo th for publi c and private goo d a r e appetites , 
passions , and parti cular affe ctions. 3 F'i nal l y , there i s 
adde d , in order t o make t he ethi c al s ys tem comp l ete , "con -
sc ien ce . n 11 This is the princip l e in man by wh i ch h e ap -
proves or· d isapprove s h i s heart , temper , and a c t ions . 04 
--- -----
1. Butler , Sermons , Prefa c e , 7 . 
2 • But l er , ~ermons , I , 3 , 4 . 
3 . .but l er , :Sermons , I , 6 . 
4 . Butler , Sermons , I , 8 . 
However, rlutler deviates from ethi cs as a matter of 
atti tude and intention when he claims that "we we re made 
for so ci et y , and to promote the happine ss of i t , as t h at we 
were intended to take care of our O\IIJJ.1 l ife , an d hec, l th , a nd 
private g oo d . " 1 I n this respect h e ma k es conse qu e n ces of 
i ntrinsic moral value . 
Ano t her point at whic h pe rsonalistic emot i vi sm t a k es 
issue with the e thi cs of butler i s on t he matte r a s to 
wh e ther t here is such a thing as ill-will. Perso nalistic 
e:notivism claims that there is, whereas l:3u t l er d enies i t . 
But l er ra ises the q ue stion , "Has not man d isposit i on s ••• 
wi t hin , whi ch lead him to do evil to ot hers, as we ll as to 
do ::s ood ? " 'l' o this But l e r ans wers, no. He sa ~rs, nThere i s 
n o su ch thi n s as self-hat red, so neither i s there a ny s u ch 
t hin ·:s as ill-will in one man t ow E: r d s another. " 2 
One final maj or point at whi ch persona lis ti c a~otivism 
and Butler's in t uit i onism g o their .separate ways is on the 
matter of !!Why s h ould men be moral? 11 I' o this ques ti on Butler 
answers be cause it 11 leads h i m to atta i n the g reatest happi -
ness h e can f or himself in the p r esent world. 11 Coupled to 
t h i s is that " the nature of man consi d ered in his public 
or social capacity leads him to a ri ght b~haviour in society , 
1. Butler , Sermons , I , 9 . 
2 . But ler, Sermons, I , 11. 
to tha t co urse of li fe wl1 ich we c a ll virtue. 11 1 As to the 
qu e stion, 11 'iJhy oU>!,ht men t o be mora l,.:'" t h e persona l istic 
emotivis t would answer be ca use of r eve rence fo r personality. 
lieverence for the wo r t h of man is one's pur pose for being 
moral . Di gnit y and the intri n sic wort h of hili-nan p ersonality 
i s the r a ison d '~tre of mora l value. 
3. 1'he Formalism of I mmanuel Kant 
Perhaps the formal and in t uitional ethic of Kant 
s h ou l d nexc b e compared wi th p ersonalistic emot i vi s m. Tn 
t h e mat t er of conse quences Kant's e thical i d eas li e very 
close to person alistic emotivism. Mor a lit y is not a matter 
of o bje c t ive or subjective consequences but one of attitud e 
a nd intent . This is not t rue for personalistic emo t ivism. 
T h e pe rsonalis t ic emotivis t h old s t hac internal co nsequences 
are of moral value. Conse quences f or Kant are irrelevant 
to moral law. The cat eg orical imperative d oes not take co g -
nizance of conse quences . Follow moral law, irres pecti ve 
of cons e quences, l et the chips fall wh ere they may . h i ?;h t 
and ~Nrong c an be determined indepsnd ent o f conse que nces. 
Concerning t he c ate5or·i cal imperati ve Kant writes; 
.c;r betriff t n i cr.tt die d a'Gerie de r Hand lung und 
das, was aus i h r erf'cli!, en soll, sond ern d ie Porm und 
das Prinzip , woraus sie selbst folg t , u..11d d as Wesen G-
l. Bu t l e r, ti ermons, I , 1 6 . 
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lich - Gut e derse l ben bes t eht in de r Gesinnung , d er 
· ' rfol -~ ma g s ein , we lcher er wo ll e . Dieser ..Lmpera -
t iv ma~ der d er S i t t l i chkeit heis sen .l 
In the matte r as to whether consequence s ' _ave any mo-
ral value , Kant is a llied wit h .!V~artineau . Per s ona li sti c 
e motivism d oes not go to this extreme. Fo r &art ineau, con-
sequenc es are a matter of pruden ce and ha ve n o moral value . 
For Kant also, c onsequ ences have no mora l value what so e ver. 
Fo r Bowne and f or the personalistic emot i vist , consequence s 
have in s t rument al moral v a lue on ly, but the y ha ve o ther non -
moral va l ues . 
One p o int in which the persona l isti c et h ic is in com-
p le~e accord wi th the intuitional ethi c of h ant is on the 
fa c t t hat morality is inner. The only intrinsic moral g ood 
is inne r, i.e., the s ood will. "Es 1s t tiberall nicht s in 
der ;;l: e lt , ja Uberhaupt auch aus ser derse l be n zu d enken mBc, -
lich , was ohn e Einschr!inkung fllr ~ut k onnte g eha lt en warden, 
als alle i n ein g uter Wille. " 2 Moral va lue is inner . By 
virtue of ~his fact persons are of intrinsic val u e; t he y have 
di ; nity . Ou-: sid e of pe rs ons there is no moralit y . In this 
res pect personalist i c emotivism and Kant i an intui t i on ism are 
alik e. 
However , the t wo d isag ree exceedinc; l y in the matter 
of fee lin 3 . An ac t mot ivated out of feelin~:S eli s qual i fies 
l. Kant, G11iS, .58 . 
2 . Kant , GMS , 10. 
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it as being mor·a l for 1\..ant . For Kant , one canno t act mo-
rally out of' sympathy, love, etc. ·rhese are non-mor&l. 
One can act only out of law. Kant s ays: 
Love is a matter of f~li~, not of will or voli-
t i on, and I cannot love oecause I will to do so, 
still less be cause I ou.~ht (I cannc;-.r-Ee neces si -
ta ted to level; hen c e t h ere is no such thin:::, as a 
duty to love. 
The persona l istic emotivist , the Bownian personalis t t o-
p; e ther with Ivlartineau wou l d take is sue with Kant on this 
point . Love an d s~mpathy are of h i ghest mora l value. Bowne 
says: 
Syrnpa thy , wi tb.out wr.ti. ch there could b e no so-
ciety , is often pronounced enemy of riJ~hteousn e ss 
and co~non good. Hen ce, Kant de clared all action 
spr in r; lng from symp athy and similar emotions t o be 
no? -mor~l, as roo t ed i n no moral insight and de -
vo "Gi on. 
Love and sympathy are among the highest possible a.ttainment s 
in the rea l m of moral worth. 
Another point upon which the Kantian e thic and per -
sonalistic emotivistic ethi c part company is on th e matte r 
of e mp irical mo t ivation. l<'or Kant , true morality means to 
make a ch oice without involving e mpirical motivat ion. er -
sonalistic e:ncti vism claims that moral motivati on may take 
p lace on the einpirical l e vel; especially such empirical mo-
tivations as lov e , merc y , sympathy , etc • .t' 'or Kant , the moral 
l. Kant , MEE, 249 . 
2 . Bowne, SC , 329. 
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law is a ''universal and necessary object of the practical 
reason" and this "reason m~ke s its end or demands a pri ori, 
1 
without anY.: regard to empirical mot ives. " Kant says, 
"Der Wi lle is ein Verm8gen, nur das j enig e zu w!Uilen, was 
d ie Vernunft unabh!lngi g von der Nei:;ung als praktisch not-
wendi g , e.i., als gut erkennt. 112 Not only does the p erson-
alistic emotivist differ on this matter of empirical motive-
tion and motivation by feeling but he also differs on this 
ma tter of reason as having any moral value. For the emotiv-
ist and for Martineau, reason has no moral value. It has a 
prudential va l ue and for the former it has instru.rnental moral 
value also . However, for Kant, it is the quintessence of 
morality . So writes Kant: 
~in jedes Ding der Natur wirkt nach Gesetzen. Nur 
ein vernftnftiges Wesen hat das Verm8gen, nach der 
Vorstellunz der Gesetze d .i. nach Prinzipion zu 
handeln , ode r einen Wi llen. Da zur Ableitung der 
Handlungen von Gesetzen Vernunft erfordert wird, 
so is der Wille nichts anderes als praktische 
Vernunft.3 
· ·he personalistic emotive ethic is i n complete harmony with 
t he Kantian ethi c concerning the reverence for men and the 
worth of man. Men have dig nity or intrinsic worth whereas 
other things have exchange value, that is, a value that is 
serviceable for some end. Hence, the di ; nity of man calls 
for reverence. Ni en be long to a kin;" dom of ends. Iv en should 
1. Windelband, HOP , 551. 
2. Kan t , GMS, 34. 
3 . Kant, GiviS, ;j4. 
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never b e treated as means onl y . 
Im Rei che de r Zwe cke hat alles entweder einen 
Preis ode r eine Wllrde. Was einen Preis h8~ , an 
dessen Ste lle kann auch etwas an dere s a.ls Aqui valent 
,~ e s e t zt we r d en; was dag e g en tiber a llen Preis erha.ben 
is~ , rnithin kein lqui valent ve r st a t tet , d a s hat eine 
Wllrde.l 
4. ~he Ethics of Jesus ~hrist 
It would be interesting to compare personalis t ic erno-
t:i.vism with the ethical tea ching s of one who is "the best o f 
all au thorities" 2 viz., Jesus of Nazareth . Al thou.:?; h J es u s, 
himS.elf, h ad not set up a system o f ethi cs such as is found 
amon g the classi c a l moralists , neve r theless, he did have some 
very important thin;:, s to s ay about mora.l pr i ncip l e s. 
'I o a z reat extent h e repu d iated the leg a li stic et rd cs 
of his day . The r e lig ious leaders o f his time had l aid o.own 
a very elaborate system o f moral l aw s wh ich ~overed practi-
c a lly every pha se of human li i'e . It began vdth a hi ~h f o r::n 
of mors.lity found in the T en Com.rnandments and ye t included 
quibo l in 3 as to the clothes one s h ou l d wear . Morality was, 
therefore, the co nfo rmity to these l e g alistic s tat utes 
whi ch were to them the wi ll o f God. Jesus repud i ated the 
teachin.; s anci prac tices o f the le&ders of his day by c han,:?; -
i nc:; the emphas is of moral value from codes t o attitude s 
l. ~an~ , GMS , 60 . 
2 . Ta ylor , ?S , 291. 
and intent . Harnack says that 11 Jesus s ev :red th e con n exion 
exis t in ~ in h is d a y b etween e thi cs and the ext erna l forms · of 
reli :;;; ious wor sh ip and technic al observance . 11 1 
To si n i s to r e vea l ar1 atti tucie . It was n ot t;he act 
wh i c h was so heinous ; but the s pi ri t or att it u d e whi ch 
prompt e d the act w.td ch was so t erri b le . "And j ust as h e 
he l d that one c oul d someti11e s b reak l a ws wi th i mpunity , h e 
taugh t that one ! J. i gh t obe y l aws to the l etter and still be 
a bad man . 112 One could b r eak the laws of t h e dabbath a nd 
s i ll b e moral, but one c an not be i nhumane and still be 
moral . 3 I t i s the inner l ife t h at i s of h i ;; he st , oral va l-
ue , n ot external a c t i on s. ·rhe mo rc.l e mphasi s of Jes us con -
s ists of the 11 spi rit or at titud e with whi ch t he act was d one . 11 4 
Conformity t o lav~ would neve r resul t in one ' e moral s a l va -
' . 5 
-c lon . 
sai d : 
~ora li ty is inner . Ac t ions are mislead i n 0 • Jes s 
~No e unto you , scribes and Phari s e es , hypocri t es l 
f or ye are l i l{e un t o whi t ed sepu lch r e s , wh i ch out -
wa r d l y appear b eautifu l , but inward l y are fu l l of 
dead men 1 s bones and a l l uncl eanness . Ev en so ye 
also outward l y ap pear ri e; hteous , unto man , but in -
ward l y y e are full of' hypo crisy and iniquity . 6 
1. Harna ck , ~C , 71. 
2 . Hockin~ et al ., TP , 151. 
3 . ~ee Luke 1 3 : 10 - 16 . 
4 . Hockin~ et al ., PTP , 152 . 
5 . Mat t hew 5 : 27 - 32 . 
6 . Mat t h ew 23: 27 - 28 . 
one 's s. c ti ons can never- be r-i gh t if' the spirit i n whic -1 they 
are don e is not. Outside of' at ·citud. es ci:1ere is no mor a lity. 
''Thou blind Pharisee, cle anse first the inside of t h e cu p 
a nd the p latter that the out side thereof may be come clean 
alsot 111 Wh at happens to consequences external to p ersons 
when forg iveness is celled for in spite of the nlli'T1ber of 
t ime s t h e offence is COI11JJ"1itted? 
·~:hen carne .Peter , and se.i d to h im , Lord , how 
oft shall my brother sin a g ains t me , and I forg ive 
him? until seven times? Jesus s a ith un to r.J.m , I 
se.y not unto t h ee, U~ti l seven cimes ; but, Until 
seventy t imes seven. 
Tha t wb.ich defiles and results in wickedness is t h a t which 
is in the spirit of man . Actions are evil be caus e t h e y pro-
c eed from evil men.3 Evil lies in i ntent and attitude . .... h e 
beatitudes also call for a g ood attitude . The blessed ones 
are the poor in spirit, the mournful, the me ek , t h ose who 
hun:;er anc1 thirst after ri ~hteousness, t he me rci f ul, and t h e 
pure i n :heart. 4 
For Je sus, the highest moral value is love. 5 Love 
"' 0 
is an attitude, so :cJ.et h in s of the s pirit . Love is an inner 
quality. Personal is t ic e:cnotivism an d the moral t eaching s 
1. Matthew 23 :26 . 
2 . Ma ~ thew 18:21-22. 
3 . Matth ew 15:11. 
4 . ~atthew 5:3-12. 
5. Matt h e w 22:36 - 40 . 
6 . Bri ghtman add s sacrif ice to love as t h e t wo central prin-
ci p les of the Christian et h ic. See Br i g h t man, ML, 19 . 
of Jesus res ards t h e value of h uman li fe very hi ::t,h l~y- . Hu-
man life an d personality are sacred . Jesus bring s t h is 
p o int out very vividly in his teacl1ings in the Sermo n on 
the hiount. I-Ie raised t he di p~ni ty of ma n t o a new level 
wh en he taught: 
Ye have h eard that it was said to t h em o f old 
t ime, Thou s halt not k ill; and whosoeve r s hall kill 
s hall b e in danger of the j udgment: but ttd s I s ay 
un t o you, that every one wh o is e.n gry with h is bro th-
er sha ll b e i n dang er of the j udgment; and whosoeve r 
s hall say to h is brot her , Raca , s hall be in dan~er 
of the co~ncil; and whosoever sha ll_say1 Thou fool, s h all be 1n d anger of t h e hell of f1re. 
I' o the pers onality of man, an g er and :C.at e are as seri ou s as 
t h e crime of murder . Hate and contempt expressed toward s 
on e r s fellow man is a case for t he s upreme court. In t h is 
res pect Rauschenbusch r emar k s: 
'l ' o abuse a man w:Lth words of contempt denie s 
his wo rth , breaks dom1 his self-resp ect, and robs 
him o f t h e re.s ard of o bhers. It is a n attempt t o 
murder h is soul. The horror whi ch J e sus fee ls f or 
s u ch ac t ion is an express~on of bi s own respe ct f or 
t h e worth of personality . 
It is the sacredne ss of pe rsonalit y an d. the d i gnity of h u-
manity that warrants moralit y a nd o b l i g a ti ons t o v~ a.rd s others . 
Concerni ng the matter of attitud es in the e chi cal 
teachins s of J esus, Blansh ard concedes t h e r e is central and 
pe rmanent truth. He writes: nwe must c o ne ede that ••• ri e;ht 
1. Mat thew 5:21 - 22. 
2 . Ra u schenbausch, SP J, 4 . 
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conduct do es not mean g oing throu ; h a set of motions, that 
it involves the heart as well as outward beh avior. 111 
In t h e f ore going respects t he moral tea ch i n g s of 
J esus and personalisti c emotivi sm are in complete a g reement. 
For Jesus and for the personalistic emo tivist, mora l laws 
have an instrtrmental moral value. It is obedien ce to moral 
law that is the essence of moral i ty. The value of moral 
law l ies in dire ctin 3 the way for the individual . They 
p oin t out t h e direction or the road to moral valu e . They 
bring one to the doorstep of morality . They are uide posts 
to the realm where moral value lies. However, thi s is no t 
a real difference since the f ormer holds to it i mplicitly 
and t h e latter, explicitly. 
The personalistic emotivis t believes that there is 
not one 11 iotatt of intrinsic moral value in all the moral 
laws in t he universe. Only persons possess i n trin sic moral 
value. ~hould one t h erefore disreg ard mora l laws? No, mo-
ral value (intrinsic) wit hout moral law (instrumental) is 
blind and moral law without mo ral value is empty. Moral 
law has ins t rwnental moral value, wh ereas, the mora l person 
has intrinsic moral value. Morality 11must proceed from the 
i ·n .. si d e out, not from the ou t side in. 112 
l. Hockin~ et a l., Pr P, 154 . 
2 . Hock ing et al ., PTP , 155. 
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5. The Te leological Perfectionism of 
Borden P. Bowne 
The perfectionistic ethics of Bowne is almost i d ent i-
cal with the ett>...ics of per·sonalis t ic emoti vism. Bovm e at-
tempte d to unite or b rin:; to a synthesis the et hics of the 
intuitionists and the ethics of the utilit&rians. 1 I~i cCon -
nell traces this problem of uniting these two schools of 
et i:1ics by Bowne to t he early days of his career even to the 
late s ix--c ies when he was a student at New York Universit y . 
Mc Conne ll sa ys that Bowne at t ba t time wrote a paper f 'or a 
class in etl~cs on the reconcilia t ion of the intuition ists 
2 
with the ut i litar ians. With t h e intuitionists, i.e., par-
3 ti cularly with Kant, he h eld t o the de c t rine of the law of 
the g ood will . 11 If two persons meet anywhere in t he uni -
verse , they owe one anot h er good will. To have to arc;ue 
tr.Qs position with a person wo u l d be a b ad sign as to that 
pe rs on 's moral state. n 4 On the other hand , the goo d wi ll 
does not ai d very much in de termining what t o do in a con-
crete situation . Th is h ad to be discovered by a carefu l 
consi derat ion of consequences . Tn this matter of conse-
quences h e si d ed vvi th the utilitari ans. 
1. Bowne, POE, iv. 
2. McConnell, Art . (1947), 237. 
3 . Bowne, POE , 21. 
4 . McConnell, BPB , 164 . 
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Bovme was also inf luen ced by Sch leierrna cher as to 
what const ituted the three basic concepts in t h e field of 
e t .t_._ ics , viz., the g ood , duty , and. virtue. Moreover, 11 each 
of t hese is essential in a s ystem which is to express the 
comp lete moral consciousness of t he race." 1 ~he p roblem 
with whi ch he was faced, therefore, was to unite the g ood 
wit h duty and add to them virtue. Virtue, for Bowne, me a nt 
t h e practice of ~ood and duty . Concerning t h e two l eading 
t h ought s with which he is dealing in his t reatment of ethi cs 
h e writes, 
One is t h e ne cessit y of uniting the intui t ive and 
the experience school of etlucs in order to reach 
any workin; s yst em. The ot her is that t he aim of 
condu c t is not ab~tract virtue, b ut ful lness and 
richness of life. 
The s ood will can n o t d ispense with experience (consequences) 
and e thics c annot dispense with s oo d will as its center . 
'l'hese two find thei r f ulfilmen'G in the ideal of morality or 
the richness of li f e. 
Bowne is in accord with personalisti c emo t ivism in 
that h e h olds t h at t h ere cannot be a valid moral theory 
which considers conduct and consequen ces only and does not 
·take int o account the inner or the persona lity of man . "And 
when we abstre.c t conduct from the personality in which it 
1. Bowne , POE , 20. 
2. Bowne , PO E , iv. 
orig inates and. which it expre sses, we h ave a base, or sordid , 
ext ernalism wt1i ch is its own condemnat ion. 111 On the ot h er 
hand he deviates from t he personalistic emo~ive et h ic in 
t h at h e also consi ders t h e intrinsic eth ical value of con -
sequen ces . That is, the utilitarian doctrine of mak in~ mo-
r al j udgments on ly in t he li ght of objec t ive co nsequences 
is valid fo r Bowne. The personalis t ic emotivists co nsider 
consequen ces but a t th e same time t h e y claim that co nse -
quences external to personalit y are of n o intri nsic moral 
value. For Bowne both subjecti ve and ob je c t ive consequen ces 
have int r insi c mo ral value . One o f the main con clusions of 
Bowne 's ethical s t udie s is t ha t et hics is two-fold: "In -
ternally, we have a growing moral ideal ; externally , we h a.ve 
a g rowing insigh t into the te ndencies of c onduct. Neither 
of t n es e can be deduced from the other, and both are alike 
necessary . 112 
In Bowne 1 s ethical t h eor y the ob je c bi ve co ns equen ces 
are n o t as i mportant as t he s ubje cti v e or internal . .l;!;Xtern -
al consequen ces h ave n o t i ntrinsic moral value an d in thi s 
respect it is i dentical t o personalis ti c emot ivism. 
Bo'<vne 1 s i d eal of :morali ty contains two e l emen t s. It 
contains "a conception o f what man o u ght to be and one of 
1. Bowne , PO E, v. 
2 . Bowne , POE , 304 . 
,2B2 
what he ought to do .nl Bot h of the s e are equally i mporta'nt 
a nd necessary. In personalistic emo tivis~ t he i d eal o f mo-
rality is that of ''what man ough t to be . " r he if what he ou ');ht 
t o don is instrumental to 11 wh a t h e ought to b e. a The 1what 
a man ought t o b e " is of intr i ns i c moral value i n personal isti c 
emotivis;.n whereas t h e "wh at he ou c,~b.t to don i s of instru.mental 
mor~:;. l value at most. Howeve r, it ma y possess ot h er value as 
ae s thet; ic value. 
The essential differen ce between personalistic emo-
t ivism and Bowne's e thi cs is that Bo wn e unites i n tuitionism 
with utili tarianisrn, th&t is, he includes both obje c tive and 
s ubj ective consequences in his syster:I as having intrinsi c 
moral value. :Personalis ti c e motivist s, h owever , reinterpret; 
o b j ective conse quences and s h ow that the y are only instru-
ment 8l fa c t ors to sub je ctive consequences . The sub j ect or 
the p erson only h as int rinsic moral value. The oril y intrin-
si c mo ral value i s inner, t hat is , it is a matter o f att i-
tude, intent, feeling . External consequences have instru-
ment a l moral va l ue a t most. 




CO NCLUSI ONS 
This dissertation leads one to tne following conclu-
sions: 
l. The re is a wide ran,s e of discrepancy in t he et hi c-
al think ing of the lo 3 ical positivists. This discrepancy 
varies from an absolute s kepticism in more.l value theory to 
t h e b elief that there are g~nuine value judgments and an 
object i v i ty in values. 
2. Loe; ical positivistic thinking in ethics is in a 
lo s ical prog ress away from skepticism. 
j. Several proponents of the emotive theory of values 
have taken a do gma t ic stand and have offered very little de-
fense of their position. The ethical theories of the los ical 
positivists are, for the most part, presented as d eclarations 
of belief, a creed , as it were, rather than a philosophical 
examination and defenc~. 
4 . Lo ·?; ical posi-civistic emotivists d o no t conunit t hem-
sal vss t o t he ir ethical t heories; thus, contradi ctins them-
selves . 
5. Lo gical positivism is self-contradictory. It is 
g rounded on principles that cannot be verified by sense ex-
perience. 
6 . The i mp lications of t h e emotive theory of values 
28 5 
are self-refuting . 'I'he results of' committing oneself ~:;o such 
an eth ic would lead to disaster, both to the ind ividual and 
to society. 
7. The emotivist's criteria o f truth is inadequate. 
Lox_; ical positivism is inter·nally a t fault; it is condemned 
by its own criteria. 
8 . Personalisti c emotivism is the only coherent con-
elusion of t h e emotivistic theory of moral value. Person -
alistic emo t iv i sm maintains that value judgments are genuine 
and tha c objective moral values exist. Ethical value is a 
matter of attitude and oblig ation is a fact of moral experi-
ence. One is obliga ted to have a moral ( g ood) attitude . 
One is obli gated to i mprove his persona l ity so a s to acquire 
g ood attitudes. Only persons ha ve moral significance. Out -
side of person~. li ty t h ere is no moral value. Consequences 
have no moral value a1)art from persons . Moral g ood pertains 
only to persons . Reverence for the worth of' man is one's 
purpose for beinF; moral . :Dig nity and t h e intrinsic wort h of 
/' h uman personality is the raison d'etre of morality. 
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ABSTRAOJ1 OF TEE DISSERT Nr ION 
'rHE PROBLEM 
The prob l em o f this disserta t ion is t o examine the 
bas i s o r 3: r ound o f t he emotive t h eory of e t h ics of con t em-
pora r y log ica l p o s i t i vist s. I t inquires into t he p r ob l em of 
t he validit y o f va lue jud gments end t h e exist ence of ob li-
g a tion i n mor &l e xperi ence. 
The emotive t h eory of e thics ha s been called by va-
r iou s names as: anal ytic value t h eory , eth ical s k epti cism, 
va l ue-nominalism, dis a~reement i n attitude t h esis, t h e n on-
c og n i tive t heory o f e thi cs, va lue exp r e ss i cn as e j aculat o r y , 
inte r j ecti onal an a lys i s, log ical pos it ivism ethi c s , and t h e 
e t h ics of the 11 Vienn a Circle. 11 
'I'YPES Of!' Err E I CA L EMO'I' IVISM 
Emoti v i s tic t hink in.:; i n e thics ma y be brok en d own i n -
t o the f ollowi n3 types: 
1. Ra dica l emoti vi sm. Ra d ic al emoti v i s t s a r e s k e p -
t ics i n ethics. These emo t ivi sts seek to main t a i n t h a t 
e thics h as n o co 3ni t i ve me aning . Th ere are nei t h e r va l u e 
j ud o:men t s nor ob l i gati ons. 'I'h e mos t t hat one can sa y a b out 
wha t pe rson s h a ve been c a llin :; e thi cs is that it is an evin c-
i ng or a n e jacu l at i on. It i s no t even a stat eme n t about 
on e's emoti on s. Among thi s schoo l of thought ma y b e c ilassi-
fied Carnap , Ayer , Russe l l and the like . 
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2. Psych olog i cal emotivism. These emotivists seek 
to make the claim t hat eth ics is a matter of p s ycholo ~ ica l 
science . One 's moti ve s o r attitud e s cons t i tut es ethica l 
behavi or. s ycnolo :s i c a l emo -c i vi sts are of two k inds: 
(a) naturalist s or hedonists , an d (b) subjectivists or r e la -
tivists . ;:;, ch lick is a representative of 'Ghe f orme r , where -
as Fe i s l is an a dheren t of t h e latter. 
3 . ~·tioderat e emotivism . lvloderate emot ivist s ma int ain 
t hat ethics does hav0 co gn it ive meanins . Debat e and dis -
cus sion on ethi cal issues is a matter of attitude . Ho wever , 
obje cti ve values are denied . ~tevenson is on e of the repre -
sentat i ves of thi s s chool of t hought . 
4 . Liberal emotivism . Liberal ernotivists insist that 
moral values h ave co2nitive meaning and that obj ecti ve val -
u e s exist . :i·:ioral values are emotive in nature . 'l'he ex isten ce 
of t;he f act of o b lL:; ation is no t tak en i nt o co ns iderati on 
in this sch ool of ethi c a l t hinking . Britton i s classified 
as t h e out standi ng proponen t of this school . 
5. Personalisti c emoti vi sm . Personalis tic emot i vi sm 
is t he p os ition maintained i n thi s d issert ation . It ho l d s 
t h a t moral va l ues are pers onal in nature . l!.thics has cog -
ni ti ve mea."1ing , i. e ., value jud;.;:;ments are .?; enui ne propo si-
tions . .c.th ical values are a matter of attitude, e · S ., kind-
ness , g ood - will , l ove , etc . Reveren ce f or person ality is 
the g round of ethics. 
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There is in emotivistic thinking a logical pros ression 
from t h e skepticism of the radical emotivis ts to personalistic 
emotivism. Thi s prog ression is a coherent one wh ich takes 
more and more of t h e facts of moral experience into : account 
and finds an adequate place for them. Althou8h each succeed-
in:; school of emotivism is found to be more inclusive and 
coherent than t h e preceding , only personal emotivism is found 
to be the most coherent wit h all t h e facts of experience. 
THE CASE AGAINST EMOTIVISM 
Only personal emotivism escapes the serious critical 
arguments which are directed a g ainst the other schools of 
emotivism. The defects of emotivism, except personalistic 
emotivism, fall chiefly under the following heads: 
1. Prac t ical conse quences and the implications of emo-
tivism. Emotivism is self-refuting . The proponents of emo-
tivism do not carry out into practice t h eir ethical t h eory 
for it would lead to disaster both personally and socially. 
Emotivism is i mpracticable. 
2. Logical positivi sts as the self-appointed guardians 
of science. Log ical pos i tivists have tak en upon themselves 
the ques t ionable task of protecting science and attacking 
oth er philosoph ies on behalf of science; yet they are unscientific. 
3. Value iudgments. The emotivists fail to tak e into 
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consi d e r ation some of the facts of moral experi ence wh ich 
validate the f act of the g enuinen ess of value judgments, such 
as t h e poss ibilit y of predicting value experiences, obli3ation 
as erlebt, t h e non-factual nat ure of t he valuab l e no t i mp ly-
ing meaning lessness, and t h e abilit y of t h e va luable t o d irect 
and redirect hQman action. 
4. Emotivism--a philosophy of declaration and denial. 
Lo gical positivis t s present their philosophy without sufficient 
g rounds. They present it as a belief with out proof. The facts 
of moral experience wh ich are not coherent with the positivistic 
e thic are denied as valid data. 
5. The p roblem of oblig ation. Even by wa y of the syn-
tactical analysis of the log ical posi t ivists, oblig a t ion is 
s h own to be a g enuine fact of moral experience. 
6. The emotivist's criterion of truth . Th eir criterion 
of truth is not on ly inadequate but self -refutin? . The prin-
ciples of log ica l pos i tivism are inconsistent wi th t he posi-
tivist's criterion of truth , for t h e principles of posi t ivi sm 
cannot be substantiated by sense experience. 
7. Internal cri t icisms. By its own crite r ia, emotiv-
isti c ethics f~lls short. The emotivism of t h e log ical po-
sitivists is in t h e realm of intros pective experience and is 
no t open to public observa tion or rules whi ch t h ey require. 
Personalis t ic emotivism is the most coherent form of 
e t h i cal emotivism fo r i t does no t omit frem considerat ion 
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any of the facts of moral experience. ?ersonalistic emo-
tiv i s m teach es that mora l va l u e is g enui ne and personal. 
Outside of persons there is·no moral value. Moral value is 
in and for persons. Moral value is one of attitude. Con-
sequences h ave instrumental value. Attitudes of moral value 
are k indnes s, love, good-will, etc. Ob lig a t ion is genuine 
in tha t one is oblig a t ed to cultivat e good or moral attitudes. 
Value j ud ynents are also g enuine. 
CONCLUS I ONS 
This dissertation leads one to the followin g conclu-
sions: 
l. Th ere is a wide rang e of discrepancy i n the et h ical 
t h inking of the logical positivists. This discrepancy varies 
from an absolute s k e pticism in moral value theory t o the be-
lief tha t there are g enuine value judgmen t s and an o b j ectiv-
it y i n values. LDg ical positivistic thinking in e thics is 
in a log ical prog r ess awa y from skepticism. 
2. The outs t anding p r oponents of the emotive theory 
of values hav e offe red no or too few g rounds for their posi-
tion. The ethi cal t heories of the log ical positivists a r e, 
for the mos t part, pre s en t ed as declara t ions of belief, a 
creed , as it were , rather than a philosophical examination 
and defence. 
3. Log ical pos itivistic emotivists do not commit 
t h emselves to their ethical theories, thus contradict ing 
t hemselves. 
6 
4. Los ical posit i vism is self-contradi ctory . It is 
founded on principles t h at cann ot be veri f i ed by sense ex-
p erience. 
5 . The implications of the emotive theory of values 
are se lf-refutin(S . The resul t s of committing oneself to such 
an e thic would lead to disaster, both to the individua l and 
to society. 
6. The emotivists' c riterion of truth is inadequate. 
Lo g ical positivism is internally at fault; it is condemned 
b y its own criteria. Eraoti vism is not open to pub lic ob-
servat ion. 
7. Personalisti c emot ivism is the only coherent con-
clu sion of the emo ti vis ti c theory of moral value . Person-
alis t ic emoti vism maintain s that va lue j ud 3ments are 3enu ine 
and that obj e c t ive moral va lues exist. Ethical va l u e is a 
matter of attitude ; and oblig a tion is a fa ct of moral ex-
pe r ience. One is oblig ated to ha ve a moral ( g oo d ) attitude. 
One is oblig ated to i mprove his personality so as to acqui re 
g ood attitudes. Only pers ons have moral s i gn i ficance. Out-
s ide -o f persona lit y t h ere is no moral value. Conse quences 
have no moral va lue apart from pers on s. Moral ~ood pertains 
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only to per sons. Reverence for the worth of man is one's 
purpose for being moral. Di gnity and the intrinsic worth 
I' 
o1' human personalityare t;he raison d'etre of mor·ality. 
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